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A conversation about a World Anthropologies Network
WAN Collective

Una conversación acerca de la World Anthropologies Network (WAN) / Red de Antropologías del Mundo
WAN Collective, traducción de Andrés Barragán

The production of other knowledges and its tensions:
From andeanist anthropology to interculturalidad?
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Introduction / Introducción
Ever since we started thinking about the World Anthropologies network (WAN), we imagine and felt the need for an electronic journal. Along with the webpage, we felt the journal was an obligatory intervention within the crucial domain of the Internet. It is our belief that as much in content as in form the journal should embody the network idea that triggered our conviction about the need to challenge the conditions of conversability among World anthropologies in all of their plurality and irreducibility, without overlooking the power relations within and among the various locations.

Many events and exchanges have already taken place amongst us and with others in various parts of the world; these include from graduate seminars in the US, Brazil, and Colombia to various face to face meetings in Italy, Brazil, the US, Argentina and Colombia. Along the way, we have held numberless informal and formal conversations about the ideas making up the project. One of the main result has been a number of texts, either collectively or individually produced.

In this first issue, we feature a representative sample of the texts we have produced in recent years around the WAN idea. The collectively authored, “A Conversation about a World Anthropologies Network,” published in Social Anthropology in 2003, is of particular relevance to the extent that it includes both a sort of manifesto and an outline of the group’s agenda. Although we still adhere to most of the pronouncements made in this text, it does not represent many of the debates that followed; some of these are the subject of the other articles included in this issue; these articles also make visible some of the tendencies, tensions, and contrasting emphases that characterize our exploration of the WAN idea. Rather than unifying or homogenizing the views and proposals about the Project, we propose that the various trajectories that can be intuited at present should be fostered in the spirit of applying to the Project the pluralizing vector we wish for anthropology as a whole.
En este primer número, estamos publicando una muestra significativa de los materiales escritos que hemos producido en los últimos años alrededor de la Red. De particular relevancia es el artículo “A Conversation about a World Anthropologies Network”. Escrito colectivamente, constituye el primer pronunciamiento público de la Red, una especie de manifiesto de lo que nos convoca y un esbozo de nuestra agenda (Publicado en el 2003 en la Revista de la European Association of Social Anthropologists, Social Anthropology 11(2): 265–269). Aunque aún nos identificamos con el grueso de lo que ahí planteamos, múltiples son los desarrollos y debates que hemos adelantado desde entonces. Los artículos que siguen a continuación, escritos por diferentes miembros de la RAM, evidencian las diferentes líneas de exploración y multiacentualidad que han adquirido las conceptualizaciones en torno a la Red. Empiezan a hacerse visibles algunas tendencias y tensiones que, a todas luces, consideramos resultado de la vitalidad de la propuesta. Antes que intentar normalizar y homogenizar las conceptualizaciones y articulaciones con respecto a la Red, consideramos que estas diferentes trayectorias que desde ahora empiezan a sugerirse deben ser alimentadas y visualizadas en aras de que la premisa de la pluralización de lo antropológico incluye también la práctica misma del entramado de la Red.

We have decided to include a “dossier” section to feature texts that while not written directly about the network have nevertheless being important for our process of defining it. The dissemination of these texts, be relieve, is important for understanding the Project. In this first issue, the dossier is devoted to the “anthropologies of the south,” taking as a point of departure a framework proposed in 1997 by the Mexican colleague Estaban Krotz. Besides his article (included in both Spanish and English) we have included a commentary by Colombian anthropologist Carlos Alberto Uribe published along with the original English version. The parallels and differences between the notion of anthropologies of the south and “world anthropologies” are explored in some of the articles in the first section of the journal.

Finalmente, hemos decidido incluir una sección denominada ‘dossier’ donde recogeremos temáticamente textos de autores que, aunque no se encuentran participando directamente del RAM, han constituido valiosos insumos intelectuales en nuestro proceso de definición de la Red. Son materiales de trabajo que nos ha parecido crucial circular y dar a conocer pensando en que los colegas que se acerquen a la propuesta de la Red cuenten también con documentos que nos han servido para elaborar la propuesta. En este primer número hemos dedicado el dossier a las antropologías del sur. Este encuadre crítico de lo que constituye la especificidad de las ‘antropologías del sur’ ha sido elaborado por el antropólogo mexicano Estaban Krotz. Además de su artículo en inglés y castellano, hemos incluido el comentario sobre la versión inglesa publicado conjuntamente con ésta publicado por el antropólogo colombiano Carlos Alberto Uribe. Los paralelos y diferencias entre el encuadre que piensa desde la noción de ‘antropologías del sur’ y el que lo hace desde la de ‘antropologías del mundo’ es expuesto en varios de los artículos de la primera sección de esta revista.
The World Anthropologies Network (WAN) collective is in the process of creating a self-organizing world anthropologies network that will constitute a dialogic space for discussing anthropology in relation to a multiplicity of world-making processes and events. The network should contribute to a plural landscape of world anthropologies less shaped by metropolitan hegemonies and opened to the heteroglossic potential of unfolding globalization processes. Eventually, the network should move towards planetary modes of inquiry while enabling plural, place-centred political/theoretical visions and concerns, without imposing uniform agendas or styles. Necessarily multilingual, and organized and effected virtually as well as through concrete (and hopefully intentionally unorthodox) events, the network will also aim at producing alternative research and funding practices, emphasizing collective research agendas and authorship, while remaining sensitive to place-based particularities. In sum, the network can be described as contributing to the project of other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.

Some questions that inspire our projects are: how do we rethink - and re-make anthropologies at a planetary level in an open-ended way, despite their historical origin in European modernity and modernity’s connections with colonialism, capitalism and globalisation? How might a ‘world anthropologies’ be characterized in contrast to the current panorama of ‘national anthropological traditions’ in which some ‘traditions’ have more paradigmatic weight- and hence more power and implied authority - than others?

In approaching these questions we consider that differences in the historical, cultural and economic conditions of knowledge-production matter in the shaping of anthropological theories and practices (and, indeed, of anthropologists). Thus an immediate goal for world anthropologies is to make visible the mechanisms by which ‘central’ anthropologies - around the world, and in the world centres - subordinate ‘peripheral’ ones (also around the world and in the world centres)2. Yet as important, and perhaps less obvious, WAN should eventually work to make visible those different knowledges that central anthropologies (just as normalising ‘expert knowledges’ anywhere) ignore, disqualify or subordinate. Last but not least, WAN works against or at the very least in tension with - the normalizing tendencies of anthropologies, whether central or peripheral.

Inspired by and in conjunction with, non-academic intellectuals, on addressing these questions we draw on the potential of our discipline’s capacity for critical inquiry, couple action and thought, reason and passion, in the hope of affecting the structure of feelings of dominant anthropological institutions - or at least unsettling unquestioned assumptions.
This proposal stems from:

(a) The analytical recognition that, rather than leading to the dismantling of canonical anthropology, most critiques of the discipline have resulted -unwittingly - in the reinvigoration of central anthropological practices worldwide. While these criticisms have questioned central epistemological/political practices, they have not impinged on the institutionalization of the discipline itself. As a result the anthropology produced in dominant centers has rarely paid enough attention to theoretical arguments produced in other parts of the world. In that sense, it might be regarded as maintaining a ‘rhetorical space’ without making actual room for other ideas, theories, activities. Moreover, dialogues between ‘central’ academics and ‘peripheral’ intellectuals have often contributed to the subalternization of the latter. The example of testimonio is eloquent in this respect. Profusely incorporated into central academic theorization, testimonio is still not taken as a form of knowledge in its own right, obviously not on a par with novel theories about it. Thus, and despite significant criticism, there is a continuing sense that anthropology in the dominant centres is still produced by ‘us’ about ‘them’ -while simultaneously producing an impression of being global. A dynamic exists that assimilates the margins into the normative frameworks of the ‘centres’, and tends to exclude- and occlude- ‘peripheral’ practices, research agendas and theoretical-political concerns.

(b) A consequence of this situation is that dominant modes of anthropological knowledge and their institutions (most notably academic patterns in the United States) currently exert a standardizing influence on other anthropologies, their institutions, discourses and disciplinary practices. Indicative of this trend is the participation of a larger number of foreign anthropologists at the annual AAA meetings, submission to American journals and, above all, the growing centripetal force of the American anthropological discursive universe on subalternised anthropologies. As with any political situation, this is a complex relationship, for as subalternised anthropologies are increasingly pulled towards the discursive orbit of dominant approaches, they also increase their tendency to resist epistemologically and practically the assimilationist tendencies that would render them invisible.

(c) The recognition that a critique that would pit a geographically located ‘periphery’ against an - also geographically located – ‘center’ could potentially mean a symmetrical reversal of the epistemological privilege created through the modern/colonial difference. Indeed, while the organizational and epistemological constraints faced by metropolitan anthropologies means that they represent an allegiance to a western episteme, this allegiance is not essentially localized. Thus, we are not targeting specific geographic centres. Rather, our critique aims at making visible the institutionalization of knowledge production (wherever they may be) that hamper critical liberating debates in academic locales. We want to break the silent hegemony inscribed by modern regimes of knowledge production and open up alternative venues for different kinds of knowledge and their conditions of possibility in their own right.

(d) WAN assumes that the boundary between academic and non-academic spheres does not result from ontological exteriorities/interiorities, but is an effect of the disciplining of ‘knowledge’ itself. Academia is only one among many sites of knowledge production and being an academic is one among many possible modes of being an intellectual. This feature is central to our argument and should constitute a crucial property of the World Anthropologies Network.
En-redarse. The World Anthropologies Network as process, method, and content

As academic intellectuals with a desire and a vocation for multiple forms of knowledge, we wish to engender a process aimed at affecting - or at least making visible - the hegemonic tendencies that tend to organize the practice within central and peripheral academic anthropologies as well as the relationship between them. The World Anthropologies Network aims at processually (and thus constantly) unsettling the simple and unquestioned hierarchy-laden social organization and reproduction of dominant anthropologies. This dynamic should bring other forms of anthropological knowledge and their institutions to the fore, without however positioning them as privileged alternatives. Eventually we purport a process through which knowledge results from interaction between academic and non-academic intellectuals.

We propose to facilitate the creation of a flexible structure, a network, to foster dialogues and exchanges (on the above set of observations, and others) among a number of anthropologies broadly understood. Our long-term aim is to develop a self-organizing world network for anthropological research and action that at the same time aims at continuously questioning seemingly dominant (academic and non-academic) forms of knowledge - as well as trends to become such.

We envision the world anthropologies network as a consciously de-centered, self organizing process with emergent properties of its own. Obviously, we cannot anticipate these as they will depend on the dynamics set in motion. Our goal is to produce a structure-generating processual network, which should result in an articulation of heterogeneous anthropologies in terms of some shared interests, complementarities, and -why not- conflicts. The network should set in motion historically situated, political-theoretical conversations and actions about culture-nature, global-local concerns, and the political economy of resources broadly understood.

The first nodes of the WAN will function as catalysts for both, triggering strategies of localization (building greater internal strength and consistency at each site), as well as interweaving dynamically and productively the diversified interests and collective dialogues that connect the sites. This process should articulate the network, while being articulated by it. In turn, it should also effect some de-stratifying function in relation to established power-knowledge networks, while avoiding becoming a hierarchy of any sort.

The form itself adopted by the network is of crucial importance. We want to emphasize that rather than a method, a set of contents, or an objective, we consider the network - la red -itself to be a fusion of these three aspects. La red should be a venue for the constant interlocking of place-based nodal points, be these theoretical, political, communicational - or institutional - in such a way that their stability, while existing, is constantly exposed to other possible forms and therefore never taken as unique or pre-eminent. We think of this processual method-objective as en-redarse, (from the Spanish, to 'self-entangle' repeatedly) - a permanent act of connecting and thus articulating the network that constantly re-generates it and nourishes the forms of knowledge and politics interlocked and/or produced through it.
Our purpose for *enredarnos* is manifold. First, and rather obviously, we wish to avoid replicating the static organisational styles available at present. (These structures have a part to play indeed, yet our objective is qualitatively different.) Second, we want to provide a pliable reflexive structure with the capacity for being constantly reformulated, for constantly considering centrifugal demands and incorporating them into its many nodes of articulation. Hence, we shall not deal with the normative question (‘how anthropology, or a transnational anthropology, ought to be’) even if the exercise will be informed by theoretical, ethical and political concerns.

The network’s overall agenda should include broad sets of research questions in socio-cultural anthropologies, but it is expected that at some point it will tackle biological, historical, and linguistic concerns and developments - again, constructing more historically informed links among these subfields that still inform much anthropological practice worldwide and, indeed, problematising these divisions and imagining other connections. Theories, politics and representations of biology/nature, of the past and of language should be as important to the world anthropologies we envision as research on the cultural politics of globalisation, identities and social movements. These agendas will be transformed and redefined as other heterogeneous sites are articulated into the network, thus bringing other dynamics into it; as other contexts, elements and environments are brought into play; and as discussions of politics of the boundary move research and intellectual lines into other configurations. Issues of training of students, practising anthropologists, public anthropologies, militant anthropologies, dissident anthropologies, ethics, activism and the like, will in all likelihood be broached at some point as part of the theoretical-political agenda of the network. Finally, we expect that this process will question at some point even the idea of an "anthropology" network and open up the structure to other inquiring systems about culture and cultural politics, whether in academic settings or outside them.

Notes

1. The WAN collective consists of Eduardo Archetti (University of Oslo), Eeva Berglund (independent researcher), Marisol de la Cadena (UC-Davis), Arturo Escobar (UNC-Chapel Hill), Penelope Harvey (Manchester University), Susana Narotzky (Universitat de Barcelona), Eduardo Restrepo (ICANH-Colombia; UNC-Chapel Hill), Gustavo Lins Ribeiro (Universidad de Brasilia), Sandy Toussaint, (University of Western Australia) and the participants in the WAN Seminars (Pall 2002) at UNC-Chapel Hill and the University of Brasilia.

2. The distinction between 'centre' and 'periphery' is complex, and it is not intended to be a seamlessly geographic one. Similarly we do not purport any kind of simple identity between 'peripheral' and 'subalternisedp' or 'central' and 'dominant'. We are concerned with the dynamic by which hegemony is established among anthropologies worldwide, thus producing the tendency for a singular anthropology, the dynamic for domination and subalternisation, and creating centres in peripheries, and peripheries in centres.

4. Testimonio is a Latin American genre that became popular from the 1970s and has been used in efforts to denounce violations of human rights usually committed by military regimes or paramilitary forces. It implied the collaboration of an academic intellectual (usually European or North American) and a grassroots organizer. The most popular in the genre is the one produced by Rigoberta Menchu and Elizabeth Burgos Debray.

5. There have been, of course, expressions of concern with this simulation in anthropology and other disciplines. The Gulbenkian report on the status of the social sciences, headed by Immanuel Wallerstein (Gulbenkian Commission 1996), already pointed at the need to revamp the knowledge production structures and practices of the social sciences in order to take account of the novel social orders on the rise. This report has been widely disseminated in some parts of the world, including Latin America, although much less so in the United States. At the meetings of the American Anthropological Association, sessions on the current status of anthropology occasionally hint at a similar predicament (see Nash 2002).

6. We do not intend to overlook the many differences within the United States or to suggest that such usage implies a normative construct. Indeed, one of our concerns is to explore concepts of `difference' within anthropology and among anthropologists, and in the constructions of `western' nation states.

7. This may be a difference between the project that WAN wants to be and previous criticisms from among Third World anthropologists. See, for example, discussions about `indigenous anthropology' (Pahim and Helmer 1982), `anthropologies of the South' (Krotz 1997) and `peripheral anthropologies' (Cardoso de Oliveira 2000).

8. We borrow from an assortment of network theories, including actor network theory and theories of complexity and self-organization. While the proposal could have been written without reference to these theories, we want to acknowledge their utility in breaking away from ontologizing modes of thinking that reify categories and freeze up the ways of imagining the world.

9. We do not wish to construct a `transnational' umbrella organization, nor a network of national organizations. Something like this already exists with the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, which functions relatively well for Europe and Latin America.

References cited


El colectivo WAN se encuentra en el proceso de configurar una red autónoma de las antropologías del mundo cuyo objetivo principal es posicionarse y consolidarse como un espacio de discusión dialógica sobre la Antropología –con mayúscula– con relación a una variedad de procesos y eventos globales. En este contexto la Red deberá contribuir a la conformación de un panorama plural, en el cual las antropologías del mundo respondan menos a hegemonías metropolitanas y estén más abiertas al potencial heteroglósico que trae consigo el despliegue de los procesos de la globalización. La Red eventualmente tendrá que desplazarse hacia modos de inquirir globales --sin que esto signifique la imposición de agendas o estilos uniformes-- a medida que activa visiones e intereses políticos y teóricos puntualizados geográficamente. Pensada en un contexto multilingüe y organizada y realizada de forma virtual así como también con eventos concretos (no ortodoxos), la Red está interesada en producir formas alternativas de investigación y prácticas de financiamiento en las que se enfaticen agendas de investigación y autorías colectivas.

En términos generales, la Red puede ser descrita como una contribución al proyecto de “otras antropologías y de antropología de otro modo”.

Algunas preguntas que inspiran nuestro trabajo son: ¿cómo podemos repensar –y rehacer– las antropologías de manera abierta y en un contexto global, a pesar de su origen en la modernidad europea, y más allá de sus conexiones con el colonialismo, el capitalismo y la globalización? ¿Cómo pueden caracterizarse unas “antropologías del mundo” en contraste con un panorama actual desbordado por “tradiciones antropológicas nacionales” en las que algunas de éstas tienen más peso paradigmático –y de ahí más poder y autoridad implícita– que otras?

Al explorar estos cuestionamientos, como colectivo consideramos que las diferencias en las condiciones históricas, culturales y económicas de la producción de conocimiento importan en la formación de prácticas y teorías antropológicas (y, por supuesto, de antropólogos/as). Así, una meta inmediata para la Red de las antropologías del mundo es hacer visibles los mecanismos por los cuales las antropologías reconocidas como “centrales” –alrededor del mundo, y en el centro del mundo– subordinan aquellas “periféricas” (también alrededor del mundo, y en centro del mundo). Otro objetivo con igual importancia, y tal vez menos obvio, es que la Red trabajará para hacer visibles aquellos conocimientos diferentes que las antropologías centrales ignoran, descalifican o subordinan (una acción normalizante dado su carácter de “conocimientos expertos”). Por último, la Red trabaja en contra –o al menos en confrontación– de las tendencias hacia la normalización de las antropologías, bien sea que éstas sean identificadas como centrales o periféricas.
Inspirados por intelectuales no académicos, al establecer estas preguntas y metas queremos señalar el potencial de nuestra disciplina para la crítica, la acción y el pensamiento conjunto, la razón y la pasión; lo anterior con la esperanza de afectar la actual estructura de las instituciones antropológicas, o al menos, para perturbar sus poco cuestionados procesos y suposiciones.

**Propósito general**

Esta propuesta está fundamentada desde:

a) El reconocimiento analítico de que, antes que liderar el desmantelamiento de las antropologías canónicas, gran parte de las críticas a la disciplina han resultado –sin proponérselo– en el fortalecimiento de las prácticas caracterísicas de las antropologías centrales. Mientras que estas críticas han cuestionado tanto prácticas epistemológicas como políticas, la confrontación con la institucionalización de la disciplina ha sido relegada. Como resultado, es claro que la antropología producida en centros dominantes rara vez ha prestado la debida atención a argumentos y críticas emanados en otras geografías en el mundo. Incluso puede considerarse que han perpetuado un “espacio retórico”, que no posibilita otras ideas, teorías y actividades. Además, los diálogos entre académicos “centrales” e intelectuales “periféricos” a menudo han contribuido a la subalternización de estos últimos. A este respecto el ejemplo de la figura de “testimonio” es muy elocuente. Profusamente incorporado dentro de la teorización de la academia central, el “testimonio” aún no es tomado como una forma de conocimiento en su propio derecho; y obviamente tampoco como equiparable a las nuevas teorías que tratan sobre éste. Así, y a pesar de una significativa crítica, existe una idea extendida de que la antropología en los centros dominantes es todavía producida por un “nosotros” sobre un “ellos” (sin importar que al mismo tiempo reproduzcan una imagen de globalidad donde estas categorías no tendrían sentido). Existe una dinámica que asimila las márgenes dentro de las perspectivas de los “centros” y tiende a excluir –y obstruir– prácticas periféricas, agendas de investigación e intereses teórico políticos.

b) La identificación que una de las consecuencias de esta situación resulta en que los modos dominantes de conocimiento antropológico y de sus instituciones (especialmente las pautas académicas norteamericanas) actualmente tienden a ejercer una influencia estandarizante sobre otras antropologías, sus instituciones, sus discursos y por ende en sus propias prácticas disciplinarias. Un síntoma de esta tendencia es la cada vez mayor participación de antropólogos extranjeros en las reuniones anuales de la American Anthropological Association (AAA), la presentación de sus artículos para evaluación a los comités de revistas publicadas en Estados Unidos, y por encima de todo, la creciente fuerza centrípeta del universo discursivo antropológico norteamericano sobre las antropologías subalternizadas. Al igual que con cualquier contexto político, esta es una compleja relación. Con mayor frecuencia las antropologías subalternizadas están siendo empujadas hacia la órbita discursiva de las aproximaciones dominantes; a tal punto, que éstas incrementan su tendencia a resistir, tanto en términos epistemológicos y prácticos, las tendencias asimilacionistas que las conviertan en invisibles.
c) El reconocimiento de la necesidad de una crítica que mine la simple definición geográfica de la “periferia” y del “centro”, especialmente cuando esta definición se reviste de una reversión esencialista de los términos en aras de esgrimir un nativismo como supuesto privilegio epistémico. Aunque las limitaciones organizacionales y epistemológicas enfrentadas por las antropologías metropolitanas se deben a que éstas son representantes de una episteme Occidental, esta episteme no se circunscribe a unas fronteras geográficas definidas. La Red no está señalando ningún centro en particular. Más bien, el objetivo crítico de la Red es visibilizar la institucionalización de la producción de conocimiento (en el lugar en que se dé) que obstaculiza debates libres y críticos entre los académicos locales.\textsuperscript{9} Queremos romper la silenciosa hegemonía inscrita por los regímenes modernos de producción del conocimiento, y abrir espacios alternativos de actuación para diferentes clases de conocimiento y de sus condiciones de posibilidad en su propio derecho.

d) La Red asume que los límites entre esferas académicas y no académicas no resulta de exterioridades/interioridades ontológicas, sino que son más bien el efecto de la disciplinalización del conocimiento en sí mismo. La academia es uno entre los múltiples espacios de producción de conocimiento, y ser un académico es uno entre los variados modos de ser un intelectual. Esta caracterización es central en nuestro argumento y debe constituir una de las características cruciales de la Red de antropologías del mundo.

\textbf{Enredarse: la Red como proceso, método y contenido}

Como académicos intelectuales con deseos y una vocación por múltiples formas de conocimiento, queremos dar comienzo a un proceso que afecte (o al menos haga visibles) las tendencias hegemónicas que organizan la práctica dentro de las antropologías académicas, tanto las centrales como las periféricas, así como también las relaciones entre ellas. La Red de antropologías del mundo busca una perturbación/ sacudimiento procesual (y de esta manera constante) de la simple y no cuestionada organización social y reproducción jerárquica de las antropologías dominantes. Esta dinámica deberá traer otras formas de conocimiento antropológico —y de sus instituciones—, sin que esto resulte en un posicionamiento de éstas como alternativas privilegiadas. Como colectivo estamos propiciando un proceso por el cual el conocimiento resulte de la interacción entre intelectuales académicos y no-académicos.

Proponemos facilitar la creación de una estructura flexible, una red\textsuperscript{10}, que fomente diálogos e intercambios (en los aspectos ya mencionados y otros) entre un número de antropologías comprendidas en su sentido más amplio. Nuestro objetivo de larga duración es desarrollar una Red autónoma y global de investigación y acción antropológica, que al mismo tiempo tenga como objetivo un cuestionamiento continuo de las formas de conocimiento dominantes (académicas y no académicas), así como de aquellas tendencias que se lleguen a convertir en tales.

Imaginamos la Red de antropologías del mundo como conscientemente descentrada, como un proceso autónomo y con particularidades propias y emergentes. Obviamente, nosotros no podemos anticipar lo anterior, en tanto que esto depende directamente de las dinámicas puestas en acción. Nuestra meta general es producir una red, procesual y generadora de estructuras cambiantes, que debe resultar en la articulación de heterogéneas antropologías en términos de intereses compartidos, complementos, y por qué no, de conflictos. La Red deberá poner en movimiento conversaciones teóricas y acciones...
políticas –históricamente contextualizadas– sobre aspectos de la relación entre naturaleza / cultura, lo global / local y, en la perspectiva más amplia posible, sobre la economía política de los recursos.

Los primeros nodos de la Red funcionaran como catalizadores tanto para provocar estrategias de localización (fortaleciendo y dando consistencia interna en cada lugar), como para entretejer de manera dinámica y productiva los diversos intereses y los diálogos colectivos que conectan los sitios. En una doble vía, este proceso deberá articular la Red, al tiempo que es articulado por ésta. A su vez, ésta deberá desempeñar algún tipo de función para des-estratificar redes establecidas de poder-conocimiento y así mismo evitar convertirse en una jerarquía de cualquier clase.

La forma la Red en cuanto tal es de crucial importancia. Como colectivo queremos enfatizar que más que un método, un conjunto de contenidos o un objetivo, consideramos la Red en sí misma como una fusión de estos tres aspectos. La Red deberá ser, como ya mencionamos, el lugar de actuación para la constante conexión de puntos neurálgicos –bien sean estos teóricos, políticos, de comunicación o institucionales– de tal modo que su estabilidad, mientras exista, sea expuesta constantemente a otras posibles formas de conocimiento y por ende nunca tomadas como únicas o preeminentes. El carácter procesual de este método-contenido-objetivo puede expresarse metafóricamente con la figura: enredarse, es decir como un acto permanente de conexión por el cual articula la red que lo regenera y que alimenta las formas de conocimiento y las políticas encadenadas y/o producidas a través de ésta.

El propósito al sugerir enredarnos es múltiple. Primero, y obviamente, nosotros deseamos evitar replicar los estilos de organización estáticos disponibles en el presente; y aunque estas estructuras, por supuesto, tienen un papel que desempeñar, nuestro objetivo es cualitativamente diferente. Segundo, queremos proveer una estructura flexible y reflexiva, con la característica de poder ser constantemente reformulada y abierta a la consideración e incorporación de demandas centrífugas dentro de sus variados nodos de articulación. De ahí que como colectivo no estemos interesados en tratar con la pregunta normativa: ¿Cómo debe ser la antropología?--; incluso, si el ejercicio de reflexión es emanado por intereses teóricos, éticos y/o políticos.

El orden del día en la agenda de la Red deberá incluir un amplio conjunto de preguntas de investigación en las antropologías socioculturales; sin embargo, se espera que en un punto determinado también maneje por igual aspectos y desarrollos en el campo de la antropología biológica, histórica y lingüística. Lo anterior, nuevamente, en espera de hacer conexiones con una base histórica fuerte entre estos “subtemas” o especialidades –los cuales todavía conforman gran parte de la práctica antropológica en un contexto mundial–, para verdaderamente entrar a problematizar estas divisiones y al mismo tiempo comenzar a imaginar otro tipo de conexiones. Las representaciones, las políticas y las teorías de campos como la biología / naturaleza, incluso en su dimensión pasada, y otros como el lenguaje, deberán ser tan importantes para la Red que nosotros proyectamos, como la investigación sobre las políticas culturales sobre la globalización, las identidades y los movimientos sociales. Estas agendas serán transformadas y redefinidas a medida que otros lugares heterogéneos sean articulados a la Red y que las discusiones de las políticas de los límites entre las líneas de
Una conversación acerca de la World Anthropologies Network 11

La investigación e intelectualidad las lleven a otras configuraciones. Temas como la formación de estudiantes, las experiencias de campo de antropólogos/as, la antropología gubernamental, las antropologías militantes, la ética, el activismo, y otros similares, serán probablemente discutidos. En su momento como parte de la agenda político-teórica de la Red. Finalmente, esperamos que este proceso comience a cuestionar, aunque de forma paulatina, la idea de una red de “antropologías” y abra la estructura a otro tipo de sistemas de cuestionamiento sobre la cultura y las políticas culturales, bien sea dentro de contextos académicos o por fuera de estos.

Notas

* El colectivo WAN estaba originalmente conformado por Eduardo Archetti (University of Oslo), Eeva Berglund (Goldsmiths’ College), Marisol de la Cadena (University of California, Davis), Arturo Escobar (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Penélope Harvey (Manchester University), Susana Narotzky (Universitat de Barcelona), Eduardo Restrepo (Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, ICANH / UNC-Chapel Hill), Gustavo Lins Ribeiro (Universidad de Brasilía), y Sandy Toussaint (University of Western Australia). Desde entonces se han sumado antropólogos de diferentes partes del mundo.


2. Por supuesto, reiteramos, con una sensibilidad a particularidades históricas y geográficas.

3. La distinción entre “centro” y “periferia” es compleja, y no está limitada meramente una distinción geográfica. En la Red estamos interesados en la dinámica por la cual es establecida la hegemonía y subalternización entre las antropologías en un contexto mundial y la creación de centros en las periferias y periferias en los centros.


6. El “testimonio”, como un género latinoamericano, llegó a ser popular a mediados de la década de los setenta y fue usado como un esfuerzo estratégico para denunciar la violación de derechos humanos por parte –usualmente– de regímenes militares y de fuerzas paramilitares. Éste implicaba la colaboración de una académico intelectual (generalmente europeo o norteamericano) y de un líder local. Algunos de los trabajos más populares en este género son los de Rigoberta Menchú y Elizabeth Burgos Debray.

7. Ha habido, por supuesto, manifestaciones de preocupación por parte de la antropología y otras disciplinas al respecto. El reporte Gulbenkian sobre el estado de las ciencias sociales, dirigido por Immanuel Wallerstein (Gulbenkian Commission 1996), ya había apuntado la necesidad de renovar las estructuras y prácticas de producción de conocimiento de las ciencias sociales, para dar cuenta de los nuevos órdenes sociales emergentes. Dicho reporte ha sido ampliamente difundido en algunas partes del mundo en las que se puede incluir a
Colectivo Wan

8. No queremos dejar pasar por alto la diversidad que se presenta en Estados Unidos en el contexto de enseñanza y práctica de la disciplina, o sugerir que tal uso implica un constructo normativo. Uno de los intereses de la Red es la exploración de conceptos de “diferencia” dentro la antropología y entre los antropólogos, y esto también al interior de sus articulaciones de los estados-nación “metropolitanos”.

9. Esta puede ser una diferencia entre el proyecto de la Red y las críticas previas de y entre antropólogos del Tercer Mundo. Ver por ejemplo las discusiones sobre “indigenous anthropology” (Fahim y Helmer eds. 1982), “antropologías del sur” (Krotz 1997) y “antropologías periféricas” (Cardoso de Oliveira 2000).

10. Este concepto lo tomamos prestado de un surtido grupo de teorías de redes, incluyendo la de actor-red, y de teorías de la complejidad y de la auto-organización. Mientras que este texto pudo haber sido escrito sin ninguna referencia a estas teorías, queremos agradecer su utilidad para tomar distancia de formas ontologizantes de pensamiento que reifican categorías y congelan diferentes formas de imaginar el mundo.

11. No pretendemos construir una organización transnacional que funcione de manera de un paraguas, ni tampoco como una red de organizaciones nacionales. En este sentido ya existen espacios institucionales como la International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, la cual funciona relativamente bien para Europa y América Latina.

Referencias citadas


In a recent volume, anthropologist-politician Carlos Iván Degregori described anthropology in Peru—his country and mine—as having developed an inward looking analytical viewpoint that lacks comparative perspective. This situation, he explains, contrasts with research conditions in the Northern Hemisphere where access to bibliographic and funding resources provide scholars with a broader view that, nonetheless, features an inward looking tradition of its own. While resources allow them to compare and contrast anthropological knowledge about Andean countries, they generally do so with information published in English, mostly by US scholars. As an example of this parochialism (which, however, is not generally considered such given the authority of North America as an academic center) he mentions an article by a US colleague devoted to a balance of Andean anthropology in which “out of sixty two titles mentioned in the bibliography, only two are by Peruvian scholars, and one of them is in English, and written by a Peruvian woman teaching in the US.” Yet, suggesting the complex geo-politics of knowledge/power relations, he admits that his own balance of Peruvian anthropology excluded, or at the very least subordinated, knowledge produced in provincial universities (Degregori, 2000:17-18).

The hegemony of Euro-American knowledge emerges from apparently innocuous disciplinary interactions. As Degregori’s self criticism alerts us, even critical dispositions may prove insufficient to shelter us from this hegemony; we need to, at the very least, disrupt the silence in which it thrives. Universal in appearance, Western forms of knowledge and its practices are not confined to Europe or the United States—they have exceeded those territories for almost six centuries now. Articulated by a vocation to spread reason, the modern geo-politics of knowledge both established a center (the North Atlantic) and surpassed it, thus constituting regional academic (and intellectual) formations with their centers (where the institutions of reason accrued) and peripheries where rational logic had a weaker established presence. These regional formations constitute a complex configuration of multiple, hierarchically organized centers, some of which are “peripheral”, in relation to other “more central” ones. Running through this configuration, layered and many-directional relations of domination and subordination contribute to shaping what eventually is considered universal knowledge and what remains considered local information—both worldwide and in specific countries. Indeed, this “universal” and this “local” are also relative within the configuration; how far local knowledge makes it, depends— we believe hegemonically—on its “theoretical strength”, and this is problematic if by that we mean a knowledge process that extracts general ideas out of specific meanings, and ignores the specificity in so doing.
To illustrate the hegemony of Euro-American forms of knowledge, most specifically the process through which it is achieved, this paper attempts a genealogical and dialogical discussion of that aspect of Latin American anthropology known as Andeanism. I follow Andeanism as it connected with academic formations in the United States, as well as with political-intellectual discussions within Latin America and Peru, specifically with debates about mestizaje and interculturalidad. I start my story early in the twentieth century, when anthropology had not coalesced as a discipline. Yet, discussions about “culture” fueled nationalist projects promoted by a regional network of intellectuals that, under the rubric of mestizaje, eventually contributed to the emergence and articulation of Latin America as a geo-political region of sorts. Significantly, the discussion was also marked by what sociologist Aníbal Quijano (1997) labeled “the coloniality of power” a historical geo-political condition that de-legitimates nonwestern forms of making sense of the world, temporizes them as pre-modern, and thus sets them up for non co-eval (cf. Fabian, 1983) representations.

In the third section I describe the emergence of another network: that of indigenous intellectuals. An oxymoronic identity at the turn of the 20th century—when Indians were unthinkable as rational beings, let alone intellectuals—acting nationally and internationally this network rebukes the homogenizing narrative of mestizaje, and proposes instead interculturalidad, a social relation able to produce a political community that indigenous intellectuals imagine through ethnic-cultural (even ontological) diversity.

The second section interrupts what could have otherwise been a sequence (i.e. from mestizaje to anti-mestizaje, and from traditional to grassroots intellectuals-politicians.) In this section I use the life and works of Peruvian literary writer and anthropologist José María Arguedas to illustrate how Peruvian social scientists contributed to the hegemony of universal knowledge in a peripheral center (Lima) as they disqualified Arguedas’ attempts (visionary in the 1960s) at re-directing mestizaje into interculturalidad, and promoting the diversity that indigenous intellectuals currently champion. A controversial Peruvian intellectual, Arguedas’s life and works were situated at several highly unusual crossroads. He was a non-indigenous intellectual and an indigenous Quechua individual, an ethnographer and a literary writer whose work resists a binary classification as either fiction or ethnography. While this may be commonsensical to post-colonial sensibilities, in the modernizing 1960s Arguedas’s life and work defied the limits of certified sociological- anthropological knowledge and the political projects this knowledge sustained. Arguedas self-identified as “a civilized man that has not stopped being at the core, an indigenous Peruvian” (Dorfman, 1970, 45). This idea, also impersonated by the characters of his stories, challenged the nationalist teleology of mestizaje: the idea that Indians would be included in the Peruvian nation as mestizos only once they completed requirements for civilization. Arguedas’ self-identification, as well as his work, strived against the “coloniality of power” (cf. Quijano, 1997) that supported images of indigenous Andeans as ‘inferior’ and the ideological historicism that legitimized this perception. And by historicism I mean the conceptualization of historical time as a measure of the “cultural” distance that exists between co-existing Western and the non-Western formations (cf. Chakrabarty, 2000). Intriguingly, and towards the construction of World Anthropologies, Arguedas’s work disrupted the silent hegemony of western forms of knowledge.
The Inter-American Hub of Peruvian Anthropology

Andeanism (as a set of academic ideas and fieldwork practices) emerged in dialogue with anthropology in the United States and, in an apparent paradox, with Latin American debates about mestizaje. An important actor in both networks was John Victor Murra (a Romanian) who in the 1970s—while teaching anthropology at Cornell was one of Arguedas’s most intense interlocutors. Yet, Murra’s participation in the US-Latin American network predates this friendship. I have traced it back to 1952 when he went to Jamaica as a Ph. D. student hired by Sidney Mintz, an anthropologist from the United States, then working in Puerto Rico sponsored by Julian Steward. From Jamaica, Murra went to Cuba where he met Fernando Ortiz, the author of Cuban Counterpoint. Tobacco and Sugar (1995[1947]), perhaps the earliest historical ethnography produced by a Latin American intellectual, the first edition of which had a prologue by Bronislaw Malinowski. Ortiz coined the term transculturación, with which he rebuked the notion of “acculturation” and joined the discussion on mestizaje, if perhaps only implicitly. From Cuba, Murra took a boat to Yucatán, and then a plane to Mexico City where he met Angel Palerm, a Spanish anthropologist who fled Francisco Franco’s fascism, and took refuge in Mexico (Castro et.al (eds) 2000:43). The friendship later included the Mexican Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, (a crucial interlocutor in the mestizaje dialogue) who had studied anthropology at Northwestern University with Melville Herskovitz and was, like Ortiz, interested in Africania. This dense network of friendships, collegiality, chance, and political emotions connecting at least the United States, Cuba, Mexico, and Spain, underwrites the complexity of anthropological conceptual itineraries across the Americas, and belies simple unidirectional flows of knowledge from North to South. It also suggests a regional Latin American intellectual formation existing beyond the boundaries of specific countries, and genealogically connected with an earlier network, one that existed before the creation of anthropology in Latin America.

Articulated by a regionalist-cum-nationalist political emotion, since the late nineteenth century, this network grouped intellectuals around the idea of Indo-América, a sub-continental community that intellectuals imagined emerging from their common cultural pre-Columbian and Hispanic pasts. Witnessing, participating, and opposing a number of political events—like the Mexican Revolution, and the increasing expansionist ventures of the US in Latin America, particularly the 1920s Marines invasion of Nicaragua—the leaders of Indo-América knew of each other, and some even worked together. Generally, Indo-Americanistas (commonly known as Indigenistas) were provincial intellectuals (mostly lawyers) familiar with their surroundings: archaeological remains, folklore, colonial writings, vernacular languages and indigenous ways of living. As anthropology consolidated in the United States, Indigenistas traveled North both to share their local knowledge with their US counterparts, and to have it academically certified. From Peru Julio C. Tello, an archaeologist, acquired an honorary degree at Harvard in the early 1920s, and the Mexican Manuel Gamio obtained his degree in Columbia where he was one of Franz Boas’ students. Luis E. Valcárcel, the head of the Museum of History (created in 1930, in Lima) toured several universities in the United States where he was “impressed with the Boasian, Smithsonian, and Harvard institutions.” (Salomon, 1985:89; Valcárcel, 1981). The US academia, however, did not exhaust Indigenistas’ intellectual interest, for Indo-Americanismo was a political doctrine—and anti-Imperialist at such. Mexico was an important ideological hub in the network, the space of a successful revolution, and a source of ideas of mestizaje.
Mestizaje was a population-making tool that promised to uplift the indigenous population by draining off their backwardness. It represented the condition of possibility of Latin America as a future part of its Northern neighbor, while accepting the inferiority of the region in its current stage of evolution. Navigating the political-academic network that connected both Americas, Latin American nationalist discussions about mestizaje encountered the conceptualization of “acculturation”—it might have even influenced it, as Ralph Beals (1953) seems to suggest.  

Resuming Paul Radin’s (1913) discussions about the influence of whites on indigenous cultures in the United States, in 1936 the American Anthropological Association included “acculturation studies” as a legitimate field for anthropological studies and defined it as “the investigation of the cultures of natives that participate in civilized life.” It was preceded by the Social Science Research Council, which in 1935 established a sub-committee to promote investigations on “acculturation studies” (Sartori 1998, Patterson 2000, Beals 1953). That same year the ACLS created a Committee on Latin American Studies that years later became an ACLS-SSRC joint committee. These associations were to coordinate research and resources with policy needs of the US government as indicated by the Office of Inter-American Affairs, where the coordinator was Nelson Rockefeller. With funds from this institution, the North American John Collier joined Mexican anthropologists in the foundation, in the 1940s, of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. Its mission: “to carry out research on “Indian problems” in countries in the Western Hemisphere” (Patterson 2001: 95). Through these and other connections “acculturation” entered the Indo-Americanista network where it encountered adherents and opponents.

Starting in this period research funds (particularly from the United States) became a crucial component of Latin American/ist anthropology and its politics for collaborative research. The *Handbook of South American Indians* (1947-1959) is an icon of this relationship. Produced under the auspices of the Office of Inter American Affairs and led by archaeologist Wendell Benet and material-ecologist Julian Steward, the collaboration between southerners and northerners must have been fraught with academic hierarchies. “The North American creators of the *Handbook* and the French ethnologists of the Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, took as apprentices a large number of Peruvian students” wrote Frank Salomon (1985:90, my emphasis). Yet the ‘Peruvian students’ were prominent Indigenistas, salient participants in the regional mestizaje network and influential ‘local’ intellectual-politicians and lawmakers in Peru. Their apprenticeship was specific to the discipline of anthropology then emerging from the Indo American network—politically influential in the South, yet academically subordinated to North Atlantic centers of knowledge, particularly to the United States and (to a lesser degree) France.

Concerned with the creation of Peru as a modern nation, intertwined with official politics, and boasting Inca legacy, Peruvian anthropology chose past and present Andean “indigenous cultures” as its object of study and political representation. Sponsored by the Peruvian state, the first institutions were Museums, the Instituto de Etnología y Arqueología, and the Peruvian chapter of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano created in 1945 (and linked to the central III in Mexico). Over the next fifteen years, anthropology became an established discipline in Peru, and as the epicenter of a “culture area” of its own it turned into the center of US Andean anthropology, rivaling Mexican anthropology and shadowing the development
of Andeanism in neighboring Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, and Colombia. In striking contrast with Mexico, the economic support of the Peruvian state to anthropology weakened by the 1960s and the discipline came to depend (almost totally) on public and private funds from the United States and Europe. As in the rest of the world, the historical linear narrative proposed by modernization theory—in both its rightist and leftist versions—weighed heavily in Peru during this period.

In Peru the prevalence of modernization paradigms meant reinforcing the teleology of mestizaje. However, the earlier Indigenista culture-history nationalist rhetoric was replaced by an economicist discourse distinctly colored by the polarized political ideologies then prevalent. Conservative proposals envisioned Indians becoming “farmers” or normalized as urban mestizos; from the other end, revolutionary projects required “peasants” or “wage earners” rather than superstitious Indians immersed in subsistence economies. Proponents of “dependency theory” shared this view. “Dependencyists,” as they were known, represented a left-inclined conceptual alternative to modernization theories that emerged from Latin America, and that argued that the lack of industrial development of the region was a result of historical colonial relations of domination and contemporary capitalist economic exploitation. From this viewpoint came a proposal about mestizaje as cholificación. The idea was proposed in the 1960s by a highly influential Peruvian intellectual, Aníbal Quijano, currently working on notions of “coloniality of power” that I use in this paper, and mentioned earlier.

Thoroughly interdisciplinary and transpiring politics, in the 1960s anthropology thrived in Peru as discursive fields like “peasants” and “the countryside” proliferated in intellectual discussions in connection with relatively successful rural social mobilizations. Accordingly, social scientists evaluated (accepted or rejected) foreign theoretical influences using a value scale measured by their ongoing political projects. For example: anthropologists working with the State, welcomed “applied anthropology”; adherents to dependency theory followed the work of Eric Wolf and Maurice Godelier, and Clifford Geertz and Lévi Strauss had marginal impact. “Culture” became the concern of a few and marginal anthropologists (whom modernizing Marxists usually considered conservatives) under the leadership of John Murra. In dialogue with Jose María Arguedas, Murra popularized the term “lo Andino” a notion that swiftly interlocked in the Peruvian Indigenista network. In the years to come this notion was to spur an interesting controversy in the United States. It was stimulated by the criticism of Orin Starn, a US anthropologist who blamed Andeanists of political blindness as they had “missed the revolution” that the Shining Path activists organized even in the villages where some of them worked (Starn 1991). While discussion around US Andeanism was not prominent in Peru, the controversy around Arguedas’s work has long survived his death in 1968. Identified as the instigator of “lo Andino”—a notion that Lima intellectuals wrongly identified as a-historical—while Arguedas’s anthropology was never important (and is currently totally ignored) his literary work continues to be contentious among social scientists and politicians alike.

All the Bloods: Arguedas as an Unthinkable Epistemological Revolution

The controversy that Arguedas’s work would eventually provoke came to fruition around his novel Todas las Sangres, All the Bloods. In the late 1960s, in a renowned think-tank in Lima, gathered around a round table, a group of prominent social scientists and lite-
rary critics discussed the novel for many hours. After a bitter discussion (that was taped, transcribed and published as a booklet in the 1980s) they arrived at the conclusion that the novel proposed an unfeasible political project, one that could even be harmful to the country. The meeting has become legendary in Peruvian academic mythology—it represents a foundational moment of “lo Andino” and of its scientific rejection.

The publication of the novel (in the 1960s) coincided with a period of intense conflict between large landowners and indigenous agriculturalists, known as “peasants” or “Indians.” Inspired by a combination of orthodox Marxism, dependency theory, and indigenous politics the movement was successfully seizing hacienda lands. Todas las Sangres, while sympathetic to the indigenous struggle, contradicted the leftist intellectuals’-politicians’ script. The script (common to Marxist insurgency in Latin America in the 1960s) indicated that the teachings of political activists (the revolutionary vanguard) —as well as activism itself—would transform Indians into peasants. Illuminated by ‘class consciousness’ these would leave superstition behind to become a part of modern history. (Compañeros—partners—was the Spanish term for this political incorporation). Todas las Sangres disputed this destiny; it therefore touched a highly sensitive political nerve of progressive intellectuals. Even more significant (and unacceptable!) Arguedas’s novel posed an epistemological challenge to the hegemony of the singular modern subject proposed by leftist and conservative projects alike.

Staged in the Andean highlands, the novel describes a bitter dispute between two brothers (Don Fermín and Don Bruno Aragón de Peralta—supreme lords of an Andean region). Fermín incarnates capitalism, progress and reason and wants to modernize Peru. His regional project is to develop a mine. Bruno, instead, is a traditional hacendado; in Arguedas’s words, “he considers modernization to be a danger to the sanctity of the spirit” (1965:15). Flanked by both brothers stands Demetrio Rendón Willka, a supervisor of the Indian workers in the novel, and the core of the controversy at the round table. An Indian recently returned from several years in Lima, following the dominant mestizaje-acculturation script, this character should have been purged of superstitious beliefs, and become an ex-Indian, an urbanized cholo, scornful of things indigenous. Yet Willka belies the script. Formal education and urbanization had not transformed him (as proposed by the nationalist projects and state policies) for he alternated urban and rural Indian garb with ease and self-identified as “a literate comunero; yet always a comunero” (ibid: 33). Willka’s urban experience had taught him about the power of modern technology, yet he also acknowledged the might of the sun. Rather than the normal hybrid on its way towards modernity, Willka impersonated an oxymoronic hybridity that refused consistency, and was able to think-act in modern and non-modern terms—much like Arguedas himself revealed he did. By the end of the novel Willka’s inconsistency crosses the tolerable threshold as it enters the political sphere to organize an unprecedented group of indigenous leaders who, like himself, recognize the power of mountains and rivers. Together they lead a successful insurrection moved both by magic and reason alike. It is reminiscent of the 1855 Santal rebellion in India as Guha (1983) has represented it. Ultimately, Todas las Sangres proposed an alternative indigenous social movement, a critical ally of the modern left—yet with an a-modern hybrid logic of its own. Literacy and modern politics were important, yet they had to be selectively used and translated, rather than eradicating, indigenous ways. As in the following quote:

“In jail one learns a lot. There is a school there. You have to listen to the politicians [political prisoners]. The world is very big. But you do not have to follow what the politicians say. We have to learn what they teach according to our understanding—nuestra
They are different. Nobody knows us. You will see!! They are going to take you to prison. [ … ]You already know how to sign. In jail you will learn to read. Let them take you to Lima!!” (my emphasis) (1964:307).

In his analysis of the Haitian revolution, historian Michel Ralph Trouillot explained that until recently, the idea of black slaves fighting for the Independence of Haiti was an unthinkable event: identified as pre-rational, the idea of black individuals (let alone slaves) defying power, and in their own terms, exceeded historically defined conceptual and political categories (Trouillot, 1992). Similarly, in the 1960s minds of central Limeño intellectuals—many of them earnest socialists, and prominent proponents of dependency theory—there was no conceptual or political place for Rendón Willka. Aníbal Quijano’s eloquence in this respect has become legendary in Peruvian social science circles. About Rendón Willka he said:

“This character is extremely equivocal. I had the impression that he returned from Lima, totally cholificado, and that he was going to proceed in a supremely astute and Machiavellian way, to assume the political leadership in the process of peasant insurrection, and therefore he appeared a little in disguise amongst his own. But the next impression, particularly at the end of the novel, suggests that Rendón reintegrates—not totally, not in a fully conscious way, but in some sense he reintegrates—back into the indigenous traditional (world).” (IEP, [1968] 2000:59, my emphasis)

The indigenous world and its animated landscape were not the secular arena that modern political organization required. In apparent paradox then, class analysis worked as a “prose of counterinsurgency” (cf. Guha 1988) for even as rural upheavals took place under the leadership of indigenous politicians (probably like Rendón Willka) they were not deemed indigenous political movements; they were—for better or worse—only an aspect of the revolutionary struggle led by urban politicians. Hadn’t Eric Hobsbawm defined peasants as pre-political actors in an analysis that included Peruvian rural movements in his sample? (Hobsbawm 1971[1959]). The notion of “change” promoted by modernizing premises (including those of dependency theory and class analysis) was specific: it moved forward from “past to future,” from “superstition” to “historical consciousness.” Untamed by this narrative Willka represented the “indianization of politics,” a historical impossibility for the sociologists who imagined a different kind of leader:

“I am currently working in a research on peasant leadership, and last year I traveled to several areas affected by the peasant movement. In every peasant union I have visited, I have found only one indigenous leader. Indigenous leadership does not exist today within the peasant movement; it appears as an exception and in isolated fashion, the Indian leader is himself going through a process of cholificación. Thus, I do not think that an indigenous solution to the peasant problem would be feasible.” (IEP, [1968] 2000:59-60)

These words—Aníbal Quijano’s once again—were the last ones transcribed from the recording of the bitter session. Albeit simplified—given the tension of the session—they refer to a more complex argument published the same year as Todas Las Sangres, and soon to become famous as cholificación. It described the transformation of Indians into ‘cholos’, their de-indianization and incomplete integration to western ways of being and knowing.11 Not-
withstanding, cholos represented a hopeful national future. They indicated—according to Quijano—“the emergence of an incipient mestizo culture, the embryo of the future Peruvian nation if the tendency continues.” (1965:61).

Even a cursory contextualization of the debate makes clear that Quijano’s position was not unique—even though he might have been Arguedas’ most articulate and vocal opponent. They were friends and intense mutual interlocutors, thus the discussion was embedded in previous unresolved conversations, the details of which I am not aware of. This does not cancel, however, the conspicuously historicist lexicon Quijano used to define “cholos”—I have italicized the future-oriented words—and which prevailed over the academic and political logic of the period. It saturated the imagination to the point of seducing brilliant intellectuals to irrational historical oblivion: they disregarded that “cholos” (albeit with different labels) had existed (historically “in between” rather than “moving forward”) for almost five hundred years (i.e. since the Spanish invasion of the Andes to the 1960s). From the historicist perspective, Demetrio Rendón Willka was not only a contradiction—he was not possible. He emerged from the genealogy of mestizaje only to belie its teleology as it proposed that indigenous ways of being (rather than assuming the forward moving history of modernity or simply ‘persisting’) had a historicity of its own—the undeniable power of industrial capitalism notwithstanding. More significantly, Willka’s political leadership implied the inclusion of indigenous forms of knowledge in nation-wide projects, and thus challenged the knowledge/power premise of socialism which (as secular communalism) required the “cooperation of rational beings emancipated from gods and magic.” Socialist liberating politics required the supremacy of reason and Todas las Sangres, perhaps prematurely, opposed this fundamentalism. Arguedas explained: “socialist theory gave a course to my whole future, to all my energy, it gave me a destiny and charged it with might by the direction it gave it. How much did I understand socialism? I do not really know. But it did not kill the magic in me--Pero no mató en mí lo mágico. (1971[1968]: 283).

From my viewpoint Arguedas’ effort coincides to a large extent—albeit thirty years earlier—with Dipesh Chakrabarty’s project to “provincialize Europe.” (Chakrabarty 2000) Suggesting that European thought is indispensable yet inadequate to explore questions of political modernity in the Third World, “provincializing Europe” is a project to explore the possibilities of renewing and transforming currently hegemonic forms of knowing from the margins of modernity. Similarly, Arguedas’s public persona (as indicated by his work and testimonials of his life) proposed an alternative politics of knowledge, one that saw the necessity of western reason and its incapacity to translate, let alone capture or replace, Andean ways of being. Rather than a multi-culturalism tolerant of all bloods, as his politics has been interpreted (Karp 2000)—I want to read Arguedas as proposing multi-ontologism, and a nationalism capable of being general and singular, articulated by reason and magic, both on equal standing, and socialist at that. Beyond prevalent economist explanations, he exposed that capitalism derived its power from the will of modern epistemologies to replace non-western ontologies with modern forms of consciousness. Thus he unveiled what Quijano (perhaps moved by this encounter, yet almost thirty years after it happened) has theorized as “the coloniality of power,” the concept that I explained earlier. In the late 1960s however, with the exception of one, (a linguist called Alberto Escobar) all participants in the mesa redonda derided Arguedas’s project.
The author of *Todas las Sangres* was as complex as the characters he had created (he was like Rendón Willka, he disclosed to one of his colleagues)—and as ‘unthinkable’ (in Trouillot’s terms) for his intellectual interlocutors of the sixties and seventies. The son of a provincial lawyer, and prey of a wicked stepmother, Arguedas was raised by indigenous men and women (Arguedas 1965). In 1969, he told Ariel Dorfman: “For someone who first learned how to speak in Quechua—as was his case—there is nothing that is not a part on the self.” And this ontology equipped him with a way of knowing, he continued in the same interview:

“I was purely Quechua until my adolescence. I will probably never be able to let go of... my initial conceptualizations of the world. For a monolingual Quechua speaker the world is alive; there is not much difference between a mountain, an insect, a huge stone, and a human being. There are, therefore, no boundaries between the “marvelous” and the “real” … there is neither much difference between the religious, the magical, and the objective worlds. A mountain is god, a river is god, and centipedes have supernatural virtues.” (Dorfman 1970:45)

Similarly, yet on a different occasion, conspicuously rebuking the directionality of mestizaje, he declared: “I am not acculturated,” and he reiterated his pleasure at being indigenous and non-indigenous simultaneously: “I am a Peruvian that proudly, like a joyous devil, speaks in Christian and in Indian, in Spanish and in Quechua.” (Arguedas 1971:282). The speech has become famous amongst Latin American/ist literary critics who usually see in it a confession of the author’s dramatically singular life trajectory, even an explanation of his death by suicide, the evidence of the impossibility of his way of being.

Canonical social sciences would have not tolerated Arguedas’s assertions, except probably as someone’s beliefs, an object of study of anthropology. Contained by literature—up until *Todas las Sangres* at least—the writer’s depictions were considered “magical realism,” the literary genre where ‘the uncanny’ ceases to be such and becomes ordinary. And in Arguedas’s life the uncanny was ordinary, not quite an object of study, but part of his subjectivity. “I know Peru through life,” he used to say (1996 [1965]: 50). With life as a source of knowledge and literature as his expressive genre he blurred the distinction between “reality” and “fiction”. As such, he described the stories he heard and used as inspiration as: “Absolutely true, and absolutely imagined. Flesh and bones, and pure illusion”(1971: 22). Anthropology would have disagreed: the animated landscape and ‘magical’ insects belonged to the realm of indigenous beliefs, and as such they were distant objects of study, and vanishing at that. The discipline was politically at odds with Arguedas’s views. He wrote in a letter to John V. Murra on November 3, 1967:

“Development projects to integrate the indigenous population have become instruments that aim to categorically uproot Indians from their own traditions, ... famous anthropologists... preach with scientific terminology about ... the inexistence of a Quechua culture, they say that Peru is not bi-cultural, and that indigenous communities have a subculture that will be difficult to uplift to the level of national culture,” (Murra and López Baralt 1996:162).

Amidst the modernizing will and the rigid political economy positions that had colored the controversial “Round Table” and that continued to characterize academic thought in the following decades, the concern for Andean cultural aspects eventually fit the label of “lo Andino;” the intellectual community scornfully confined it to anthropology and ethno-history, the sciences of the past; sociologists and economists devoted themselves to the stu-
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Interculturalidad or Knowledge as Dialogic Relationship

“... the gods and other agents inhabiting practices of so-called superstition have not died anywhere. I take gods and the spirits to be existentially coeval with the human, and think from the assumption that the question of being human involves the question of being with gods and the spirits.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 16)

I have been told that the discussion that took place at the Round Table did not have immediate repercussions; the tapes where were lost and unearthed several years later, as a consequence of a cleaning spree at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Yet, it was not an ephemeral and isolated incident involving the relationship between two intellectuals. Once the transcription was published as a pamphlet (that has had several editions) the event became a topic of conversations in Peruvian and international academic circles. From my viewpoint, the controversy featured a double, intertwined symbolism. Epistemologically, the discussion expressed the tension between a widespread analytical tradition that “tends to evacuate the local by assimilating it to some abstract universal; and a hermeneutic tradition that finds thought intimately tied to places and to particular forms of life (Chakrabarty 2000: 18). Politically, the discussions in the Mesa Redonda were a prelude to the intense disputes that pitted “campesinista” (or “clasista”) political leaders against their “indianista” counterparts and that took place all over Latin America in the last decades of the 20th century. (Hale 1994; Yashar 1998) These were part of a process that some have labeled “the return of the Indian” (Albó 1991; Ramón 1993; Wearne 1996), a reference to the increasing political significance of social movements that articulate their demands around indigenous issues and ethnic claims—and that in one way or another challenge simplistic universalizing analytical viewpoints.

Emerging in the early 1970s, organizations like the Colombian CRIC (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca), ECUARUNARI in Ecuador, the AIDESEP in Peru, and in Bolivia the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari, insurged in the political picture of their countries demanding and enacting indigenous citizenship. Since their inception the movements have...
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proposed projects that defy the teleology of mestizaje. Accordingly, by the 1980s (albeit, like any political organization pervaded by internal ideological conflicts) they managed to install a new nationalist (yet highly heteroglossic) vocabulary. Words like “pluri-ethnic,” “pluri-cultural,” “pluri-national” reflected their demands for respect of their ethnic singularities. More significant, the new terminology—its very heteroglossia—challenged the homogeneity that sustained nationalist ideals, and the State formation that implemented them. Indigenous political organizations acquired steadiness and jumped to center stage in the 1990s, coinciding with the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Columbus to the Americas as a symbolic landmark. Perhaps the most unexpected and spectacular event in this respect was the Ecuadoran Levantamiento Indígena (the Indigenous Uprising) that shook the country and occupied its capital, Quito, in June 1990. According to Ecuadoran historian Galo Ramón, the Levantamiento “removed the dam that the dominant project for a national State, had created since 1830” (Ramón, 1993: 2).

Predictably (although surprisingly, and still inadmissibly, to some) the political mobilization—the return of the Indian—also meant an “uprising of knowledges” (cf. Foucault, 1980: 81-87), the insurrection of ways of knowing defined by science as local, disqualified and illegitimate. Reminiscent of Arguedas’ character Rendón Willka, the original leaders of the movement were indigenous individuals who combined rural and urban experience, as did the movement, as it deftly appropriated modern practices and transformed their logic. Illustrative of this, and since the very beginning, the political demonstrations of the movement boasted Andean ritual iconography and enactments, thus de-secularizing politics, as in Arguedas’s novel. Intended as “acts of memory” (cf. Bal 1999) the de-secularized political rituals also defy official nationalist histories, introducing into the political pantheon the presence and ideas of indigenous activists. In Bolivia, for example, as the memory of Tupac Katari was revitalized and politicized, his phrase “I will return transformed into thousands” became central to the indigenous social movement. Túpac Katari was an indigenous insurgent who led an anti-colonial struggle at the end of the eighteenth century; his very memory demanded the restoration of indigenous actions and knowledges in history-- the de-colonization of history. Urged by this need, the social movements produced their own organic intellectuals, indigenous university students and professors decided to “recover and re-elaborate the indigenous past and its forms of historical knowledge” (Ticona 2000: 12). They also established Non Governmental Organizations, like THOA—Taller de Historia Oral Andina—which functions in La Paz, (Bolivia) since 1983-1984 and works to “investigate, disseminate, and revitalize the culture, history, and identity of indigenous peoples.” (http://www.aymaranet.org/thoa7.html)

Ideologically fragmented into divergent tendencies, the process of re-writing indigenous histories and transforming the political habitus in Andean countries is no panacea. As with any political process, this one has been fraught with power struggles, expressed in essentialisms, factionalisms, and the production of universalizing meta-narratives of its own. (Warren 1998; Ticona 2000; Albó 1994; Van Cott 2000) However, it has certainly burst open evolutionary narratives of indigeneity and advanced a politics of indigenous heterogeneity. Within this novel narrative, Guatemalan-Maya historian Edgar Esquit explains: “Mayaness is what Mayas do, provided that other Mayas recognize it as such” (2000). More importantly, the public (and at times highly influential) presence of indigenous intellectuals has made obvious the possibility for an epistemic border (cf. Mignolo, 2000) where, at ease or awkwardly, rational knowledge cohabits with non-rational knowledge. Organized in social movements, this blend sustains political projects that have as an important ambition to transform the modern State. The most widespread expression
of this attempt is currently phrased as *interculturalidad*, a political project through which the indigenous social movement in Ecuador, for example, proposes to create “a plurinational State, that recognizes the diversity of its peoples” (Yumbay 2001:14).

Sustained and produced by political organizations frequently opposed to the neoliberal policies that states have attempted to implement since the 1980s, (Selverston-Scher 2001) *interculturalidad* belongs to the genealogy of *mestizaje*, yet it works against the coloniality of power/knowledge and the stage-ist narrative of history that sustained the former. Like *mestizaje*, it produces and is produced by a dialogic academic-political intellectual Latin American network; yet the current network (enhanced by the world wide web) includes indigenous intellectuals/politicians and global institutions—ranging from funding agencies (like Oxfam America, or the GTZ) to multilateral organizations (the World Bank, for example.) Emerging in the 1970s from discussions about bilingual education programs for elementary schools in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, *interculturalidad* (again, like *mestizaje*) is a highly heteroglossic notion. The most widespread Peruvian version is a State-project defined as a “dialogue among cultures” (Godenzzi 2002); still a bio-political attempt to “improve Indians,” it revolves around bilingual education (Quechua and Spanish). In Bolivia, the PROEIB Andes, a college for bilingual education teachers in Cochabamba, features a similar mission since 1996 when it was established. In both countries, the main activities are administered and funded by the State through the Ministry of Education, and the participation of indigenous organizations is marginal. Yet *interculturalidad* has also an ambitious version that aims at forging nations—and ultimately a world—characterized by “pacific cohabitation among peoples and cultures, based on justice and equality for all” (Menchú 1998:13). Towards that goal, in Ecuador, “the indigenous movement has had as one of its main political and ideological objectives the construction of *interculturalidad* as a principle that articulates demands to a monocultural State, and that aims at transforming the very conceptualization of the State itself” (Walsh 2002: 115) Its greatest challenge then is to become a new social relationship that along with feminisms, environmentalisms, and indigenous social movements can confront former social hierarchies of reason, property, gender, and sexuality and produce a democratic State that “does not hold cultural renunciation as a condition for citizenship” (Tubino 2002).

Seemingly then, in one of its most consequential versions, *interculturalidad* is a novel (and, I would say, deeply subversive) State-making technology and an epistemological site for the production of a different kind of knowledge. Related to this, (as well as to the urgency to re-write national history, and to produce histories) the creation of alternative centers of knowledge has been a central concern of indigenous social movements. In Ecuador, the Universidad Intercultural represents such an effort. A document stating its goals describes it as a plural space, (i.e. not exclusively indigenous, or for the production of “indigenous knowledge”) “for the creation of novel conceptual and analytical frameworks, able to produce new categories and notions that have *interculturalidad* as their epistemological framework.” (Instituto Científico de Culturas Indígenas, Editorial 2000) The same editorial criticizes modern science as having emerged from a monologue and building self-referential categories “that did not allow the inclusion of “the strange” and “different” within the borders of knowledge.” Intriguingly, it concludes with a series of questions:

“If modern science has been monologic, and if the conditions for knowing are always implicated in the conditions of power, then how can we generate the con-
ditions for a dialogue? How do we articulate interculturalidad within the limits of epistemology and the conditions of knowledge production? How do we contribute to the adventure of knowledge from different sources? (¿Cómo aportar a la aventura del conocimiento desde nuevas fuentes?)” (ibid).

I want to bring these stimulating questions to the arena of anthropology—which the Universidad Intercultural rightly criticizes as having constituted itself by creating and maintaining indigenous peoples as others, and moreover, by excluding their possibility self-understanding. Thus, in finalizing this section, I want to use the opportunity of the questions as a call for an anthropology (most specifically for an ethnographic production) articulated by what I call “relational epistemologies.” Inspired by Arturo Yumbay an Ecuadorian politician who described the role of the anthropologists who work with the indigenous social movement as one of acompañantes (companions in a dialogic sense—see Yumbay 2001), I see relational epistemologies as a situated knowledge position (cf. Haraway 1991). That position assumes the historical contingency of universal categories and uses them in dialogic process with local thought, while paying relentless and critical attention to processes of translation between both, thus rendering local knowledge visible. Relational epistemologies cancel subject-object positions, and upon interacting with its others as selves who speak, think and know, (cf. Salmond, 1995) they have the potential to create the conditions for the emergence of anthropology in the plural—skilled enough to overcome its Western singularity and become a multiple world discipline. Eventually, beyond its disciplinary boundaries, World Anthropologies could communicate between Western disciplines and other knowledges, considered as such in their own right.

Concluding Remarks

At the beginning of this paper I said I would use Arguedas to illustrate the politics of knowledge production as they emerged within the Peruvian intellectual-political community. Yet, I did not mean to present a polarized situation with Arguedas on one side, and recalcitrant rationalists on the other one. This is not how hegemony works—and the hegemony of Western knowledge practices are also apparent in José Maria Arguedas’ work. For in spite of the epistemological challenge that his literature represented, the process through which this writer crafted his anthropology was full of intriguing tensions that reveal his compliance to reason, science, and to the social-academic hierarchies that structured Latin American society in the 1960s and linger today. In his correspondence with anthropologists he repeatedly regretted his “ignorance of theory” and subordinated local anthropology to metropolitan centers of knowledge: “Only those that have been seriously trained abroad can teach here, can conduct scholarly institutions (…) The rest, like me, can do a little in art but in the sciences we’re pathetically dead, and some of us accept to remain in our positions because there is no one better yet” he wrote in a letter in1966. 22

This opinion belongs to the genealogy of knowledge against which interculturalidad has insurged. Yet the dynamics and hierarchies of hegemonic knowledge continue to pervade its production. Pamela Calla, a Bolivian anthropologist describes some of the conflicts at the Bolivian PROEIB College where she teaches. Students, she tells us, have coined labels that attest to different forms of being indigenous, which, however, highlight the tensions of being “inferior” in a modern sense, i.e. less educated or less masculine. For example, on one occasion the students classified themselves into “academics” and “fundamentalists.” Not surprisingly, the “academics” self-position as a superior group in the tension and is challenged by the “fundamentalists” self-identification as “more indigenous” and therefore
more masculine (Calla 2002). Although the latter interpretation challenges dominant stereotypes, whereby “women are more Indian” (De la Cadena 1991) they continue to abide by modern gender hierarchies. Similarly, pressures to be modern and indigenous are complex—as in the following quote, by an indigenous leader, whose name I will keep anonymous:

“Sometimes I feel I am going crazy because I cannot think like an Indian anymore. I fight for Indians among whites, and therefore I have to think like them. I represent indigenous interests within State institutions, but I have not been back in my village for three years. I travel all over the place, and I know I am an Indian. But what kind of an Indian?” (Oliart 2002)

As becomes obvious through these quotes, interculturalidad is not a smooth, let alone simply successful, process. Moreover it has not eliminated images of liberal Andeanism in the region. A consequential example should suffice to illustrate the way it thrives in Peru. In 1984, caught in war between the Shining Path and the Peruvian Army, indigenous peasants from the village of Uchuraccay (located in the region called Ayacucho, the epicenter of the violence) collectively killed six journalists who were investigating another massacre that had taken place weeks earlier in a nearby area. Reactions to the event included colonial anti-Indian fears as well as paternalistic pro-Indian attitudes. The Government responded by nominating a commission to investigate the massacre. Led by the internationally famous Mario Vargas Llosa, since the assassins were Indians (not modern Peruvian citizens) the key members of the official group were two anthropologists, rather than lawyers as would correspond to a criminal investigation. Removing the killers from history, the anthropologists explained that the Indians had killed the journalists moved by a combination of ancestral fears and cultural principles. The anthropologists who authored the report are currently key advisors to a governmental effort to transform Peru into a multicultural nation compatible with the economic mission of neo-liberalism. From this perspective, Andeanist multiculturalism continues the legacy of earlier acculturation theories. Indians can successfully become modernized chulos. The current President, Alejandro Toledo—commonly called “el Cholo Toledo” in Peru—represents this possibility, for he is “an ex-Indian with no complexes, and the cool calculating mind of a Stanford, and Harvard academic” with the ability to “understand life from a viewpoint rooted in analytic rigor and scientific information.”(Llosa 2000:20). It may be only a coincidence, but the author of the quote is Alvaro Vargas Llosa, the son of Mario Vargas Llosa, the authority in the aforementioned report. (He is also the author of a book entitled La Utopía Arcaica in which he discussed Arguedas’s work as an anachronistic desire, a reversal of History—and thus not only Utopia, but archaic at that.)

In the 1960s-1970s historicist class analysis worked as a “prose of counterinsurgency” that excluded indigenous revolts from the academically defined field of politics. At the turn of the twenty first century, liberal multiculturalism can work as an “anti-politics machine” (cf. Ferguson 1990) by including within the hegemony of liberalism—or neo-liberalism in this case—circumstances that could reveal and thus politicize everyday narratives of “cultural” or “ethnic” exclusion. The inclusive yet de-politicizing work of multiculturalism works through normalizing education. In Peru, for example, the scandal that would otherwise represent the image of a cholo as President of the country, is canceled—or at the very least soothed —by references to Alejandro Toledo’s training in the centers of reason, an indication of his adequacy as a modern politician. Arguedas through his intricately fictional
Rendón Willka—and through his own life—questioned normalization through education. He thus rejected the everyday habits of thought of his peers and provoked an intellectual-political scandal that the counterinsurgent prose of modernity could not control. Similarly scandalous are discussions of interculturalidad and the presence of indigenous intellectuals in countries like Guatemala, Ecuador—let alone Peru. Siding with the scandalous (for they challenge the simplicity of modernity) and inspired by Arguedas, I want to propose that in as much as indigenous social movements articulate an alternative to modern politics—and the nation-states they sustain—they have the potential to transform the liberal empirical notion of “diversity” currently tolerated in liberal multi-culturalisms into political demands for the citizenship of plural ontologies and their forms of knowledge. As a western social science enabled by non-western locations, anthropology is in the condition to contribute to the visibility of other forms of knowledge. In order to do that, an awareness of anthropological knowledge as a dialogic process of translation—between the local and the universal, between histories and History, between the singular and the general—is in order.

Notes

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1. I use Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue with Foucault’s genealogical perspective to avoid the linear historical narrative that naturalizes the current geo-politics of knowledge.

2. To formulate this notion Quijano (1997) explains that an intertwinement exists between Euro-centric forms of knowledge and current forms of domination throughout the world. The roots of this power formation can be traced back to the sixteenth century when beliefs in the superiority of Christian faith vis-à-vis “paganism,” enabled Europe to constitute itself as the epicenter of modernity allegedly the most advanced Historical moment of humanity. Supported by a Euro-centered notion of linear time, the power that supported the Conquest of the Americas and connected the “new” and “old” worlds conditioned a production of knowledge according to which Americans occupied the past and lacked what Europeans had: most specifically, civilization and reason. Installed in the discipline of History, this conceptual alchemy that relentlessly and pervasively reproduced the image that Europe was the future of non-European populations has survived de-colonizing movements, and continues to inform dominant ways of knowing.

3. Influenced by readings of Spengler’s The Decline of the West (which reached Latin American readers through the Spanish Ortega y Gasset’s Revista de Occidente (Valcárcel, 1981) Indo-Americanistas proposed that their “ideological and philosophical liberation from trans-Atlantic domination” was to be epistemologically inspired by “a spiritual attitude sympathetic of the past.” (García, 1931:33)

4. The most prominent proponent of this regional cum nationalist community is José Vasconcelos accredited as the inventor of the Raza Cómica—the leading slogan of the Mexican nation-building project specifically known as mestizaje. The Peruvian Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre founded the Acción Revolucionaria Americana (later to become the APRA, an important populist Peruvian party) while in Mexico in 1924, where he worked as a personal aid to Vasconcelos, then Minister of Education. In turn, Haya de la Torre was a conspicuous supporter of the anti-imperial struggles of César Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, and both subscribed Vasconcelos’s brainchild, Indoamérica. Similarly, from the other end of the continent the Argentinian Ricardo Rojas crafted the image of Eurindia, suggesting a regional identity built from the encounter between indigenous American and
European traditions, imported to Argentina by colonial Spaniards, and by Italians, Spanish, and English immigrants in the early 20th century.

5. According to Ralph Beals (1953) Robert Redfield—then at the University of Chicago—coined the term after his visits to Mexico in the 1920s. Similarly, Melville Herskovitz (another of Boas’s student and like him interested in American-African population) used “acculturation” upon returning from fieldwork in Surinam (where he might have become in contact with Caribbean notions of métissage and negritude.) He was working with Redfield at Chicago at that time (Beals, 1953).

6. Also in 1936, Redfield, Herskovitz and Linton wrote “A Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation.” (Beals, 1953)

7. Among the first to contest the notion was Fernando Ortiz. Acculturation, he opined, simplified the complex cultural give and take that characterized Latin American society since the arrival of the Spaniards. The mixture was transcultural—it operated in multiple directions as the Latin American indigenous, Spanish, and black cultures changed interdependently. (Ortiz, 1940; Rama, 1975; Coronil, 1995). While some literary critics use the notion of transculturación to conceptualize Arguedas’s position, Ortiz’s concept maintains “the notion of levels of cultural development” (Coronil, 1995: xix) that Arguedas’s experience and writings oppose.

8. Also a consequence of “culture area,” (and illustrative of the international influence of the notion) the Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos was funded in 1948, with Alfred Métraux as an important authority.

9. The think-tank was the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Created in the early 1960s, by a group of elite sociologists, anthropologists, historians, philosophers, and economists it was among the first institutions to actively seek and receive private funding. It was peculiar in that it combined the legacy of Indigenismo with cutting edge dependency theorists. The elite social position of its members, along with their leftist penchant made the Institute an influential organization, central in the development of the social sciences in Peru. Luis E. Valcárcel, John Murra, José Matos Mar—all figures related to the Mexican hub of inter-American anthropology—were members of the Instituto.

10. To control the turmoil—and modernize the countryside—the State responded with development plans to “integrate the indigenous population” and in which anthropologists—foreign and local—profusely participated. The best-known efforts were the Cornell-Vicos project, and the Plan de Integración de la Población Aborigen. With the participation of anthropologists from the United States and Peru, they functioned in the 1950s and 1960s.


15. The words belong to Enrique Bravo Bresani, an engineer attending the Mesa Redonda, and soon to become an ideologue of the Revolutionary Military Government that in 1968 issued an Agrarian Reform aimed at halting the rural turmoil.

16. Among critics that have commented on the phrase are: Rowe, Escajadillo, Cornejo Polar, Lienhard, Spitta, Rama, Larsen, Lambright, Moreiras, Devine

17. The Uruguayan Angel Rama, for example, has likened Arguedas’s denial of acculturation to Ortiz’s earlier “transculturation”—I presented it in the first section. But Arguedas’s testimonial suggestions transcend the bi-directional cultural mixture that Ortiz defined as transculturation. While this notion altered the linearity of acculturation and argued for the cultural specificity of Cuba, it yielded to the superiority of Western civilization. Moreover, it was conceived from a Western way of being and knowing.


19. In this—and probably other features—Arguedas’s work is comparable Zora Neale Hurston’s production.


21. According to Carmen María Pinilla, the attendants were prey of “a scientificist” position that prevented them from offering a “more open” viewpoint and attitude. The two most prominent opponents of Arguedas were considered among the “most serious” among the nascent social sciences. (107) “En ellos sobre todo el de Quijano sobre cholificaci’on, se apreciaba el uso cetrivo y ejemplar de la teoria sociologica para explicar proceses de cambio en el peru, anotando regularidades y haciendo generalizaciones.” (107)

22. The letter was addressed to his dear friend, Alejandro Ortiz Rescanciere, who was studying in Paris under the direction of Claude Lévi Strauss, an almost unknown figure in the 1960s Peruvian anthropology circles. (Ortiz Rescanciere, 1996: 209).

23. That these “timeless Indians” were seasonal laborers in coffee plantations, that they went on weekly trips to nearby towns to purchase rice, sugar, kerosene, and cigarettes, that their sons and daughters were servants in the city, and that they were unfortunate actors in the war between the State and the Shining Path were absent in the report.
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“Communication is the process of making unique experience into common experience, and it is, above all, the claim to live. For what we basically say, in any kind of communication is: 'I am living in this way because this is my experience'... Since our way of seeing things is literally our way of living, the process of communication is in fact the process of community: the sharing of common meanings, and hence common activities and purposes; the offering, reception and comparison of new meanings leading to the tensions and achievements of growth and change” (emphasis added, Williams 1984:55)

The project of a World Anthropologies Network (WAN) challenges anthropologists to engage in world wide communication not only among scholars but also with the knowledge produced in non-academic contexts and in non-scientific realms of experience. The desire to create a new form of communication stems from the will to be alive, to form a community that will allow us growth and change in unexpected directions. This ecumenical objective however, has to deal with the awareness that all knowledge is produced in, and seeks to create, particular fields of power and we are not exempted from it ourselves. The tension in the WAN project is one between 'epistemological tolerance' with its paradoxical liberal, modernist taint, and the setting of an epistemological program which has a definite grounding in various emancipatory political projects. It is this tension I want to address in the paper.

My attempt in this paper is to explore the positionalities of three probably incompatible discourses that represent, however, serious attempts to go beyond the easy disqualification of particular non-hegemonic forms of knowledge as 'epistemological nativism'. The first is the discourse of singularity and autonomous consciousness that raises the issue of the unavoidable opacities of translation we should contend with if we choose to recognize the 'heterotemporality' of plural histories and forms of knowledge (Chakrabarty 2000: 72-96). The second is the discourse of active participation in a local political project as part of the production of knowledge, where commitment to a collective struggle against (or for) some form of domination and injustice requires both concrete experience and a certain urgency in the necessity to identify historical forces that are seen to be substantial and material (this would be exemplified by the work of Moreno or Sarkar below). The third is the discourse of ethnographic realism (Terradas 1993), representing an attempt to revive anthropology as a comparative endeavor by developing the explicitness embedded in the realist methodology of early ethnographies. By engaging with these three methodological perspectives my aim is to raise some issues about how a World Anthropologies Network could provide a real communicative space for fostering growth within anthropological knowledge.
Introduction: Andalusia and the Rest

Let me start with a piece of local history of the awareness of a particular form of anthropological knowledge in Spain. In 1973 in the Primera reunión de antropólogos españoles (Sevilla), Isidoro Moreno (University of Sevilla) in a paper about "anthropological research in Spain" addressed the production of anthropological knowledge in Spain, and in particular in Andalusia. He described it as a double colonization: 1) spatial --Spain conceived exclusively as a territory full of informants, as an object of study-- by foreign anthropologists (mainly North-American) who had offered nothing valuable "to the knowledge of Spain, the progress of Spanish anthropology or the development of anthropological theory"; and 2) theoretical --through the mechanic application by local anthropologists of concepts and theories developed by Anglo-Saxon scholars to deal with other realities (1975:325-6). In a paper written ten years later Moreno (1984) develops this early insight more thoroughly and tries to show how two very different ethnographies of Andalusia, one by a British structural-functionalist (Pitt-Rivers), the other by an American Marxisant anthropologist (Gilmore), both suffer from blatant forms of ignorance that stem from their pragmatic and superficial involvement with the local history, economic realities, political conflicts and symbolic expressions of Andalusia.

In both community studies, once again, Andalusia provides only the field, and the excuse, for useless academic polemics that take place in other countries and for obtaining degrees and status for professionals of anthropology that have little interest really in the present and the future of the Andalusian people. And this has only one name, that of anthropologic colonialism (original emphasis, Moreno 1984:73).

Let me highlight here "useless academic polemics", "obtaining degrees and status for professionals of anthropology" and "little interest really in the present and the future of the Andalusian people". Although these remarks echo some of the contemporary critiques of the production of anthropological knowledge (Asad 1973, Fabian 1983) as well as such path breaking papers as F.H. Cardoso's critique of the a-political "consumption" of dependency theory by US scholars (1977) and the earlier phase of subaltern studies (cf. Pouchepadass 2000), they were produced without knowledge of them, that is without the sense of participating in a wider polemic about anthropological knowledge. Rather they were conceived as part of a personal experience as an anthropologist and as an Andalusian nationalist of a marxian background, strongly engaged in political participation. Moreno's critique stems from the felt inadequacies of 1) separation of theory from practice, 2) the reproduction of a structure that validates what counts as anthropological knowledge, that is, the patterns for acquiring professional status at the center and 3) the lack of engagement --personal and political (i.e. "present and future of the Andalusian people")-- of the researcher, that is, the objectification of the anthropological subject. I will come back to this later on. The story, however, has more developments to it. In 1997 in his contribution to "Provocations of European Ethnology" Michael Herzfeld points to the

"various responses of Europeans to the, sometimes startling, discovery that they are already under the dissecting gaze of anthropologists. This is both an intellectual refinement of a covert racism (of the 'we are not savages' variety), at one level, and
at another, paradoxically, a late version of the colonialist critique of anthropology. These are not necessarily mutually incompatible stances. Taken together, however, they indicate how powerful and pervasive is the model of *occidental superiority* and the idea that rational scholars are somehow free of cultural constraints or the messy vagueness of symbolism (see especially Connor 1993; Huntington 1993). Moreover, they reflect the *perpetuation of colonialist assumptions* even, or especially, within the optimistically named 'new Europe'. This appears with notable force in the *epistemological nativism* of certain Spanish anthropologists (e.g., Llobera 1986; Moreno Navarro 1984), although rarely those in the national capital [no names or references given], a contrast that shows how easily subnational hierarchies may *reproduce international inequalities* (see Fernandez 1983).

(Original emphasis, bold added, Herzfeld in Asad et al. 1997:714).

What I find revealing is the way in which Herzfeld’s discourse is an unforgiving disavowal of European [Southern European] anthropologists as such, that is, as colleagues who could share polemic anthropological ground. I find it particularly revealing as well that he cites a Catalan --Llobera-- and an Andalusian --Moreno--, both overtly peripheral nationalists and not particularly Spanish in their 'self-presentation'. Herzfeld creates a breach between himself and the likes of him (reflexive anthropological scholars at the centers) and the 'nativist' intellectuals, through conflating their position as anthropological objects of foreign (Anglo-Saxon) anthropologists' gaze and their arrogance and “occidental superiority as rational scholars”. As a consequence, he invalidates their scholarly but obsolete methodological critique of knowledge production in anthropology on the grounds that it is “covert racism” and “epistemological nativism” and in fact negates the possibility to communicate with these scholars on common professional ground. Indeed, the problem that Herzfeld seems to have with the epistemological nativism of peripheral Spanish anthropologists stems from his view of them as akin to nationalistic folklorists and therefore subsumable under his critique of the methodological 'distanting' and conceptual 'fixedness' of nineteenth century folklorists (Herzfeld 1987). As a corollary, it is then based on his epistemological rejection of the blatant and explicit political intent of their intellectual project. European contemporaneous 'anthropologists' who are peripheral nationalists are placed in the field as objects of study and significantly precluded from entering the 'a-nativist' (scientific?) epistemological debate in anthropology.

Why is Herzfeld unwilling to engage in a serious epistemological discussion with these anthropologists? Why the very arrogant and dismissive tone of his critique? Why a form of 'colonialist critique' that has been voiced before and after by scholars inside and outside of the US and the UK since at least the late 1960’s (Gough 1968, Berreman 1968, Asad 1973, Fabian 1983) is considered unacceptable in a Southern European location? Because it comes from "European" scholars? Because it comes from "Spanish" scholars? Because it comes from (peripheral) nationalist scholars in Europe? Or because he feels that there is a competition for field and knowledge production from these local scholars, something that could undermine Anglo-Saxon authority in that 'area' of study, much in the same way as the subaltern studies school has managed in a very short time to substitute in the centers of knowledge production about South Asia most non-South-Asian origin scholars? Is it an appeal to openness or a practice of closure? We will follow these themes latter in the paper.
Passionate epistemologies and the 'dissimulation of dissimulation in the north'

I want to present another strand of the story of the polemical 1984 article by Moreno. In his critique of Pitt-Rivers' classic of Mediterraneanist anthropology, *The People of the Sierra* (1971[1954]) he writes:

“When Pitt-Rivers in the [second] preface to his book --that, by the way, was not published in the Spanish version-- declares that his objective has been to explain, through an ethnographic example, Georg Simmel's essay about secrecy and the lie, he congratulates himself at not possibly having a better example than Grazalema to prove it, given that --and this is a literal citation-- 'Andalusians are the most accomplished liars I have ever encountered … one never knows what Andalusians think'. / What evidence did Pitt-Rivers have to assert this? His two year experience in Grazalema. How would we qualify the assertion? (…) it shows a total ignorance of the meaning of popular Andalusian culture as a *culture of oppression*, where a series of traits --such as, for example, mistrust disguised as sympathy with strangers, English anthropologist included-- are a mechanism of defense, fruit of centuries old collective experience, in face of that which is external and unknown, which is always something potentially aggressive and source of possible misfortunes (…). In any case, this quality of great liars that the aristocracy of British anthropology attributes to us, he should have looked into it in depth in order to explain it, instead of presenting it, as he does, as if it was a cultural explanation”. (Moreno 1984:73).

The interest of this critique in the context of our paper appears if we compare it with a recent development in US anthropology that has a methodological objective and uses (among other material) precisely this preface to the second edition of Pitt-Rivers' *The People of the Sierra*. I am speaking of Michael Taussig's *Defacement. Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative* (1999).

In this rather obscure and philosophical work, Taussig presents a critique of historical *origins* and social *functions* as methods to approach an understanding of social reality. In his characterization of reality passion and empathy seem to be better ways into cultural understanding than rational analysis. But the position of the anthropologist or historian in communicating this reality, or even the need for doing so, remains obscure in his account. Taussig uses Pitt-Rivers' preface (as well as the entire ethnography) to prove a methodological pitfall predicated on the dialectics of secrecy, revelation and public secrecy. The variable geometries and tensions between reality, performance and authorial narrative involve 1) anthropological subjects' dealings amongst themselves (as observed and interpreted by the British anthropologist) 2) the interaction between the anthropologist and his subjects of study, and 3) between the anthropologist and the reading public (both scholar --i.e. his confrontation via footnotes with E. Hobsbawm-- and non-scholar, but English speaking). Taussig points thus to the unavoidable selective processes of categorization and analysis in the Enlightenment tradition of the social sciences that obscures and silences real life practices as they enshrine others with central explanatory powers. Moreover he stresses the deceptive methodological pretense that description and explanation are possible at all because they are based in the "concealment of ideology" (74), the "charade of scientific detachment" (75) and the repression of passion (76), while adding the concrete grounding of this in a North/South power relationship:
“For what is surely referenced here in this epiphanous encounter between north and south, between the cultivated man of letters from the north and the sun-drenched tillers of the southern soil of untruth, is an uneasy acknowledgement as to a certain secret of the secret in which the south has long had the function of mirroring, in its dishonesty, the dissimulation of dissimulation in the north?” (1999:76-77).

Two things seem to me worth highlighting. First, Taussig's comfortable unawareness of local scholars' (anthropologists and historians) critiques of Pitt-Rivers' ethnography (Moreno 1984, 1993, Frigolé 1980, 1989, Serrán Pagán 1980, Martínez-Alier 1968). This would have given him some insight about important aspects of knowledge production, about what the 'cultivated men of letters from the south' thought of the encounter and about the real politics of the production of truth in Mediterranean anthropology through various forms of concealment. For example, what happens with local scholars' multiple and diverse [even contradictory i.e. Frigolé 1980 and 1989] critiques of Pitt-Rivers' work? How would he deal with their methodological perspectives, some more passionate than others, but all of them with a 'scientific' pretense, therefore within the social science Enlightenment tradition? What happens when social scientists, while aiming at description and explanation do not pretend to be passionless, ideologically neutral or detached? How does their work speak to the work of those that base their knowledge and its authority on the pretense of detachment? How is it part of a political engagement locally, nationally? Also, reading local scholars would have given him an additional information about public secrecy: the fact that the preface to the second edition was not published in the first Spanish edition (1971) although it was contemporary with the English second edition (1971). Why? Was it bad consciousness at calling Andalusians as a whole --as a 'culture'-- liars? Was it self-protection against possible critiques by local 'native' anthropologists such as Moreno? In any case it provided the turn of the screw for the "dissimulation of dissimulation in the north".

However, I am more interested in a second aspect of the comparison between Moreno and Taussig's scholarly exploitation of Pitt-Rivers' secrecy and lie perspective in his ethnography. Taussig makes it a critique of modernist realist pretenses of revealing truth through rational analysis (of functions or origins, i.e. Dunk 2000) and proposes impassioned characterization instead, but from a distance. Moreno, while also making a critique of detachment --"professionals of anthropology that have little interest really in the present and the future of the Andalusian people..."-- proposes going into the historical depths of the production of a 'culture of oppression' and of a meaningful national Andalusian identity that does not eschew class, gender and race fields of force (Moreno 1981a, 1981b, 1981c, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993). In Moreno's critique we see that passionate practice is not simply a self-centered search for pleasure through an abstracted idea of concrete participation that becomes an end in itself for the anthropologist's self. Rather it is actively and outspokenly a political project, a desire for change, an emotional engagement aimed at transforming Andalusian lived reality in a particular direction, through producing particularly useful knowledge towards this aim. As part of a political project then, it is necessarily part of an abstraction, a process of 'fixating' concepts that design and enable particular forms of collective action.

The above can be seen in a recent contribution to a volume on La identidad del pueblo andaluz (The identity of the Andalusian people) where Moreno (2001) explicitly states his intellectual and political program as the participation in the production of an Andalusian
identity in historical, cultural and political terms in order to empower Andalusian people in the context of increasingly globalized market forces and multi-layered structures of governance:

“In no place in the world does national sovereignty exist any longer, as it has been understood up to now: our age is now one of 'shared sovereignties', where a web of knots of different sizes and importance is being woven. These knots will define the structure of future relationships between peoples. If Andalusia does not become one of these knots, it will be excluded. If, on the contrary, it manages to occupy one of these positions, this will mean emerging from the present-day periphery and subalternity. And this is not only a problem of juridical definitions, rather of an everyday cultural and political leading position. There is no other form, presently, of guaranteeing the survival of a people, in our case the Andalusian people, other than through asserting and developing the triple dimension of identity: historical, cultural and political” (2001:160)

And he adds:

“But the identidad-resistencia (identity-resistance) that can be generated today by Andalusian culture should not be understood as an end in itself, but as a means, a necessary preliminary stage, towards the construction of an 'identidad-proyecto' (identity-project) aimed at making possible a less unequal and unjust society than the present one, through a deep transformation of the internal social structure and the termination of the external dependency and subalternity.” (2001:170).

To a 'scientifically detached' intellectual, this program can be read as an attempt at providing a clear conceptual category "Andalusian identity" in order to create something similar to what Gramsci called an historical bloc capable of producing an alternative hegemony for revolutionary purposes. Or, alternatively it could be read as akin to the nationalistic folklorists search for 'origins' (Herzfeld 1987).\(^5\) For the local scholar involved in the production of this quasi homogenizing concept of Andalusian cultural values to be reshaped into tools of struggle against market totalizing values (2001:162-4) it is much more than that. Are we prepared to deal with this sort of politically engaged, local knowledge production without displacing it away from epistemological coevalness? And how would we do it if we eschew all of the unitary frameworks produced by modernity?

The production of knowledge and forms of political engagement

As the above stories highlight the issue of communicability within fields of knowledge is tied both to the institutionalization of particular regimes of truth and to the involvement of these processes with real life issues of dominance and exploitation, with the reproduction of particular structures of inequality, or alternatively the substitution of those structures by other ones. I am well aware that my own discourse is well entrenched in modernist assumptions about history as a continuous and connected (therefore unique) process tying past and present realities with imaginings of possible futures. It is not one, however, that incorporates as its foundational corpus an idea of a particular teleology of transitions into a particular social, political or economic future. My perspective remains critical of Foucault's notion of
'genealogy' as opposed to that of 'history' for I try to place the concrete analyses of local or regional historical processes in the wider movement of a global, connected history. And I try to follow the threads that create feelings of community and coherence, the production of multiple histories enabling political agency, from the raw materials of heterogeneous and contradictory situated experiences.

If the process of 'genealogy' oriented against the power effects of 'scientific' discourse has been a major epistemological breakthrough for the social sciences, it seems to me nevertheless that it has also produced a paradoxical catatonic effect that was not intended by Foucault. The ultimate goal of the genealogy process was, for Foucault, an attempt to free historical local knowledges from their subjugation in order to enable them to counter the coercion of a fixed, unitary, scientific theoretical discourse, and this with the explicit aim of empowering them for struggle. Archeology as 'method', genealogy as 'tactic' (Foucault 1979 [1976a]:131). Unlike what has happened to many of his followers in the social sciences, Foucault had a political project explicitly concerned with specific, local struggles. He was deeply engaged in the active transformation of social reality as he experienced it, he was definitely not only interested in the unveiling or exposure of multiple discourse/knowledge processes, but also wanted to "exercise power through the production of truth" (Foucault 1979[1976b]:140).

However, and this is the unresolvable tension in Foucauldian epistemology, the 'production of truth' from where we may 'exercise power' in our struggles against diverse forms of domination will have to be eventually inscribed in some kind of 'fixed' hierarchies, referring for example to a particular concept of 'justice'. It will also have to be inscribed in a geometry of objectives for change and thus get a set course, an 'orientation', a determined 'sense' of/for action. Yet it is obvious that the literal definition of 'genealogy' presents an absolute arbitrariness of being, a permanent fluidity of everything: time, space, people, concepts, relations, knowledge (Foucault 1979[1971]:13). It is difficult then, from this epistemological position to engage with reality in an attempt to transform it because there is a break --instead of a dialectical tension-- "between 'real history' on the one hand and the historical commentaries and texts of social actors and intellectuals on the other" (Roseberry and O'Brien 1991:12).

We are then left with the question of how to render politically productive the tension between the production of multiple situated knowledges and concrete political engagements. In an interesting debate on the historiography of racisms Ann Laura Stoler raises the crucial problem of 'the politics of epistemologies'. Her analysis of anti-racist histories of racisms leads her to underscore: 1) "the pursuit of origins that constitutes 'traditional history' is a moral pursuit that is fundamentally ahistoric" (Stoler 1997b:248) and 2) "a search for racisms' origins both shapes and is shaped by how we think about race in the present and what we imagine is effective anti-racist scholarship today" (Stoler 1997b:249). Her point is that the focus on "fixity, permanency, somatics and biology" (Stoler 1997b:249) as the 'original' visible physical form of racism hides the fundamental ambiguity always present in racisms between 'ocular epistemologies' of somatic taxonomies and the fluid plasticity of the intangible qualities that are social and cultural elements of racial political practices. And her conclusion is that "if racisms have never been based on somatics alone nor on a notion of fixed essence, then progressive scholarship committed to showing the protean features of racial taxonomies does little to subvert the logic of racisms".
since that logic itself takes the plasticity and substitutability of racial essences as a defining feature of it" (Stoler 1997b:252). In sum, that both a) epistemological error deflects anti-racist struggle from the real issues and b) that contemporary anti-racist political agendas inform histories of racisms' origins (see also Stoler 1997a:201). If we think of 'political rationalities' as an important part of political economy as Stoler suggests (1997b:250) we can better situate our knowledge-making as part of our own political agendas (anti-, pro-), but also, as we attempt to analyze or communicate with other forms of knowledge we need to be able to gauge the weight of power struggles in the theoretical structures (and teleological histories) they produce.

Consciousness then --and coherent consciousness as 'knowledge'-- is a material expression of experience --giving meaning to social relations in real life-- and is also a material force, exereting pressures leading to change (Thompson 1978:97, 171, 175-6; Williams 1977:75-82). It is in light of these discursive practices or political rationalities that I want to approach the issue of knowledge production and political engagement. Fabian (1983:152-165) has developed the concepts of 'allochroic distancing' and 'coevalness' in his effort to historicize anthropological practice and find a way out of dominating forms of producing knowledge. His insight stresses the unavoidable coevalness of communication in the field encounter but also in the encounter with other forms of produced knowledge through polemic. That is there is a recognition of conceptual co-presence, therefore summoning us to engage with it as a present reality (and a political one) and not as something definitely enclosed in a past that is no more, or is in a realm of other-than-knowledge cultural production (cf. also Amselle 2000:211).

In my opinion, we need to know more about the global and local histories that shape a particular order of domination, its material processes and discursive frameworks, and the micropolitical and macropolitical fields of power. Categories that shape local knowledges should be treated as part and parcel of a historically formed discursive framework during conflictive nationalist, colonial, post-colonial, etc. historical times and spaces. We should engage with the fact that these categories take form as part of tensions between different social and political agents at different times, agents who get involved in multiple and heterogeneous relationships in the course of trying to secure differential access to resources and power, while forwarding and resisting claims over land, work, symbols, etc. through the production of different discourses that all have a pretense of coherence (Roseberry 1989, 1994).

Exploring epistemological barriers to real engagement

At this point I would like to develop further 1) the issue of comparison vs. incommensurability, and the possibility of thinking of any 'knowledge' as beyond communication, but also the tension between distancing and participation; 2) the issue of 'project' and the break from the epistemologies of 'modernity', that is, the capacity to foster change of post-modern fragmentary epistemologies where categories and knowledge are 'multi-sited', endlessly self-reflexive and permanently unstable; 3) the issue of markets for knowledge products in relation to the reproduction of power structures, setting the field of forces for 'authority' in knowledge, within the academy as well as without it, in local, national and international arenas. In this regard I would want to show that political engagement and
'project' development is not an exclusive prerogative of the Left, on the contrary, and that 'peripheral' intellectuals are not a homogeneous body of 'counter-hegemonic' knowledge producers either.

In order to develop these points in a comparative dimension I will briefly explore the case of post-colonial South Asian scholars with the aim to address the obstacles for real engagement produced by an abandonment of 'realism' and of modernist unitary epistemological frameworks. The post-colonial critique of knowledge production is based on 1) power and 2) discursive regimes. The relationship between these two concepts is posed in such a way that their articulation constructs both the object of study and the paradigm (in a Khunian sense) or authorial narrative (in a post-modern sense) in which social relationships are explored in search of an explanation. There is no fixity (no essentialism?) to the object of study, but constant displacement as the power relations enclosed in the teleological and unitary histories of modernity (colonialist, nationalist, marxist) seek to produce a particular knowledge in order to serve the perpetuation (or subversion) of the existing order (Guha 1983). Following a trend that had its origins in the late 1960s Euro-American historiography, first among the French Annales group with the 'Histoire de la vie Privée' and feminist historians, but almost simultaneously among Italian historians doing micro-history, British Social Historians such as Raphael Samuel and the History Workshop group, and German Social Historians such as Lüdtke with the Alltageschiste group, the aim of the Subaltern Studies group was to give voice to the 'subaltern', meaning by this a large and heterogeneous category of people. The originality of the group developed as it drove closer to post-modernist or Foucauldian assumptions and away from Marxist social history. That is, when it abandoned realism. When discourse became the only referent of reality, and knowledge production became self-referential. As Prakash (1990) defines the new post-Orientalist scholarship "First, it posits that we can proliferate histories, cultures, and identities arrested by previous essentializations. Second, to the extent that those made visible by proliferation are also provisional, it refuses the erection of new foundations in history, culture, and knowledge." (1990:406). Moreover, this project is situated as a political one "an issue of engaging the relations of domination" (1990:407) where "the power attributed to the knowledge about the past makes historical writing into a political practice and turns the recent post-Orientalists historical accounts into contestatory acts." (407).

Following other critiques of post-colonial perspectives (Dirlik 2000, Subrahmanyam 2000, Sarkar 1997, 1999, Pouchepadass 2000, O’Hanlon & Washbrook 1992) I want to underline the difficulty that this epistemological vision poses to real political engagement. Critiques have pointed to the fact that post-modernist perspectives are themselves a 'grand narrative' and are inserted in present-day economic and political fields of force (Subrahmanyam 2000:95, Dirlik 2000:77), they have pointed out that those producing this post-colonial knowledge are themselves fully a part of the centers of knowledge production, mainly in US universities (Bénéï 2000, Friedmann 2000) and therefore occupied in academic power struggles within it, rather than in subversive action in 'subaltern' locations. Some have pointed to the danger that post-colonialist essentialization of local culture can pose for justifying the nationalist Right politics locally in India (Bénéï 2000, Pouchepadass 2000:179).

As a matter of fact it is interesting to compare the work of 'subalternist' historians in the US, with the rest (in Europe and India). Kaviraj [SOAS, London] (2000:75) for example, points to the dependency of post-colonial theory in regard to Western knowledge, and seems
to propose a detachment from it linguistically (2000:79) and theoretically (2000:84-5). Not so much a closure of a different realm of knowledge but a vindication of unawareness of Western theory, and Western debates (cf. also Ramanujan and Narayana Rao in Subrahmanyam 2000:92). On the other hand, a historian such as Sumit Sarkar [University of New Delhi, originally a part of the Subaltern Studies group, and actively involved in the public critique of the fascistization of the Hindu nationalist movement (through his contributions in daily newspapers, teaching, and writing in Bengali and English), was not prepared to forgo a Marxian idea of differentiation within the framework of a unique history and, significantly, of a realist history. In Sharkar’s view then, 1) different struggles or localized 'histories' are perceived as part of a unique although differentiated process, 2) that there is a distinction between description of a past reality as gathered through documentary information and the attempts by government to construct a particular narrative as well as a particular discourse.

What is striking in his presentation about a particular struggle over historical knowledge production is its grounding in reality, that is in concrete, present-day political struggles in India. Indeed, it is real that Sarkar has had serious censorship problems with his account of the history of the anti-colonial movements in India because he stated through documentary evidence that right-wing Hindu nationalist movements such as those in power until April 2004 were conspicuously absent from the fight for freedom. What is also striking as opposed to the ecumenical discourse of proliferation of discursive realities and shifting perspectives of post-colonial theory is his outright disqualification of 'old fashioned, discredited' discourses about history, as well as the clear ' foundational' and 'modernist' paradigm at work both in the presentation of the past and in the struggle to spread a particular knowledge of the past in the present and for present-day struggles, namely the struggle against the rise of a totalitarian state (Sarkar 1993, Sarkar in Frontline, V.7, 2000).

To my mind, Kaviraj and Sarkar's intellectual positions represent two different politically engaged possibilities in the struggle against hegemonic control of knowledge production and their effective subversive power. The former says that we do not have to convince those in power that the particular knowledge we produce is valuable, we just have to give it value on our own terms and ignore the center's (Western) unawareness of it. As a corollary we will be empowered to value non-scientific, non-rational, non-modern (non-secular, literary, ritual etc.) forms of knowledge if we so decide. The result of this project is the absolute incommensurability of forms of knowledge, the 'autonomy' of the subaltern consciousness (Pouchepadass 2000:177-82). Although this sounds extremely radical, it is in my opinion an expression of the very liberal willful notion that one is free to make history as one wishes. But what does incommensurability entail? It entails the impossibility of comparison and generalization therefore impairing the construction of 'grand narratives' including the possibility of producing new emancipatory narratives to replace discredited 'modernist' ones (cf. Pouchepadass 2000:181; Dirlik 2000). The impossibility of abstraction across localized and extremely diverse and often contradictory experiences of knowledge production. The impossibility of a common 'project' (is this exclusively a 'modernist' concept as well?) of any sort because of the endless dynamics of fragmentation (in time and space). How do we deal with these sorts of propositions that eschew comparison as a 'foundational' principle? Of propositions that preclude a unified language of some sort that would make communication possible and hence collective action? What are the concrete political realities of such projects? Theoretically anthropologist have dealt with the issue of comparison and
incommensurability for a long time, and have produced such concepts as 'emic' and 'etic' which, as we all know are tricky (because of the objectification of anthropological subjects that they entail) but useful (because it is an attempt to bridge the incommensurability of radically different forms of knowledge production and the need to enable communication).

The case of Sarkar, on the other hand, proposes the struggle for control of the locations of knowledge production in a concrete situation. But, although he underlines, in his view of history, the multiplicity of struggles that converge in the anti-British struggle, he defends a 'modern' unitary conception of social history, where different forms of struggle predicated on different experiences of reality and different (but not autonomous) forms of consciousness, are linked to a unitary movement of history through the reference to a real reality. It is also significant that his particular 'modernist' version of history is related to a 'modernist' political emancipatory project and is actively involved in trying to counter the right-wing nationalist government's control of knowledge production.

Responsibility and communication in a World Network

The cases presented above serve as comparative stances of the involvement of social scientists in transformative projects of reality. I am going to go back, now to my initial story of the Andalusian anthropologist Isidoro Moreno and his particular way of knowledge production and how one might deal with it in the event of a World Anthropologies Network. Is it possible for a worldwide 'scientific' community of anthropologists to be open enough to others' passion as to be able to communicate with scholars who are working in their own places? To achieve their goal such anthropologists are partly renouncing the distancing and 'objectivity' of the conventional professional anthropologist, a distancing that is belied by the 'cultural shock' experience that they claim is evidence to their proximity and immersion? Is it possible for anthropologists to be open to concepts and paradigms of knowledge that are alien from the one (whatever it is) they have, or is hegemonic in the academia? How is the participation in the struggles and debates of their own society of anthropologists such as Moreno and historians such as Sarkar, different from the methodological oxymoron of anthropology: 'participant observation'? How is the fact of having a project about the transformation of the society we live in and we observe and study different from 'social engineering'? What makes it different (we should keep in mind that often an 'emancipatory' intention or discourse is an important part of both right and left political agendas)? Who decides?

The first thing that we have to deal with is the fact that anthropologists (and other social scientists) who are engaged in a political project use stable concepts and unitary laws of movement (whatever they be). If their objective is to transform reality, they have to have a realist (not just discursive) sense of reality. They will need categories adequate to the political projects they want to engage in (this has been the practice always among those holding power as well as among those wanting to become empowered) and they will need a structure of meaning that makes explicit the relationship between those categories and the relationship between categories, analysis of reality and transformation of reality, that is, a link, through experience that connects consciousness with practice (O'Hanlon & Washbrook 1992, Dirlik 2000). Moreover, they will aim not so much at fragmenting realities but at producing a collective will (Gramsci 1987:185).
The knowledge produced by and for political engagement on the ground, eliminates distancing and tends to create stable, unitary and directional frameworks and concepts of the 'modernist' type. This type of knowledge is based on a sense of responsibility, that sets very clearly 1) the relationship between the anthropologist and those he observes 2) the issues that have to be explored to get a better knowledge and set forth some kind of organized, transformative project, 3) the concepts and models that should be developed for it. Engaged anthropologists in the 1960s such as Gough (1968) represent already an expression of this.

But outlining the framework of mutual responsibility between those participating in a coeval reality that is meant to be crystallized as knowledge of some kind is, I contend, the only way that we can create a real space for communication. Responsibility is what links knowledge production to reality, real people, real suffering, real power. Responsibility is what makes knowledge into a project. 'Participant observation' on the contrary, is what creates distancing out of what is irretrievably an experience that creates responsibilities while it lasts, the ethnographic fieldwork. But is distancing necessary in order to create some grounds for comparison, some shared discourse across places and types of knowledge? My feeling is that some distancing is necessary if what we aim at is communication and as Williams said, through tensions, growth.

But we have other obstacles to deal with if we aim at creating this planetary space of anthropological encounter. Obviously one is language: To be forced to use International English in order to communicate more widely is in itself an aspect of oppression and dependency (Kaviraj 2000; Comelles 2002), but I won't expand this question. What I am more preoccupied about has to do with local political struggles and knowledge legitimization processes at the peripheries and how, from the distance of being in another place and coming from a different disciplinary history, we are to approach them without having a background, as we say in Spanish, 'sin conocimiento de causa'. I have always been surprised by the 'errors of judgement' that some of my foreign colleagues make about the work and political positioning of some of my Spanish colleagues. I myself make a judgment from my particular academic experience, linked to a particular history of the discipline within Spain, and from my political positioning regarding present-day issues in Spain (and the world). However biased my appreciation of the knowledge produced by my anthropologist colleagues is, I can situate it in concrete practices and particular histories that help me 'understand' what they are really saying under the often indistinguishable use of the latest conceptual jargon borrowed from abroad (Narotzky 2002). Foreign friends and colleagues of mine with similar political positions and biases are incapable of reading between the lines, until they become aware of the local histories and struggles. My question is how do we build the criteria necessary to the 'understanding' of the work of colleagues whose disciplinary histories and political positioning with respect to real world issues we ignore? Is it an unnecessary preoccupation? Is blind openness a 'good' per-se? Can knowledge, through exchange, appear as detached from its process of production? What sort of vision do we have about knowledge flows as different form the actual 'market' of knowledge, one of generalized reciprocity?

Let me recount another story that will clarify this in relation to Spanish anthropology. In February of 2000 there was a pogrom-like event against North African immigrants in the town of El Ejido, Almería (Andalusia), a town governed by the Partido Popular (Right). Under the eyes of a non-intervening and complacent local police, Spanish residents attacked immigrants, in an organized way, destroying their property, desecrating
their cult space and driving them to the mountains to seek refuge. For the then governing party Partido Popular (PP) the events had been a spontaneous burst of anger from the Spanish residents at the non-integrating practices of the immigrants and their criminal behavior (the alleged cause of the pogrom was the assassination of a local girl by a Moroccan immigrant). But what I am interested in exposing here is the participation as 'experts' in the production of knowledge about this event and more generally issues around immigration policies and multiculturalism by Spanish anthropologists. Before the events took place, several anthropologists such as E. Martín (Universidad de Sevilla) and F. Checa (Universidad de Granada) from Andalusia had been doing fieldwork in the area of the Poniente Almeriense where El Ejido is located, trying to evaluate the realities of immigrant workers' life in intensive plastic agriculture. The work of Martín et al. (2001) was being co-financed by the European Union and the Junta de Andalucía (Autonomous government in the hands of the Social-Democratic PSOE). Their work was mainly empirical but clearly related to a loosely 'political economic' framework, highlighting the impact of economic transnational processes and national exclusionary policies. An anthropologist from Madrid, Ubaldo Martínez Veiga (Universidad Autónoma Madrid) was also doing fieldwork in the area (Martínez Veiga 2001). Close to the union Comisiones Obreras (Left) he was moved to respond to the role of the unions in organizing and defending immigrant workers' rights. The work he produced was very theoretical and framed in a strong political economy conceptual structure. After the events, these anthropologists began being very vocal about the knowledge they had produced, participating in many local forums such as union meetings, immigrants associations, etc. All of them tell how they experienced forms of intimidation, from censorship to life threats. A few months after the events of El Ejido, in December 15th 2000, the new Ley de Extranjería, excluding illegal immigrants from basic civil rights such as association, public meeting, union membership, health and education was approved by the Senate (PP majority). In January 4th 2001, 12 immigrants die in Lorca, Murcia. In application of the new Ley de Extranjería repression hits the victims: illegal immigrants in the area are expelled from the country in order to apply for legal admission. Local agricultural entrepreneurs in Lorca are exonerated from their exploitive and inhuman practices regarding immigrants. While immigrants explicitly point to the new law as causing the increase in the death toll.

In this context the PP government creates an institution 'Foro de la Integración de los Inmigrantes' and places as its president an anthropologist, Mikel Azurmendi (an ex-member of the Basque nationalist group ETA, he is presently in 'exile' from the Basque country after allegedly receiving death threats, and is now close to the PP's views and policies against peripheral nationalism and immigration). Soon Azurmendi produces a book Estampas del Ejido (2001), and numerous newspaper contributions (Azurmendi 2002a, 2002b) where he explains the events as a conflict between cultures, where immigrants are responsible for upsetting local ways and lacking a proper 'work culture' and 'democratic tradition' and justifies the government's repressive policies towards immigrants. After the public presentation of these views by the anthropologist 'expert' Azurmendi, a strong reaction took place among the many anthropologists that did not share his views. Following an initiative of Isidoro Moreno (then president of the Anthropological Associations of the Spanish State, FAAEE) a document of protest about Azurmendi's positions and questioning his professional capacity, was written by Martín and Moreno and sent to be signed by all other academic anthropologists. Of a total of 129 anthropologists [tenured in universities] 63 signed [some non-tenured], that is approximately 50%. It is difficult to assert the 'reasons' for not supporting such a 'corporative' move, defending the anthropological profession against an alien body...
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(Azurmendi). Many who signed the document would not have written it in the same way, but felt that it was a move towards positioning anthropology in a particular framework of responsibility. Many who did not sign did so also for 'corporative' reasons: not voicing public critiques against a 'colleague'. Others probably did it for pragmatic reasons: there is a lot of funding from government agencies for doing research on immigration. Finally others plainly supported Azurmendi's views.

So where does this leave us for gauging the value of knowledge produced in peripheral locations, when we ignore the practices and realities that create a context for 'understanding' the complex power relationships and contradictory projects involved in its production? The post-colonial critique has often 'essentialized' non-hegemonic locations in the production of knowledge, as it has essentialized Euroamerican locations. But as the case I have just presented shows, the production of anthropological knowledge in the peripheries is diverse and attached to multiple political agendas spanning from the Right to the Left, from the justification and support of governmental policies (whatever those be) to their critique, from 'institutional' forms of agitation to 'alternative' forms of agitation. I am not driving toward a proposal of censorship: I may learn a lot from reading Azurmendi (one has to know the arguments of one's opponents), and I want to know what he has to say as an anthropologist. However in order to be able to appreciate his knowledge and make something of it, that is, in order for the communication of that knowledge to be really possible I need to know where he stands on real life issues. 'Scientific' detachment has made us believe that knowledge can flow and communicate without being grounded, not only with respect to the author but also to the historical context of its production. And it is partly so: that is how we read most of what we read in our Western hegemonic knowledge production context. But we always have some clues, precisely because the hegemony has produced a 'small' world: we know what sort of journals publish what, we read the acknowledgements and get an idea of the personal context of the author, we know about the political positioning in the US academy because it is well covered, discussed and publicized in the many forums open to it. But we do not have the same sort of knowledge about India, or China, or Morocco, or Russia to name but a few. Would a world anthropology network provide a space not only to access detached forms of knowledge but also to situate them in their production processes?

World Anthropologies: a Realist Proposal

We get back now to the need to communicate our knowledge and to create growth out of communication. How would this be possible within this very 'politicized' environment that I have described, within this lack of distancing, this unavoidable and obvious participation of anthropologists who work 'at home' in the very real issues and debates that produce the present? Should we, following Herzfeld, discard 'epistemological nativism' as un-scientific and engage with it only as an object of study? Should we, following Taussig, opt for self-contained characterizations of passionate experience? Should we, following the lead of Kaviraj, ignore what we do not know? The problem is difficult to solve and is a classical anthropological problem after all, spiced with history and politics and the Damocles sword of post-colonial and Foucauldian critique. It is the problem of incommensurability and comparison, of detachment and participation, of the degree to which knowledge production is political from the outset and the need for communication.
As I see it, there is no way out of political positioning in the production of anthropological knowledge. In this, the post-modern critique made us aware of the profound political implications of seemingly objective forms of knowledge, that were nevertheless enmeshed in a particular regime of truth. But do we throw away all the knowledge that we know was produced from a particular (intended or unintended) political position? Do we learn nothing from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, Arguedas, Rivers, or Malinowski, for example? We undoubtedly do. So how do we proceed? We situate them and their concepts in a historical context, a reality in the past that gives a particular meaning to what they said. Then we proceed analogically bringing those descriptions of reality, the concepts and structural frameworks, to work with our own present reality that we want to explain; we stretch the concepts; we confront them; we create new ones out of the creative synthesis with other concepts from other times and authors; we produce a new framework or modify an older one, to give meaning to the relation between those concepts we use in reference to the reality we want to understand and change (or support).

In anthropology, moreover, we use the ethnographic descriptions (however critical we are about how they were produced) as material for comparison, we adopt in this regard something similar to the 'suspension of disbelief' that realist fiction entails, we have to trust that there is some reference to 'real' reality in the description. Because we need to proceed in this way through communication of other works of very different kinds to think and grow in our thinking about reality. And, to be able to do that in a creative way we need explicitness, that is, we need to be told (or to know or learn) what the political project of the author is. This will empower us to 'understand' better his or her work, and to relocate knowledge in reference to a concrete reality. We can only learn something from discourses that are alien to our concrete reality and to our theoretical framework if the responsibility of the author in relation to his/her reality is clearly outlined, if an effort is made towards explicitness. Then we will be able to place that knowledge or its critique in our theoretical framework and proceed towards our own project.

Something similar is what Ignasi Terradas (Universitat de Barcelona) proposed with his reappraisal of the methodology of 'ethnographic realism' (1993):

“To the extent that the ethnography exists, it exists as a thing in the Durkheimian sense and in the Marxist sense. Objectivity and alienation are the stereotypes of the failed ethnography. Subjectivity and metonymy are those of a pseudo-ethnography. The realist ethnography moves in between a reality that always exceeds it and a theorization that is an approximation. (...) Judgements about ethnographies must come from their mutual confrontation. If not we won't get ethnographic knowledge but psychological, stylistic, moral, political, etc. [knowledge]. (...) The inter-ethnographic dialogue is what realizes the appropriate and wide meaning of the ethnography. That is its real meaning, that which appears in the context of the flow of ethnographies itself.” (1993:120)

For Terradas it is the relationship between ethnographies that constitutes anthropology as "a scientific (analytic) and artistic (evocative) reality" (1993:120) and it is the possibility to apprehend the distinction between description and interpretation in ethnographic writing that constituted the epistemological break in anthropology:
“Our point of departure now is that realist ethnographic composition and anthropological theory have to come from the total confrontation of several ethnographies. (...) the pioneer effort of anthropologists at the beginning of this [20th] century stems in their forecast of such a confrontation. That is the reason why they made the effort to provide an explicitness without precedents in their descriptions, methods and theories. The ethnographic text that gets to us after this epistemologic break that we can easily characterize as the revolution of explicitness in anthropology, is what distinguishes ethnographic realism and marks a very important stage in the history of the discipline.” (Terradas 1993:121)

What Terradas' paper points to is the importance of ethnography in our discipline, but an ethnography whose aim is to transcend a particular experience through its aprioristic will to communicate with other ethnographies and through this unending parallactic exercise try to better understand reality. If it is true that the production of ethnographic knowledge has to be historicized it is nevertheless our particular link to reality as a social science and we should re-learn to deal with it. It is from within our ethnographic experience, thinking and writing, that communication with other anthropologists' work can proceed but also, unappealingly, the will to communicate has to be part of the life and growth of anthropology. It is from our reference to lived reality, a unitary, contemporaneous and shared reality, that modes of responsibility can be made explicit. I contend that both distance and participation are necessary for communication to take place and that political projects are an unavoidable reality of the products of social scientists. Only hegemonic forms of knowledge present themselves as apolitical.

Endnotes

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1 I am indebted to Marisol de la Cadena for the concept and for making me think about this issue.

2 Although Llobera is one of the few early 'cosmopolitan' anthropologists in Spain.

3 The attempt at controlling particular fields for ethnographic research is an accusation that has been thrown at some anthropologists from within Spanish anthropology. There is a legend that recounts that somewhere in the early 1970s' there was a meeting of three anthropologists (Esteve Fabregat, Lisón Tolosana and Isidoro Moreno) who partitioned Spain into closed areas where they would have control over who was allowed to do field work in them, referring basically to the young generations of Spanish anthropologists. Esteve controlled Catalonia, Lisón controlled Galicia and Moreno controlled Andalusia. However,
exclusion has not been confirmed in actual practice although early students of them when doing field work in Spain tended to work in these areas.

4 We may recall here Appadurai's 'gatekeeper concepts' in area studies (1986) and Herzfeld's analysis of the creation of 'fixed' concepts in Mediterranean anthropology (1987).

5 The project that Moreno presents is a clear search for origins and history and oblivious of foucauldian emphases on genealogies (1979[1971]).

6 During the seminar, Shiv Vishvanathan remarked to me that Sarkar had been involved in 'official' politics and been pampered by previous governments. He had then supported and excluded particular histories and historians and his present day harassment situation had to be understood in the context of these long-term and complex processes in Indian politics and academia. In short, Shiv's point to me is that Sarkar was not an 'innocent victim' in a dichotomic good-guys bad-guys scenario. In my view his remark lends support to my argument (below) that grounding in the political practices of scholars is a crucial element for knowledge communication.

7 Indeed, it is amazing how we are prepared to accept, even if it is to oppose it, the hegemonic discourse, and how in this process we often resort to adopting and adapting a large part of its conceptual tools and driving narratives, while we tend to dismiss without second thoughts or more often to ignore non-hegemonic discourses about society.

8 Another anthropologist from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Carlos Giménez, who works on immigration but had not done fieldwork directly in that area was also very vocal during a first moment.

9 Martínez Veiga and Martín, personal communications.

10 The document and the signatories appeared in Página Abierta, n.128, año 12, pp.46-47

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Discussing theory in anthropology often means to discuss the discipline as a whole. Another possibility is to pinpoint certain topics to thoroughly explore them. But my option here is located more within the tradition of a sociology of knowledge. I view the issues that anthropologists address, their theoretical preoccupations, contributions to knowledge, dilemmas and mistakes, the heuristic and epistemological capabilities of the discipline, as embedded in certain social, cultural and political dynamics that unfold in contexts which, in turn, are differently and historically structured by changing power relations. The main sociological and historical forces that traverse anthropology’s political and epistemological fields are connected to the dynamics of the world system and to those of the nation-states, especially regarding the changing roles “otherness” or “alterity” may play in such international and national scenarios.

Other introductory remarks must be made. This article is heavily inspired in a collective movement called the World Anthropologies Network (WAN) of which I am a member. “World Anthropologies” aim at pluralizing the prevailing visions of anthropology in a juncture where the hegemony of Anglo-Saxon discourses on difference persists. It stems from the realization that, in an age of heightened globalization, anthropologists have failed to discuss consistently the current nature of their practice and its transformations on a global scale. This is perhaps a result of the international hegemony of U.S. anthropology, and its tendency to confound its own internal crisis with a global one.

“World Anthropologies” want to contribute to the articulation of a diversified anthropology that is more aware of the social, epistemological, and political conditions of its own production. The network has three inter-related goals: a) to examine critically the international dissemination of anthropology - as a changing set of Western discourses and practices - within and across national power fields, and the processes through which this dissemination takes place; b) to contribute to the development of a plural landscape of anthropologies that is both less shaped by metropolitan hegemonies and more open to the heteroglossic potential of globalization; c) to foster conversations among anthropologists from various regions of the world in order to assess the diversity of relations between regional or national anthropologies and a contested, power-laden, disciplinary discourse. Such a project is part of a critical anthropology of anthropology, one that decenters, re-historicizes, and pluralizes what has been taken as “anthropology” so far. It questions not only the contents but also the terms and the conditions of anthropological conversations.

The last introductory remarks refer to my understanding of anthropology as cosmopolitics. Cosmopolitics are discourses and modes of doing politics that are concerned...
with their global reach and impact and are embedded in conflicts regarding the role of difference and diversity in the construction of polities. I thus view anthropology as a discourse about the structure of alterity (Krotz 1997) that pretends to be universal but that, at the same time, is highly sensitive to its own limitations and to the efficacy of other cosmopolitics. We could say that anthropology is a cosmopolitan political discourse about the importance of diversity for humankind.

Looking at anthropology as a cosmopolitics is not an act devoid of implications. It means, right from the beginning that anthropology is not the only discourse on diversity’s importance, in spite of its sophistication. In fact, we should expect anthropology to be one of the most sophisticated cosmopolitics on diversity since it is an academic discipline. But, a shamanistic discourse of an Yanomami Indian in Brazil’s Amazonia may also represent a cosmopolitics, and, this is indeed the case. See the cultural intertextuality present in the speeches of the Yanomami leader Davi Kopenawa who articulates shamanistic discourses on the fate of the earth and global environmental discourse (Albert 1995). It also means that anthropology’s position in the intellectual/academic market needs not to be restricted to the savage slot, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1991) put it. The increased variety of alterities prompted by globalization processes have, since quite sometime now, brought many different subjects to the attention of the anthropologists. Another important implication of viewing anthropology as a cosmopolitics is the awareness that the history of North-Atlantic academic anthropology is not sufficient to account for the history of the anthropological knowledge on a global scale. This is due not only to the specificities of the histories of anthropologies in different national settings but also to the fact that other cosmopolitics have developed in other regions of the world and have configured a variety of knowledges akin to what would later be known as anthropology, the “academic discipline that made its first appearance in the North Atlantic region” (Danda 1995: 23). Mexican anthropologists, for instance, usually locate the beginning of Mexican “anthropology” in the 16th century and refer in particular to the writings of monks such as Bernardino de Sahagún as the founding moment of anthropological thought in that country (Lomnitz 2002: 132). Ajit K. Danda rightly considers that it is necessary to distinguish between anthropology as an “academic discipline” of anthropology as a “body of knowledge”. The latter comprises, in my own terms, a cosmopolitics. Danda goes on to say that it “appears as a mistaken notion to assume that the rest of the world was void of anthropological knowledge and until such impetus from the North Atlantic region had spread elsewhere, there was no significant exercise worth the reference from those areas” (Danda 1995: 23). He exemplifies with ancient Indian literature going back as far as 1350 B.C. when the Manava Dharmasåstra (The Sacred Science of Man) was written. Anthropology is thus a Western cosmopolitics that consolidated itself as a formal academic discipline in the 20th century within a growing Western university system that expanded throughout the world.

Like other cosmopolitics anthropology reflects the historical dynamics of the world system, especially those related to the structure of alterity. Let me put it more straight: some of the most fundamental changes in anthropology in the 20th century were due to changes in the subject position of anthropology’s “objet” par excellence, native groups all across the planet. This also means that theory in anthropology reflects world politics and, by extension, that theory in anthropology is always/already political.
To better understand this critical anthropology of anthropology a brief consideration of how I envision the discipline’s trajectory in the 20th century is in need. The following arguments revolve around transformations that took place mostly within hegemonic anthropologies. Hegemonic anthropologies are discursive formations and institutional practices that have been associated with the normalization of anthropology under academic modalities chiefly in the United States, Britain and France (see Restrepo and Escobar, 2004). Anglo-Saxon anthropologies, especially North-American anthropology, represent interesting scenarios to see the intersections between national and world systems of power. I want to show by the end of the next section that, currently, there are new agents at play, a situation that opens unexpected challenges and perspectives. Such new agency is not made up of leaders of indigenous populations transformed by modernization nor of “exotic” migrants in global cities, important forces for the problematization of hegemonic anthropologies. This turn the new force comes from within anthropology itself. I am referring to the increasingly important role that non-hegemonic anthropologies play in the production and dissemination of knowledge on a global scale.

Transformations of world systems of power

The first decades of the 20th century, until World War Two, were moments of great expansion and consolidation of anthropology in many countries. Institutions were found and international networks were created in ways that replicated existing geopolitical relationships among loci of the world system in a period when both empires and nation-states were firmly established. It was a foundational and triumphant moment. Anthropology started to be a discipline with a profile of its own, to have a growing number of institutions dedicated to its growth and reproduction as well as an increasingly visible mass of practitioners. Besides the North-American, British and French hegemonic anthropologies, various anthropologies were starting to expand in such places as Japan, Mexico and Russia. The education of main founding figures of diverse “national anthropologies” in Anglo-Saxon centers together with international exchange often were a basis for cooperation and dissemination of anthropological knowledge that created a sense of sharing a same field of research goals and disciplinary programs. Since anthropology and traveling have been always associated, from its first moments anthropology tended to develop within cosmopolitan frameworks and networks.

The history of Mexican and Japanese anthropologies well illustrate how the expansion of this period was characterized by relationships of anthropology with processes of nation- and empire-building. After the Mexican revolution, the need to integrate Indians/peasants to the nation-state was the main force behind the growth of an _antropología indigenista_ with the support of powerful state institutions (Krotz, forthcoming). First worried about the origins of Japanese culture, Japanese anthropologists were soon to follow the colonial expansion of their nation-state and do field research in countries, such as Korea and China, were imperial Japanese hegemony was exerted (Yamashita, forthcoming). In sum, the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were moments of foundation and expansion that coincided with the growing power of nation-state and imperial systems. With different nationalisms and colonialisms in place, natives were mostly viewed through modern eyes as peoples who...
Second World War, a fundamental moment of rearrangement of the world system, would radically change this panorama. It was an inflection of the previous global expansive period, a moment of redefinition of the relationship between anthropology and the nation-state that would have impacts for generations to come. If, in many situations, the British providing the most visible case, anthropology’s relationships with state interests happened under the umbrella of colonial administration, now, war invaded the very core of the discipline in a much more intense and complete way than during First World War. American anthropologists had been involved to some extent with intelligence efforts during First World War, a conflict that, contrary to World War Two, never generated a total consensus on the part of North-American intellectuals. Many of them defended a neutral position. According to Marcio Goldman and Federico Neiburg (2002: 188), “in the field of anthropology, disagreements reached a culminating point when, right after the War, in its annual meeting of 1919, a censorship vote removed Franz Boas from the presidency of the American Anthropological Association. In spite of the fact that the explicit reason was the public denouncement of the participation of anthropologists in federal agencies of intelligence and espionage, in reality the AAA was also censoring Boas for his pacifist positions against the American intervention in World War One. As Stocking observed, the climate of exacerbated patriotism after 1918 could not tolerate pacifist ideas formulated by an author who was seen by some as a suspect German immigrant of Jewish origin” (Goldman and Neiburg 2002: 188). A few decades later, Boas would consider abandoning his career as an anthropologist to combat Nazism (idem: 194-195), a fact that can be read as an index of the consensual climate associated with World War Two. Several of his former students, such as Margaret Mead, led the participation of anthropology with the war effort. In some cases, natives became enemies, such as in Ruth Benedict’s, “The Chrysanthemum and the Sword” (written in 1942 for the Office of War Information and published in 1946), perhaps the most famous example of association between anthropological knowledge and war effort. Second World War, with unprecedented unanimity, proved that anthropology could be good to provide “intelligence” on the enemy, to be able to overcome it, on the allies, to learn how to cooperate with them, and on one’s own nation to learn how to use its own force (Goldman and Neiburg 2002: 198-199). The spurious relations between anthropological research and state interests had a more concrete example in the participation of several anthropologists in the administration of concentration camps of Japanese-Americans during World War Two (Suzuki 1981). We still need a consistent history of the role of anthropology during World War Two in different countries (see Weber 2002, for some of the dilemmas of French ethnology under the Vichy government). This was an important period because it cruelly revealed modes of interaction between anthropology and state elites that would certainly be more unlikely to happen in periods of peace.

World War Two was a turning-point in the history of the world system. Among other things, it represented the exhaustion of the classic imperialist-colonialist era and the beginning of a new moment under the hegemony of the United States. Colonialist ideologies of expansion gave place to developmentalist ones (Escobar 1995). The Cold War created a world divided into two antagonistic halves, a division that had strong impacts on the development of anthropologies in countries such as China and the Soviet Union (see Smart forthcoming and Vakhtin, forthcoming). Anthropology’s real triumphant and booming pe-
Period started after World War Two. In part it coincided with the modernizing drive of the time that called for educated masses that had greater access to a rapidly expanding university system in many countries. But it also coincided with a renewed demand for “scientific” knowledge about strange and exotic natives for the sake of “development” needs worldwide. Increasingly, natives ceased to be colonial subjects of Western empires to become citizens of “underdeveloped” nation-states. Inequalities and differences within the world system were now to be managed through peaceful and rational means such as development plans and ideologies fostered by multilateral agencies as the United Nations and the World Bank.

In a time full of confidence in the modernizing drive and in the role of science and technology in the great destiny of humankind, the number of practitioners of anthropology rose steadily. Over fifty years ago, Alfred Kroeber (1953) surveyed world anthropology and published his findings in his well-known book “Anthropology Today.” Kroeber counted 2,000 anthropologists worldwide, 600 of which were members of the American Anthropological Association (AAA). Today, the American Association has some 11,000 members. World anthropologies have surely grown and diversified since World War Two. When the Association of Social Anthropologists of the British Commonwealth (ASA) was founded in 1946 it had approximately 20 members. It grew to more than 150 members in 1962 and to approximately 240 members in 1968 (Asad 1973). Today ASA has 600 members. As for Brazil, Otavio Velho (1980) points out that 41 persons attended the first Brazilian meeting of anthropology, in 1953, 109 in 1959, 141 in 1968, and 408 in 1979. In 2004, more than 1,500 attended the Brazilian meeting (Graphic 1 shows the approximate membership of some of the largest anthropological associations in 2004).7
But political processes of the post-war period, the golden years of anthropology, were soon to converge, in the 1960’s, to a major crisis of representation of hegemonic anthropology caused by a clear change in the subject position of native and/or powerless groups, anthropology’s classic research “object.” Decolonization impacted British anthropology in ways that are still being digested, while the Civil Rights Movement and the reaction against the Vietnam War changed the North-American scenario. Natives spoke back speaking with their own voices and criticized anthropology as a close aid of colonialism, especially in Africa where the last wave of decolonization was happening and the role of anthropology during colonial times was an issue (see Nkwi, forthcoming). Afro-Americans forced the American nation-state to a new national pact where culture and identity were highly politicized, in a movement that would open the way for multiculturalism and the politics of difference. The imperialist war mobilized hearts and minds against the simplistic and fierce coldwarrior’s geopolitics and nationalism. The “age of innocence” of anthropology (Wolf 1974) was finished as the relationship between knowledge and power became more and more explicit with the involvement of anthropologists in counter-insurgency intelligence in countries such as Thailand rising new ethical and political problems (Wolf and Jorgensen 1975). All those exotic and subalternized others needed to be seen as subjects of their own destiny. Critique of anthropology became a “literature of anguish” (Ben-Ari 1999) deepening one of anthropology’s strongest ambivalent self-representation (Wolf and Jorgensen 1975) according to which the discipline is either the child of Western imperialism (Gough 1975), the child of violence, as Lévi-Strauss (1966) called it, or the revolutionary discipline questioning Western claims to superiority (Diamond 1964). Ben-Ari (1999), who sees such an ambivalence as a dichotomy that pervades anthropology since the end of the 19th century, phrases it this way: anthropology is either corresponsible for the problems created by the expansion of the West or it is a tool for better human understanding.

This critique was articulated in the 1960s and 1970s largely from a Marxist political economy approach, and usually in the name of Third World struggles against colonialism and imperialism. Dell Hymes edited volume, Reinventing Anthropology ([1969] 1974), as well as Jean Copans, Anthropologie et Impérialisme (1975), represent the best illustrations of this literature. Even though the contributions to these volumes were unevenly developed and had different emphases, they shared the insistence on the need for a shift in the basic epistemological, institutional, and political foundations of Anglo-American anthropology.

The world system underwent another round of profound transformations with the events that led to the end of the Soviet Union (1989-1991), finishing the Cold War period and inaugurating the present moment which may be called of really existing globalization. A triumphant capitalism lost its counterpart, became more and more transnationalized and extended its capillarity to previously closed territories and markets. Real globalization created even more complex flows of commodities, people and information, reshuffling the relationships among fragmented global spaces, the local and the global. Time-space compression (Harvey 1989) gained further impulse with new advancements of the communication industries under the hegemony of computer and electronic capitalism. Digital technologies and the internet epitomized what Castells (1996), for instance, called the informational mode of development. Cyberspace, in special, propitiated an enormous increase of the global exchange of information and the emergence of a transnational virtual-imagined community (Ribeiro 1998) which is a strategic means of creation and support of an ever more noticeable global civil society. New international migrations created more diverse
ethic segmentation within nation-states almost everywhere reinstating the role of distance in the definition of ethnographic subjects. For hegemonic anthropologists, natives were no longer those exotic people living thousands of kilometers far from their homes, they became neighbors.

All these transformations prompted another crisis of representation in hegemonic anthropology. The lines between natives and non-natives were blurred, the structures of socio-cultural otherness (Krotz 1997) in global and national contexts increased in complexity. Other disciplines, such as cultural studies, and theoretical approaches, such as post-colonialism, that did not carry anthropology’s original sin of cooperation with colonialism, entered the scene. Globalization reinforced the contradictions between ethnic segments and nation-state power. Multiculturalism and the politics of difference internationalized themselves reinforcing “native” political movements and the culturalization of politics.

The two major crisis of anthropology described above were highly related to the changing positions of anthropology’s classical subjects, native or powerless groups, or to changes of anthropology’s relationship to the “savage slot” (Trouillot 1991). But currently there is another element which was never duly incorporated by previous critiques and is bound to impact anthropology: the foreign presence and importance in the production and reproduction of knowledge in hegemonic academia. This is not really a novelty, since the academic and scientific milieu, and anthropology is a confirmation of such a statement, has always been prone to internationalization. However, international cross-fertilization has happened within a very limited universe composed of a restricted number of partners. It may be true that in locations such as the North-American university system the diversity of faculty and researcher’s nationalities have increased in the past decades, a function of the very central place of the American scientific, technological and academic systems in the globalized world. But this increase in diversity, in anthropology and elsewhere, has not corresponded to an intense growth in the consumption of a variegated foreign production, an indication of the normalization of the work of what Aijaz Ahmad (1994) calls the “ethnic intellectuals.” In fact, I am not so much worried about the migration of persons and the contributions that many foreign scholars have historically made to the strength of hegemonic centers. My main preoccupation is with what could be called the migration of texts, concepts and theories.

The monotony of international cross-fertilization is not an exclusive problem of anthropology. Sociolinguist Rainer Enrique Hamel, in his study on “Language Empires, Linguistic Imperialism, and the Future of Global Languages” (2003), considered that “it may be taken as a symptom of English scientific imperialism in itself that … most authors from English speaking countries and their former colonies who write about the world as a whole do so without quoting a single non-English language text in their vast bibliographies” (p. 20). This problem, though, is particularly interesting when noticed in a discipline that praises diversity so dearly. Polyphony in anthropological production means first the recognition of an enormous production in different world locales that need to gain visibility if we take seriously the role of diversity in the construction of denser discourses and in cross-fertilization. Secondly, it means an awareness of the unequal exchanges of information that occur within the world system of intellectual production and a deliberate political position that intends to go beyond this situation towards a more egalitarian and hence enriching environment. Finally, it also means an intellectual critique, and subsequent critical action, on the mechanisms that sustain such uneven exchanges not only within the academic milieu but
also without it, involving other forms of knowledge production, other cosmopolitics about otherness.

The present is another moment of reinvention of anthropology that is not so much linked to a crisis in the subject position of native populations, the discipline has already gone through this experience, but to changes in the relationships among anthropologists located in different loci of the world system. Steban Krotz (2002: 399) also envisions profound transformations in this same direction. For him, “in spite of the fact that the main impulses for the production of anthropological knowledge continue to come from the countries where this science originated, such impulses are also increasingly happening in places where live those who were until recently exclusively favorite anthropological objects. This requires the creation of new structures of knowledge production that, precisely in the universe of knowledge, do not submit cultural diversity to a model that pretends to be unique and eternal in an exclusive way.” Many anthropologies are ready to come to the forefront. Indeed, their greater international visibility is a prerequisite for reaching a more heterologic and egalitarian community of world anthropologists and more complex forms of creating and circulating theory and knowledge on a global level. Much of the improvement of anthropology will depend on how we answer this question: in an era of heightened globalization, and after the intense epistemological and methodological critique of the last 15 years, how can we establish new conditions of academic exchange and regimes of visibility?

Power and hegemony in anthropology

Our debate on world anthropologies aims at showing the existence of other loci of knowledge production on diversity, such as those represented by the experience of interculturalidad (see Walsh, Schiwy and Castro-Gómez 2002; De la Cadena forthcoming). It also aims at criticizing the existing uneven exchange of information and theory within anthropology. This inequity often gets discussed under different labels: central versus peripheral anthropologies (Cardoso de Oliveira 1999/2000); international versus national anthropologies or anthropologies of nation-building and anthropologies of empire-building (Stocking 1982); hegemonic and non-hegemonic anthropologies (Ribeiro and Escobar 2003); anthropologies of the South (Krotz 1997); etc. Such classifications are helpful to think about the existing inequalities. But we need to transcend these dualities since, as Verena Stolcke stated (personal communication), they are not capable of dealing with transnational orders. They also reflect various kinds of power relations. In sum, the international circulation of ideas is heavily intertwined with power relations and may itself “have the effect of constructing and reinforcing inequality” (L’Estoile, Neiburg and Sigaud 2002: 23).

Anthropology has had a long-standing relation with state power everywhere. In fact, in many ways the discipline was shaped by these relations. Whenever there is an authoritarian regime, as in Stalinist times in Russia, the anthropology/state relation becomes more obvious (Vakhtin, forthcoming). On one hand, state elites impose a control of the critical potential of anthropological production and theories. On the other hand, they convert anthropology into a technique of social control, into a kind of social engineering aimed at managing the relations between ethnic minorities and powerful central governments. In wartimes, as we mentioned before, even in non-authoritarian regimes, such as the North-American one, anthropology may be called to develop similar roles plus to become a source of intelligence on the enemy. The role of anthropology in nation-building is well known and we do not need
to expand much on it (for the Brazilian case see, for instance, Peirano 1991). It suffices to say that anthropologists (re)create contradictory ideologies of national unity or diversity that are anchored on the perceived authority of academic production and often are reflected in policies of state apparatuses (in education and culture or in the administration of ethnic conflicts) and in the political positions of civil society’s agents such as NGOs. The dilemmas that Australian anthropologists (Toussaint, forthcoming) are facing regarding the authority of anthropology in aboriginal land struggles that reach the national judiciary system is an example of the intricate modes of relations between anthropology, state apparatuses, and the discipline’s self-representation especially regarding the authority of its “scientific” status. Anthropology developed everywhere in relation to the national and international interests of states regarding the status of the native populations “found” in the territories states traditionally controlled or in new colonial areas (L’Estoile, Neiburg and Sigaud 2002).

We need to dwell a little more on the relationships between anthropology and empire-building, anthropology and colonialism. There are good reasons to think of British anthropology when this is the subject. However, we still are to see a study that sorts out the complicated relationships between the discipline and colonial administration. According to Ben-Ari (1999: 385) “we simply do not know how, or whether at all, any anthropological knowledge was used by colonial powers.” On the one hand, anthropology may have provided support for local opponents of colonialism. On the other hand, Ben-Ari (idem) also argues that anthropological knowledge, together with the census, the map and the museum, was part of what Anderson (1991: 163) called the grammar of the colonial state style of thinking about its domain. For Ben-Ari (1999: 388), the crucial question is to understand anthropology’s place in the making of colonial taxonomies and discourses. In his analysis of the relationships between French colonialism and French ethnology, D’Estoile (2002) showed how several research and educational institutions, such as the Institute d’Ethnologie and the Musée de l’Homme, were supported by the French colonial apparatus, in a continuous movement of exchange of people, information and knowledge between “modes of administrative knowledge and scientific discourse” aimed at legitimating a rational domination over African natives.10

This discussion also brings to the fore the limits of anthropology as a universal discipline. The need to set apart the real or imagined links between anthropology and colonialism in African and Asian countries (Barnes 1982, Kashoki 1982) leads to a more acute critique by post-colonial intellectuals of these regions. Africa represents the best scenario to consider the efficacity of the universalist anthropological discourse, even more so than India. In Africa the universalist pretension of anthropology was soon related to Eurocentrism and developed a debate on the need for an African epistemology. Much more intensively than in India, where anthropological thought was a part of post-colonial debates on nation-building (Visvanathan, forthcoming), in Africa the discipline was caught between isolation and nativism. However, any pretension to a nativist epistemology is a paradox since, as Mafeje (2001) noted, d’après Rabinow, there is nothing more Western than the discussion of epistemology. Furthermore, claims to cultural and scientific authenticity may well be a kind of neo-Orientalism (see Velho forthcoming). Nativist approaches may also be a reaction to the existence of a body of foreign intellectuals and literature who maintain the valid standards of interpretation of a given culture or country. Velho (idem) argues that the absence of Brazilianists, foreign scholars specialized in Brazil, contributed to hinder the development of a nativist approach in that country.
The existence of an anthropology -- meaning the discipline that was institutionalized in university systems during the 20th century -- totally isolated from Western hegemonic anthropologies is an impossibility even in authoritarian regimes (see Vakhtin forthcoming and Smart forthcoming). Anthropology, from its inception, is a cosmopolitics on otherness with a Western origin. If acknowledgement of a given statement in anthropology depends on its validity, validity itself, in the last instance, depends on its consecration by a community of argumentation that is also a cosmopolitan community. Even nativist perspectives would have to go through this kind of process. This is why it is impossible to believe in an isolated anthropology the validity of which would be entirely recognized and fulfilled solely within the confines of nation-states. The examples of anthropology in Russia and in China are, again, strong reminders of such a predicament (see Vakhtin, forthcoming, and Smart, forthcoming).

The fact that anthropology expanded from the North Atlantic region to other corners of the world does not mean it cannot benefit from its many different existing versions and from the different tensions it created with pre-existing local systems. I agree with Shinji Yamashita (1998: 5) when he argues that “if cultures travel, as James Clifford (1992) puts it, anthropology travels too. Through traveling the world, it can be enriched and transformed by its encounters with different local situations. I firmly believe that the anthropology of the 21st century will be constructed on the basis of the ‘glocal’, namely ‘global-local’ relations (Robertson 1995), in the same way as other major forms of cultural production in the world are constructed.” But it is also true that there are different travelers and ways of traveling. Hierarchies of knowledges and of cosmopolitics are always predicated upon hierarchies of social and political power. The Indian situation brings about interesting considerations. The way through which anthropology displaced vernacular forms of producing knowledge in India (Danda 1995) cannot be understood without considering the geopolitics of language, knowledge and prestige implemented by British colonialism that ascribed power to the colonizers’ language, culture and science. English was not to be universally taught in colonial India but at the highest levels as the language of administration, science and high culture, of the university system (Hamel 2003). Such a move created a need to identify with the colonizer’s language, to desire and practice it if certain social agents and agencies were to be seen as part of the elite. Anthropology was since the beginning placed and taught in a larger context that prefigured its own privileged power over other cosmopolitics. This is certainly also the case in countries such as Peru, where the subordination of indigenous knowledge is the counterpart of the hegemony of Euro-American academic-economic-formations, as De la Cadena (forthcoming) puts it. A final word on the discussion on native, indigenous anthropology in contrast to an international or universal anthropology: if there is anything left of it is that, in the end, the “insider” is a citizen while the “outsider” is not. At stake are different kinds of social responsibility and of political roles of the anthropologists. Other possible associated issues are of methodological order, regarding mainly the nature of the intersubjective encounter and the role of strangement in the construction of anthropological knowledge.

One of the best established dichotomies when anthropologists think of anthropology on a global scale could be dubbed Stocking’s dilemma. According to Stocking (1982) there are anthropologies of nation-building and anthropologies of empire-building. The effectiveness of this formulation stems from the fact that it points to the scope of the reach of the anthropological work and imagination depending on whether anthropologists do field research mainly in their own countries or abroad. The opposition anthropology tout court / anthropology at home (a rather popular phrasing in the U.S.) indicates that for so called im-
Empirical anthropologies the discipline means research abroad and that doing research at “home” is not similarly valued. But Stocking dilemma’s may well be transcended if we think that behind empire building there is always a nation-state. The importance of colonialism in creating and reinforcing national ideologies in the metropolises is well-known. In fact, anthropologies of empire-building are also anthropologies of nation-building, but vice-versa is not true. Furthermore, this dichotomy may create the impression that there are only two options for world anthropologies. Anthropologists everywhere would be trapped in either serving the nation or the empire, which is obviously not the case. First, there are anthropologies of difference-building. Second, there are the cases of “national anthropologies” that may internationalize themselves, such as in the Australian, Brazilian, Canadian and Mexican cases, without falling in the temptation of becoming empire-building anthropologies. Portuguese anthropologist, João de Pina Cabral (2004: 263), inspired by the reading of a book on Brazilian anthropology, mentions the possibility of a fifth anthropological tradition, different from the American, British, French and German ones, a tradition “that does not identify itself with any of the imperial projects that, historically, moved scientific development.” Archetti (forthcoming) has also shown that one hegemonic anthropology, such as France’s, maybe at the same time geared towards nation and empire-building. The Japanese example is also interesting for it shows that given external constraints one anthropology can be national or imperial over time (Askew 2003), and, indeed, today, post-imperial. Currently, Japanese anthropological research is rather internationalized but has no relationship with imperial expansion as may have been the case in the past.

The project of developing Latin American post-imperialist cosmopolitan (Ribeiro 2003) points to the existence of post-national and post-imperial anthropologies in which several reversions of power positions are to be sought. Since an important post-imperial goal is to provincialize the United States through the critique of its mediascapes and ideascapes, one of the tasks of Latin American researchers would be to generate knowledge through field research on North American subjects, especially on those that powerfully prefigure cosmopolitan and ideologies of power and prestige. Instead of doing research on the subalterns of the South, to do research on the elite of the North. Up and North the anthropologist goes. Since hegemony is the art of exerting power silently, let’s not only let the subalterns speak, let’s make the powerful speak!

The relationships between anthropologies and systems of power are complex since in many ways anthropology is part of much larger power relations and constraints, including those created by unequal development on a global scale. For example, there are educational, academic and scientific systems differently developed throughout the world with different access to resources and to nation-state power. It is clear, however, that such relationships cannot be reduced to a disjunction between anthropologies of empire-building and anthropologies of nation-building. The underlying factors are the kinds of positions, perspectives and practices anthropologists have regarding powerful and powerless groups and projects. A way of looking at it is to consider that anthropology is good to provide certain groups, powerful or powerless ones, with knowledge that “legitimates” claims over ethnic and cultural diversity as well as over access to natural and social resources.

Currently, the relationships among anthropologies on the global level reflect different kinds of power imbalance. As we know, there is no anthropology without dialogues with the hegemonic anthropologies since anthropology historically came from metropolitan countries and disseminated as a cosmopolitics through expanding university systems. World
anthropologies will develop through theoretical critique but also, and perhaps more importantly, through the political activity of those that are interested in such propositions. World anthropologies imply, for instance, the construction of other conditions of conversability, by bringing together in networks anthropologists and, I submit, anthropological institutions to discuss how we can make the heterogenizing forces of globalization work in favor of heteroglossic initiatives. This is why Arturo Escobar and I organized an international symposium on World Anthropologies, in March 2003, in Italy, of which a book will come out in the United Kingdom next year (see also endnote ii). This is also the reason why Paul Little and I organized a meeting in Brazil, in June 2004, that brought together 14 presidents of national and international anthropological associations to discuss and negotiate more democratic modes of global interaction, production and dissemination of knowledge. In both initiatives we counted on the support of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. The president of the associations from the following countries were present in the meeting in Recife: Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, India, Great-Britain, South-Africa and the United States. Japan sent the director of international relations of the association. The presidents of the following international associations were also there: European Association of Social Anthropologists, Latin American Association of Anthropology, Pan-African Anthropological Association and the International Union of Ethnological Sciences. The awareness of the importance of the meeting and the enthusiasm of all the representatives of these anthropological institutions showed that the time is ripe to create more horizontal and diverse modes of interaction and exchange on the global level. As a consequence the World Council of Anthropological Associations was created. WCAA has as its primary goals to promote more diverse and equal exchanges between anthropologies and anthropologists worldwide (see the founding agreement of WCAA in www.abant.org.br). A by-product of this meeting was a debate among Australian, Brazilian and Canadian anthropologists about the many problems and issues surrounding the engagement of anthropologists in native people’s struggles for land.

The critique of the power imbalance between hegemonic and non-hegemonic anthropologies is made by world anthropologies in order to go beyond the existing ossified power structure, to show that there are many possible contributions coming from other subject positions and that one may expect a more complex cross-fertilization if we are able to construct other conditions of conversability that foster the creation of a more heteroglossic transnational community of anthropologists. In a paper inspired in several debates that occurred within the World Anthropologies Network collective, Eduardo Restrepo and Arturo Escobar wrote that the project of ‘world anthropologies’ is an “intervention geared at the implosion of the disciplinary constraints that subalternized modalities of anthropological practice and imagination have to face in the name of an unmarked, normalized and normalizing model of anthropology” (2004: 2). There are two notions that are helpful to understand the present situation. They refer to what Restrepo and Escobar called assymetrical ignorance and I call a tension between cosmopolitan provincialism and provincial cosmopolitanism.

Assymetrical ignorance: cosmopolitan provincialism and provincial cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitan provincialism and provincial cosmopolitanism are based in the existing unequal relations on the global symbolic economy. I will give a brief definition of both no-
tions. Cosmopolitan provincialism means the ignorance that hegemonic centers usually have of the production of non-hegemonic centers. Provincial cosmopolitanism means the knowledge that non-hegemonic centers usually have of the production of hegemonic centers. This asymmetrical ignorance may express itself in such common curious situation such as the fact that the history of universal anthropology (i.e. of hegemonic anthropologies) is known and studied by non-hegemonic anthropologists but vice-versa is not true. The processes through which these anthropologies without history, to use Krotz’s apt expression, became institutionalized and grew are not taught or in the best cases are seldom taught even in their own countries. Classics include only foreign anthropologists.

In many graduate programs outside the hegemonic core, being capable of reading in at least two languages other than one’s native language is a mandatory prerequisite. Indeed both cosmopolitan provincialism and provincial cosmopolitanism can be better understood if we consider the language issue, a rather complicated one when transnational communication is at stake. English has been the most expansive language in the past five centuries (Hamel 2003: 16). Brazilian sociologist Renato Ortiz, in an unpublished paper on “The Social Sciences and English”, shows that world English is framing the sociological debates on a global scale. He also comes to the conclusion that “the more central a language is in the world market of linguistic goods, the smaller the proportion of texts which are translated to it” (p. 27). In the United States and England, less of 5% of the publications are translations, while in France and Germany this number is around 12%, and in Spain and Italy it grows to 20%. Here is an important angle of the sociolinguistic basis from which metropolitan provincialism stems. If the opposite is true, that is the less important a language the more translations there will be in it, we are equally facing the sociolinguistic basis of provincial cosmopolitanism.

Rainer Enrique Hamel (2003: 24) warns that “scientific monolingualism might not only deepen the existing inequalities in the access and diffusion of scientific findings, but also threaten scientific creativity and conceptual diversity itself as a basis for scientific development as such.” He sees the danger that we pass from “a strong hegemony of world English to a monopoly, from a plurilingual paradigm of diversity that admits language conflict to a monolingual paradigm of English only” (2003: 25). If scientific monolingualism raises such general and serious critiques, monostylistic anthropology can be considered an impediment for a polycentric global anthropology.

Centrality is a positive and a negative asset when dealing with disciplines that rely on interpretation and context to improve their heuristical capacities, which is the case of anthropology. It is positive because in the main centers there are the best working conditions (wages, libraries, research funds, access to dissemination and visibility). It is negative because of a linguistic, cultural and political reduction that working for a same national university system implies (it does not matter how big and diverse it may be it will not match world diversity) and because of metropolitan provincialism, a linguistic and sociological closure that implies in a big loss of diversity and of interest in other productions. In this sense, if we think of the practice of anthropology on a global scale, we will see a strong potential of cross-fertilization scattered in different glocales. A potential of creativity impossible to be found in a single place. There is sociological and linguistic evidence indicating that such a creativity is located in and coming from non-hegemonic locales since cosmopolitan provincialism allows for a more complex vision of the discipline as an international discourse. This is not a call for ignoring the important contributions hegemonic anthropologies have made and make to knowledge. Quite the contrary, I men-
tioned how closely the history and production of hegemonic anthropology are followed everywhere. But it means a need for other academic practices that include more horizontal exchanges and the recognition that today anthropology is a much more diverse discourse than what most North Atlantic centric interpretations suppose. It is time to strive for multiculturality in lieu of one or a few kinds of centricisms.

**Final Comments**

Ben-Ari (1999: 402-403), in an investigatory manner, refers to the importance that critiques of anthropology’s involvement with colonialism have for the career of academic generational groups. Is the notion of “world anthropologies” but another chapter of “disciplinary politics” made possible by this moment of increased globalization? While it is right that, like in any power field, anthropologists and other scholars also strive for power, in our discipline critique play other roles besides being a part of “electoral politics”, as Trouillot (1991) called it. Critique should not be seen simply as unfavorable judgments, but as thorough examinations and positions that are fundamental for the advancement of any discipline and for the constant enhancement of its practitioners’ heuristic capacities and ethical standards. World anthropologies are obviously not a resentful claim of authenticity neither a resentful perspective on hegemonic anthropology. The pretension of a nativist perspective was clearly rejected in this text in favor of an openly dialogical and heteroglossic vision. Furthermore, any idea of a “periphery” that is the essential source of authenticity, pristine otherness or unparalleled creativity and radicalism is doomed to be another sort of Orientalism (see Velho forthcoming). If we were to draw a map of current interconnections and exchanges among anthropologies as well as to make a directory of world anthropologists, we would immediately agree with Johannes Fabian’s (forthcoming) statement that “anthropology has succeeded in making many of its practitioners into transnationals, that is, into scientists whose frame of mind is no longer set by an unquestioned national identity”.

It would be ironic if the project of world anthropologies is seen as the new capacity of the “periphery” to strike back, a simplistic frame of mind akin to some interpretations of the aims of the post-colonial critique regarding former imperial metropolises. I’d rather think that this is a moment of enlargement of the anthropological horizon that will make anthropology a richer academic cosmopolitics, one that is capable of dealing with the new challenges arising in the 21st century. World anthropologies provide a window of opportunities for all those who (a) know that hegemony of a certain universalism is not a natural given; (b) understand that difference is not inequality and (c) that diversity is an asset of humankind.

In this text, I wanted to avoid an intellectualist approach to the problems that theory in anthropology have faced in the past and face today. Instead, I chose a sociological perspective in order to suggest that challenges and horizons in anthropological theory are embedded in several historical predicaments. My goal was to show that changing the relationships and flows of information within a yet to be fully developed global community of anthropologists is a powerful way of changing theoretical orientations today. Two other equally necessary changes are in order. Those related to the relations between anthropologists and differentiated socio-cultural segments, and lastly, those related to the pretension of anthropology of being the universally valid discourse on alterity.
It is almost a truism to say that a given discipline and its practitioners are influenced by specific historical, social, economic, political and cultural contexts. Within this framework, it is important to note that transformation is a constant in the history of anthropology anywhere. Indeed, anthropology is a phoenix whose death, or drawn-out agony, has been pronounced several times, at least since the 1920s when Malinowski urged anthropologists to conduct more ethnographic fieldwork in face of a vanishing native world. Anthropology’s many deaths and rebirths indicate the discipline’s ability to transform itself over the past century and project its critique onto itself, magnifying and redefining its interests, attributes and theories. The abundance of alternatives became a powerful stimulus leading to a constant reappraisal of the discipline’s fate, field, objectives, programs, characteristics and definitions. The many resurrections and reincarnations of anthropology can only be understood if we consider that it is a highly reflexive discipline that projects itself onto and receives feedback from the topics it studies. As a consequence, anthropology is fine-tuned to the sociological changes that historically occur. In a globalized world we need to have more diverse international voices and perspectives participating at any assessment of the frontiers of anthropological knowledge. Indeed, a globalized world is a perfect scenario for anthropology to thrive since one of anthropology’s basic lessons is respect for difference. A discipline that praises plurality and diversity needs to foster these standpoints within its own milieu. The time is ripe for world anthropologies.

Notes

1. Conferencia magistral en el coloquio internacional “¿A dónde va la antropología?”, 23 de septiembre de 2004, en la UAM-Iztapalapa, con motivo del Trigésimo Aniversario de la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.

2. Some of the most active members of this network are Arturo Escobar, Eduardo Restrepo, Marisol de la Cadena, Sandy Toussaint and Susana Narotzky.

3. Inspired in debates triggered by WAN, Marisol de la Cadena and I organized a session in the 2002 AAA meeting; Arturo Escobar and I put together an international symposium in Italy; and Paul Little and I organized a meeting in Brazil of 14 presidents of national and international anthropological associations in order to discuss ways of having a more plural global community of anthropologists. As a result of the symposium in Italy, a book will come out next year on World Anthropologies. The Recife meeting was an opportunity to create the World Council of Anthropological Associations. See more on this below.

4. Esteban Krotz (2002: 353) calls the attention to a “certain predisposition”, of authors who write on the history of anthropology, “determined by the language, history and culture of their countries of origin. For instance, Frenchman Claude Lévi-Strauss considers that anthropology began with Rousseau and Durkheim, while British Lucy Mair highlights the importance of Adam Smith; on the other hand, the German Wilhelm Mühlmann emphasizes Herder’s distinguished role, and for the Italian Ernesto de Martino, Giambattista Vico is, naturally, of special importance.”

5. In the beginnings of the 1970’s, Jean Copans (1974: 52) stated that “the history of ethnology is also the history of the relations between European societies and non-European
societies”. He anticipated that decolonization would have an impact on the theory and practice of the discipline. Archie Mafeje (2001: 49) considers that “the important lesson to be drawn from the experience of the African anthropologists is that anthropology is premised on an immediate subject/object relation. If for social and political reasons this relation gets transformed, anthropologists might not be able to realize themselves, without redefining themselves and their discipline”.


7. It was made after a survey conducted during the meeting “World Anthropologies: Strengthening the International Organization and Effectiveness of the Profession”, held in June 2004, in Recife, Brazil, with the presence of 14 presidents of anthropological associations.

8. In the AAA meeting of 1966, a motion against the role of the U.S. government in Vietnam was highly controversial in another indication of how ideologically torn apart were American anthropologists (see Gough 1975).

9. Ben-Ari states (1999: 400) that the literature of anguish is “now seen to be as important to an understanding of a sociology of knowledge as the more conventional issues of methodology, the study of language or gaining good entrances to, and rapport, in the field.”

10. “In the colonial situation, the scientific study of natives appears, together with actions in the areas of education and health, as a privileged means to simultaneously demonstrate the ‘profound humanity’ (a preoccupation with indigenous populations and their costumes) and the scientific superiority of the tutelary power” (L’Estoile 2002: 75-76). Scientific superiority would be a peaceful and convincing means to show the legitimacy of the colonial enterprise, something that in France got a life of its own in a Colonial School, kept by the government in the first half of the 20th century, to train administrators through a specialized education that could impart to colonization “a good quality scientific spirit” (idem: 77).

11. Electoral politics is “the set of institutionalized practices and relations of power that influenced the production of knowledge from within academe: academic filiations, the mechanisms of institutionalization, the organization of power within and across departments, the market value of publish-or-perish prestige, and other worldly issues that include, but expand way beyond, the maneuvering we usually refer to as ‘academic politics’” (Trouillot 1991: 143).

References cited


Ortiz, Renato. n.d. “As Ciências Sociais e o Inglês”. Mimeo.


SONHO DE UMA TARDE DE INVERNO
A UTOPIA DE UMA ANTROPOLOGIA COSMOPOLITA

Alcida Rita Ramos

Resumo

Por meio de um exercício de imaginação, de inspiração indígena, propõe-se uma utopia antropológica em que diversas tradições da profissão não sofrem com limitações linguísticas, desigualdade de produção e consumo, gozem de uma intercomunicabilidade verdadeiramente horizontal e se dediquem ao compromisso de transformar os antropólogos em atores políticos. Esta utopia contrasta com a situação corrente em que as antropologias metropolitanas alcançaram um tal grau de hegemonia que têm dado ensejo a que se dê a disciplina em dois blocos virtualmente opostos: Centro e Periferia. Mas eis que surge no horizonte um vulto ainda nebuloso, porém com o potencial de dar vida material àquela utopia que tem sido até agora rigorosamente imaginada. É a Rede de Antropologias Mundiais (World Anthropologies Network – WAN), em si um produto de quem sonha com uma antropologia cidadã e democrática.

Prelúdio

O tema do universo antropológico dividido em zonas diferenciadas de poder parece se agigantar quando visto do centro desse poder. A dicotomia Centro versus Periferia assume berrantes cores primárias quando observada contra o pano de fundo da paisagem branca e, ao que parece, inabalável da Metrópole. O que se segue é um breve exercício em fantasiar o que seria dessa paisagem se o jogo de poder fosse outro. Criar uma ficção de democracia acadêmica como recurso retórico, a exemplo da caricatura, ajuda a ressaltar os traços mais salientes da problemática em questão.

Utopias são boas para sonhar. Seu horizonte, ainda que inalcançável, e talvez por isso mesmo, traz dinamismo e principalmente dúvidas sobre os topoi e cânones acadêmicos que nos são impostos mais pela inércia política do que pelo convencimento intelectual. É desnecessário dizer que a hegemonia antropológica que nos perturba, pelo menos aos que estamos fora da Metrópole, não é um produto autônomo, mas sim reflexo de um estado de coisas muito mais abrangente, ou seja, a divisão mundial de trabalho e as decorrentes trocas desiguais entre povos e nações. Por que então não sonhar com o que, em outra dimensão histórico-política, poderia ser? Por que não emular o que nos ensina a sabedoria etnográfica sobre diversidade e como conviver com ela? Por que, por uma vez, não nos deixamos guiar pela experiência indígena, já que os nossos próprios recursos explanatórios se mostram insuficientes na conjuntura atual em que sentimentos agonísticos impregnam nossos discursos profissionais e parecem nos conduzir a um beco sem saída?
Era uma vez uma utopia chamada Cosmantrópolis, alcunha talvez tão inusitada quanto o seu conteúdo, o que não é de surpreender. Para fundar a utopia os ancestrais fundadores da Cosmantrópolis inspiraram-se nos sábios poliglotas do rio Uaupés no noroeste amazônico onde a regra da exogamia linguística pode reunir sob o mesmo teto falantes de muitas línguas, mesmo que uma delas, a do cabeça da casa comunal, seja predominante. Construíram então uma comunidade de múltiplas vozes, numa espécie de Babel organizada e solidária no sentido durkheimiano de solidariedade, desta vez, orgânica. Todos partilhavam idiomas, idéias, soluções e propostas, sem que cada um dos parceiros perdesse sua identidade e cor local, preservadas como capital simbólico a serviço da coletividade. Cosmantrópolis prosperou e tornou-se a comunidade pensante mais criativa e vivaz na paisagem das ciências sociais. Publicações proliferavam com um público escritor e leitor sem fronteiras. Seminários, longe de imitar a alienante linha de montagem industrial, duravam o tempo necessário para que todos os participantes pudessem expressar por extenso suas idéias e as terem plenamente discutidas. Assim, o fluxo de idéias corria sem limites nem de tempo nem de espaço. Recursos para pesquisa não se limitavam a reforçar idéias dominantes e agradavam em especial a ousadia da experimentação intelectual de onde quer que ela viesse. Os editores de textos tinham como norma multar quem fizesse de conta que suas idéias eram originais e quem omitisse dar o devido crédito a colegas situados nos países onde desenvolveram suas pesquisas de campo. A exemplo dos sábios nativos do Uaupés e alhures, os fundadores de Cosmantrópolis viajam com maus olhos o culto à personalidade, pois desconfiavam que, por trás do hiperbólico e súbito sucesso individual, há sempre algo que cheira a ocultos passes de mágica que enaltecem o praticante mas denigrem o coletivo. Por isso, não encorajavam a tendência à proliferação daqueles híbridos intelectuais vulgarmente conhecidos como “étnicos chiques”.

Esses distintos profissionais, embora trouxessem grandes contribuições para a geração e manutenção de polêmicas que muitas vezes vinham a calhar para interromper uma sonolenta rotina acadêmica típica da ciência normal kuhniana, pouco faziam para ter reconhecida a tradição que originalmente os inspirou. Enfim, Cosmantrópolis seguia seu curso de pequenas transgressões em meio a uma vigiada tranquilidade social e justiça intelectual quando forças maiores começaram a agir. Mais uma vez, a etnografia indígena nos traz inspiração. Um dia, o demiurgo reuniu o povo escolhido e apresentou-lhe o dilema da escolha. Dispôs uma série de objetos à sua frente e convidou-o a escolher o que quisesse. Havia todo o equipamento tradicional já conhecido e também um grande número de novidades ininteligíveis. O povo escolhido selecionou o que quis e rejeitou o resto. Ficaram então com arcos, flechas, canoas, panelas de barro, redes de dormir, e todos os objetos que fizessem sentido no seu universo. Um tanto surpreso, o demiurgo avisou que aquilo que fora rejeitado seria oferecido aos forasteiros, os homens brancos que ainda não faziam parte do mundo do povo escolhido. Motores, aviões, rádios, espingardas, roupas e toda sorte de objetos não identificados acabaram nas mãos dos desconhecidos. Passa-se o tempo e, inexoravelmente, as novas gerações são assaltadas por forasteiros como que caídos do céu em suas máquinas voadoras, envoltos em peles artificiais, carregando canos que cospem fogo e, sem pedir licença nem dar satisfações, fazem exigências, apropriam-se da terra e de tudo mais que lhes interessa e, assim, transformam o povo escolhido em povo, se não vencido, sem dúvida, oprimido. Como se isso não bastasse, juntando insulto a dano, vieram os missionários e impuseram o humilhante império de uma
As línguas locais, além, naturalmente, da dos brancos, em detrimento de todas as outras. Em retrospecto, essas novas gerações lamentam que seus ancestrais tenham feito tão má escolha perante o demíurgio, mas uma coisa é certa e fonte de orgulho: o atual poderio dos brancos nada mais é do que o resultado do exercício da agencialidade dos índios. Foi porque eles fizeram a escolha errada que os brancos chegaram a ser o que são hoje, ou seja, o produto de um erro fatal. Os índios perderam bens preciosos como vidas, terra e, quase sempre, autonomia, mas conservaram a convicção e o orgulho de quem já teve, e portanto poderá voltar a ter, o destino nas próprias mãos.

E assim também Cosmantrópolis se viu subitamente colonizada por uma enxurrada de hábeis tecnologias e empreendimentos do saber que desestabilizaram o sistema horizontal de igualdade na diferença e instalaram a verticalidade do poder de produção, distribuição e consumo de bens antropológicos. Impôs-se a todos o humilhante império de uma das línguas em detrimento de todas as outras. Perderam-se as referências nacionais que davam o sabor orgânicos e cosmopolita à profissão. Tamanha foi a concentração de riqueza que tornou obsoletos os mecanismos de controle da desigualdade. Reconhecer a legitimidade e utilidade de outros saberes deixou de ter importância estrutural. Cosmantrópolis entrou em colapso, dando lugar à crescente hegemonia da Metrópole enquanto o resto, fragmentado e impotente no que passou a ser chamado de Periferia, entregou-se à auto-comiseração, lamentando a injustiça da história.

Moral da história

Quais seriam então as questões centrais que impedem o florescimento de uma antropologia genuinamente cosmopolita? Vimos algumas: a forte hegemonia linguística, a desigualdade do mercado editorial, a intransitividade de idéias da Periferia para a Metrópole e até um certo cultivo da ignorância estudada sobre o que se produz fora da Metrópole, o que muito contribui para a invisibilidade do que não é metropolitano. Vejamos alguns exemplos.

Na década de 1990 antropólogos metropolitanos deram-se conta daquilo que muitas antropologias latino-americanas há muito já sabiam, ou seja, a necessidade de trazer a problemática indígena para o contexto político mais amplo. Alguns (por exemplo, Thomas 1991) promoveram um ato de contrição pela ingenuidade ou culpa de terem criado um Outro culturalmente exótico e políticamente isolado. Não lhes ocorreu olhar para além de seu umbigo profissional, buscar alternativas antropológicas e descobrir se sua sensação de mal-estar vem da antropologia como disciplina universal, ou do seu modo específico de praticá-la. Isto nada mais é do que uma visão etnocêntrica ou miópe da antropologia que, afinal de contas, enquanto campo de conhecimento, é muito mais do que a mera soma de seus profissionais, independentemente de onde eles trabalhem. Além disso, abandone o apelo da diversidade, com o argumento de que cultivá-la é contribuir para a dominação dos fracos, é perder o sentido político da diferença, quando é exatamente esse sentido que pode atuar como antídoto contra a certeza que tem a Metrópole do seu próprio poder e da suposta impotência do Outro. Pois é essa mesma diversidade que é capaz de desestabilizar a imperturbável auto-satisfação da Metrópole e deveria ser ela o estímulo para os metropolitanos se dedicarem a fazer a etnografia de sua própria casa. Mas, ao exercitarem o que chamam de repatriação da antropologia, eles esbarram na falta daquele savoir político que marca os pesquisadores latino-americanos para quem a antropologia em casa é
praticamente tão antiga quanto a sua própria profissão. Ao descobrirem que a antropologia não vive apenas do estudo dos “primitivos”, os metropolitanos propõem dar-lhes as costas para se dedicarem ao estudo do próprio Centro e da gigantesca teia de poder que enreda os povos periféricos. Isto parece provocar uma reação quase matricida com relação à disciplina. Acusada, por exemplo, de transformar o conceito de cultura num instrumento de dominação (Abu–Lughod 1991), a antropologia passa a ser também responsável por reforçar o desequilíbrio de poder mundial que esses pesquisadores parecem ter acabado de descobrir. Depois de passarem décadas pesquisando fora de casa, dão-se conta de que o poder, mais do que nada, clama pela atenção dos antropólogos. É o que poderíamos chamar de nostalgia do Centro.

Assim, continuar a estudar “primitivos” assume um caráter politicamente incorreto se não for feito no contexto de opressão e injustiça histórica. Ou seja, o trabalho antropológico aos olhos desses adventistas só é legítimo se inquirir os caminhos da dominação ocidental sobre povos marginalizados. Em si mesmos esse povos não seriam mais capazes de gerar outro interesse que não o do exotismo. É como se eles dependessem dos antropólogos para tornarem as suas “agonias de opressão” (Herzfeld 1997: 23) politicamente visíveis e relevantes.

Se tais antropólogos se dispusessem a sair por um instante da Metrópole e examinasse as feições que a antropologia assume na “periferia”, veriam que o problema de contextualizar o local numa perspectiva política mais abrangente é o pão com manteiga das antropologias mexicana, argentina ou brasileira, para nos limitarmos ao circuito latino–americano. Se há aí um cânone facilmente reconhecível, ele é baseado em relações interétnicas e não no estudo monográfico unitário. Portanto, para quem cresceu profissionalmente com a noção de que fazer antropologia é um ato político (Ramos 1999/2000) que, por definição, privilegia a contextualização das transações sociais intra e inter-povos, essas questões que ultimamente vêm perturbando nossos colegas metropolitanos somem um pouco como descobrir a pólvora. Supor que a supressão do cânone etnográfico por si só eliminaria os efeitos perniciosos do exotismo é deslocar o eixo do problema, pois o trabalho antropológico nunca acontece no vácuo, seja no campo, seja no escritório, e nem o antropólogo tem pleno controle do seu produto, que passa a integrar o vasto mercado de trocas simbólicas com suas regras e conseqüências próprias. Dependendo do contexto sócio-político, o público leitor, elemento fundamental da produção antropológica, pode, em última instância, neutralizar uma ideia potencialmente fecunda. Esperemos algum dia poder perfurar a couraça da Metrópole e inseminá-la com o vírus da auto-dúvida. É verdade que toda sociedade tem seus mecanismos de defesa contra potenciais ataques aos seus limites, mas é raro encontrar uma manifestação tão forte quanto a extraordinária capacidade que tem a Metrópole de fagocitar o estranho, o diferente, transformando tudo numa polpa de fácil digestão mental.

Se, por um lado, é evidente o apetite voraz que têm os centros de disseminação por bens culturais, também é certo que, subjacente à história processual, há sempre um movimento dialético que se desenrola em silêncio, quase sempre imperceptivelmente, mas que tem o poder de transformar o curso dos acontecimentos. É bem possível que a atual onda de globalização já tenha em seu boço o esboço de seus próprios limites, trazendo para o horizonte uma nova era. Mesmo levando em conta o limitado poder que tem o discurso
antropológico para mudar corações e mentes neste vasto mundo, nem tudo está perdido na nebulosidade da globalização.

Afinal, os atuais meios instantâneos de comunicação criam condições de possibilidade para a cooperação entre membros da Metrópole e da Periferia que, por sua vez, não chegam a ser blocos monolíticos totalmente refratários à dissedência. Nos espaços liminares de transgressão criados pelo fluxo de ideias que, embora tímido, já existe, reside o potencial de se reconfigurar os cânones impostos pela Metrópole e de se revisitar a utopia da Cosmantrópolis6.

Fechando o círculo, voltemos a ela. É que aponta no horizonte um vulto que, embora ainda um tanto amorfo, já traz o potencial de transformar o panorama político da antropologia mundial. Chama-se WAN (World Anthropologies Network) e é identificado como “um movimento coletivo [que tem a finalidade] de pluralizar as visões prevelcentes da antropologia num contexto em que persiste a hegemonia dos discursos anglo–saxões sobre a diferença” (Ribeiro 2005). Uma iniciativa de profissionais de vários países, a maioria na periferia antropológica, WAN tem por objetivos lançar um olhar crítico sobre a disseminação internacional da antropologia, alargar a sua paisagem plural e engajar antropologistas de várias regiões em conversações produtivas que conduzam a uma antropologia crítica de si mesma e à construção de um cânone antropológico policêntrico (Ribeiro 2005) ou, melhor ainda, de cânones diversos, mas acadêmica e politicamente equivalentes. Há, pois, que cuidar com muito carinho dessa delicada planta em nascendo para que possa dar os frutos que promete.

Isto nos mostra que o cosmopolitismo não reside, afinal, na Metrópole que, com honrosas exceções, tende a se satisfazer com o tedioso exercício de auto–referenciação. A cosmopolítica antropológica está lá onde se lê em várias línguas, onde se acolhem idéias de fora sem gerar fidelidades acríticas e estéreis. Lá onde se reconhece que a agenciaidade de incautos ancestrais pode gerar a força e o impulso necessários para superar o status quo. Lá onde, como disse o políticamente incorreto, mas perspicaz Sarmiento, “las cosas hay que hacerlas. Bien o mal, hay que hacerlas”!

Notes

1. O formato deste pequeno ensaio, como se fosse uma fábula, uma narrativa mítica ou, mais sobriamente falando, uma utopia, veio–me de assalto num dia azul e gélido de fevereiro no Meio Oeste os Estados Unidos durante minha estada na Universidade de Wisconsin, Madison, no primeiro semestre de 2005. Talvez por isso ele pareça um tanto etéreo, irreal, ou mesmo fantasmagórico sem, no entanto, trair seu compromisso com o empenho analítico e a seriedade intelectual.

2. Inspiro–me no importante trabalho em que Gustavo Lins Ribeiro (2005), em seu louvável esforço de renovação, advoga a necessidade de se criar um espaço cosmopolitico que contemple uma antropologia verdadeiramente mundial em que antropologias nacionais tenham oportunidades iguais de expressão e influência.
3. Alguns pensadores, como Ahmad (1992), não escondem seu profundo desconforto com o fenômeno do (ou da) intelectual que migra para a Metrópole e assume a posição de porta-voz de seu país, estrangulando, assim, a voz dos que ficaram para viver a realidade que o (a) migrante deixou para trás.

4. Publicar em inglês pode trazer reconhecimento ao autor, mas quase nunca à antropologia nacional de sua origem. Como um gato preto em campo de neve (na vivida imagem do novelista gaúcho Érico Veríssimo), tenho-me visto tomar dimensões inesperadas que não são tanto o resultado aleatório de um esforço solitário, individual, quanto parte integrante da minha tradição antropológica nacional que, por sua vez, e como a minha produção, é um amálgama de influências internas e externas, embora com um sabor próprio. Os estudantes da Metrópole que têm textos meus, ou de outros em situação semelhante, e se impressionam com certas descrições e posições não têm como alcançar o mundo invisível que me sustenta e me dá coerência. No entanto, não é por não o verem que ele não existe, a exemplo da fábula dos “povos sem história” que só não a exibem porque os estudiosos ocidentais não têm os meios necessários para alcançá-la. O que passa por ausência de uns é, lamentavelmente, produto da ignorância de outros.

5. Quem minimamente educado deixaria de perceber o Brasil na literatura de Machado de Assis, ou a Argentina na obra de Borges (ambos universalistas)? Por que isso não acontece na antropologia? Será uma questão de se ser ou não ser minimamente educado? E por que é permitível não se ser minimamente educado?

6. Sou grata a Florencia Mallon por seus perspicazes e otimistas comentários.

Referências


“OTHER ANTHROPOLOGIES AND ANTHROPOLOGY OTHERWISE”:
STEPS TO A WORLD ANTHROPOLOGIES FRAMEWORK

Eduardo Restrepo & Arturo Escobar

Introduction:
Creating the space for “world anthropologies”

This paper has two parallel aims: to make visible the intensification of certain processes and practices of disciplinization affecting a variety of anthropologies in recent years, particularly in the United States; and to outline a framework for “world anthropologies” which both pluralizes the discipline in novel ways and contests current anthropological canons. We describe this double goal under the rubric of ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’ At an immediate level, the aim is to complicate the picture of a single tradition emanating from the West that defines anthropology as a modern form of expert knowledge. According to this view, anthropology has become universalized through national and sub-national traditions that are, to a greater or lesser extent, confined within the epistemological space constituted by a given field of conceptual and institutional practices. By contrast, ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise’ requires thinking about the discipline in a broader frame and within a multiple space, that of ‘world anthropologies.’ ‘World anthropologies’ involves a critical awareness of both the larger epistemic and political field in which anthropology emerged and continues to function, and of the micropractices and relations of power within and across different anthropological locations and traditions.

In order to envision ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise,’ it is necessary to revisit the subtle modalities through which the models that emerged and became consolidated chiefly in British, French and Anglo-American academic establishments became naturalized. There is more, however, to the project, in that we make some suggestions to start thinking about the conditions that could make a plural landscape of world anthropologies possible. We believe it is important to discuss these processes openly, given that ‘anthropology’ today, perhaps more than ever, functions as a global field, albeit one in which some anthropologies have more paradigmatic weight—and hence more power and implied authority—than others.

This paper is based on the analytical distinction between what one may call ‘dominant anthropologies’ and ‘other anthropologies / anthropology otherwise.’ This analytical distinction has hardly been explored, mostly because the critiques done so far (at least in the centers) have been articulated from the locus of enunciation and within the assumptions that constitute ‘dominant anthropologies’ (broadly, capitalist modernity). ‘Dominant anthropologies,’ in other words, assumes a single epistemic space within which Anthropology functions as a real, albeit changing and contested, practice. ‘Other anthro-
ologies / anthropology otherwise,’ on the contrary, suggests that the space in which anthropology is practiced is fractured –perhaps even more so today than in the past, and despite increasing normalizing tendencies world wide—making it into a plural space. In other words, rather than assuming that there is a privileged position from which a ‘real anthropology’ (in the singular) can be produced and in relation to which all other anthropologies would define themselves, ‘world anthropologies’ seeks to take seriously the multiple and contradictory historical, social, cultural and political locatedness of the different communities of anthropologists and their anthropologies.

We hope to show that ‘world anthropologies’ is not just a clever label intended to replace previous attempts at speaking from outside the domain of dominant anthropologies, such as ‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ anthropologies (Jones [1970] 1988, Fahim and Helmer 1980, Narayan 1993), ‘anthropologies of the South’ (Krotz 1997), ‘peripheral anthropologies’ (Cardoso de Oliveira 1999/2000), or ‘anthropology with an accent’ (Caldeira 2000). Many of the questions formulated by these conceptualizations are pertinent and useful for the project of ‘world anthropologies.’ However, as we will see, ‘world anthropologies’ does not claim an epistemological and ontological privilege on some other criteria (e.g. the identity of the speaker, geographical location, or type of contestation). Rather, we see the project of ‘world anthropologies’ as an intervention geared at loosening the disciplinary constraints that subalternized modalities of anthropological practice and imagination have to face in the name of unmarked, normalized and normalizing models of anthropology.

It is important for us to locate this paper in two ways before beginning our argument. First, although some of the argument may apply to other anthropologies, the paper is written from the perspective of Anglo-Saxon anthropologies -- more concretely, anthropology in the United States—in which both authors are chiefly located (both of us, however, have significant experience and engagement with several Latin American anthropologies, especially in Colombia). Because we see both an intensification of certain normalizing processes within US anthropology and a growing ascendency of this anthropology on many world anthropologies—with both processes remaining largely unexamined in the US itself, although increasingly problematized and discussed elsewhere—we believe it is important to attempt a new kind of provincialization of US anthropology at this particular historical juncture. Our critical exercise is thus conducted in the terms of an academic discourse that has been largely minted in the US academy and, of course, in the English language (the “post-imperial dialect,” as Gustavo Lins Ribeiro would put it, 2000). This might seem paradoxical in relation to the argument we want to make. Let us say that we see this article as part of a broader project of envisioning a ‘world anthropologies’ landscape, which would include looking carefully at other anthropologies, forms of knowledge, modalities of writing, political-intellectual practices, networks, and so forth. In other words, while we do not see our goal as determined by “the center,” we do address this center as an element of a broader strategy that aims at both showing the naturalization of canons and contributing to a pluriverse of knowledge practices. This is one important point of intervention, although by no means the only one. Also, we do not want to suggest that dominant anthropologies are “bad” while “subaltern” ones are “good.” We are not making a moral argument but an analytical one about power among anthropologies, as we will see in detail. Ideally, this exercise of double critique (critique of power over and power within) would have to be carried out on all world anthropologies. The second way in which the pa-
per the paper needs to be located is in its Latin American orientation. As it will become clear, we derive part of our critical conceptualization from certain recent developments in Latin American/ist scholarship which are likely to color our argument in particular ways.

Part I of the paper describes succinctly our view of ‘dominant anthropologies.’ This view is set in an epistemological and political context that is somewhat broader and different from many past critiques in dominant Euro-American anthropologies. Part II examines the critiques of dominant anthropologies from within. Our intent is to show the shortcomings of these critiques from the perspective of world anthropologies, particularly the fact that every round of critique seems to have been followed by a new round of institutionalization and professionalization. Part III goes on to present a broad context for reassessing anthropological practice that goes beyond the space of intra-disciplinary critiques. Our aim at this level is to engage in the broadest conceptualization we can envision in order to revisit the possibilities and constraints under which mainstream anthropological establishments operate. Finally, part IV takes a first few steps towards the positive project of imagining ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’

I. The epistemological and political context of ‘dominant anthropologies’

“[…] privileged anthropologist, much like privileged people everywhere, avoid scrutinizing too closely a system from which they benefit”


Discourse and practice in ‘dominant anthropologies’

By ‘dominant anthropologies’ we mean chiefly the discursive formations and institutional practices that have been associated with the normalization of anthropology under academic modalities chiefly in the United States, Britain and France. Hence, ‘dominant anthropologies’ include the diverse processes of professionalization and institutionalization that accompanied the consolidation of disciplinary cannons and subjectivities and through which anthropologists recognize themselves and are recognized by others as such. Thus, with the concept of ‘dominant anthropologies’ we attempt to identify an analytical and political space to examine those changing, contested and heterogeneous practices, and unspoken agreements that constitute what certain anthropologists already have done and said as such. We should remark, however, that whereas the concept of ‘dominant anthropologies’ certainly points at a geopolitics of knowledge, ‘dominant anthropologies’—as much as subaltern or other anthropologies—do not correspond neatly to any set of geographical locations.

Despite their diversity and heterogeneity, ‘dominant anthropologies’ converge in their attempt to bracket the historicity and cultural specificity of their own discourses and practices. Therefore, ‘dominant anthropologies’ have constituted themselves as a set of differentiating interventions of what counts as ‘anthropology’ and who an ‘anthropologist’ is, which tend to obliterate diversity or elicit particular constructions of what is thinkable as different. These modalities of articulating anthropology are indissolubly embedded in particular institutional settings and linked to political economies; they subtly regulate the pro-
duction of possible discourses, the terms of the disagreements, and effect a normalization of anthropological subjectivities. ‘Dominant anthropologies’ draw disciplinary genealogies and boundaries as they reproduce themselves not only discursively, but through the control of the authorization of those who can know. There is a multiplicity of academic and institutional practices (e.g., training, research, writing, publishing, hiring, and so forth) that constitute obvious mechanisms of foreclosure of the conditions of re-production and consolidation of the ‘dominant anthropologies’ establishment. Indeed, these anthropologies are constituted by the changing and always disputable order of the anthropologically thinkable, sayable and doable, configuring thus not only their horizon of intelligibility but also their possible transformations. As we shall see, while the analysis of these micro-practices of the academy have been broached in the past two decades in dominant anthropologies, it has been done in a partial and almost anecdotal way.

‘Dominant anthropologies’ are made possible by a set of institutionalized practices and modalities of production and regulation of discourses. These practices and modalities are anchored in a disciplinary domain. As Foucault argued, “[d]isciplines constitute a system of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules” (1972: 224). As discourse, “anthropology is a rule-governed system of utterances (a discursive formation, in Foucault’s sense of the term) that systematically constructs ‘facts’ in ways that have at least as much to do with the goals of the discipline and the organizations it sustains as with the world ‘out there’” (Escobar 1993: 379). These modalities of disciplinary control are diffuse, but highly efficient. As Brazilian anthropologist Kant de Lima has shown (in one of the few ethnographies of US anthropological knowledge practices), disciplinary constraints are “much more concerned with the control of forms of how any knowledge is produced than with its contents. However, clearly this inattention to contents is only apparent: the emphasis is placed in what is said rather than on what should not be said. The form of disciplinary control is more diffuse, and consequently it may be more efficient” (1992: 194).

In other words, institutionalized practices and relations of power shape the production, circulation and consumption of anthropological knowledge as well as the production of subject positions and subjectivities. These micropractices of the academy define not only a specific grid of enunciability, authority and authorization but also the conditions of existence of anthropology as an academic discipline. While some of these processes have been already discussed (Fox, ed. 1991; Trouillot 1991; Rabinow 1991; Clifford 1988; Kant de Lima 1992; Escobar 1993; Brenneis 2003), they tend to be taken for granted as a sort of common sense that is rarely subjected to systematic scrutiny. As Ben-Ari (1999: 390) states in a persuasive paper, “while we are very good analyzing how anthropology creates various others such as the ‘natives’ or the ‘locals’, we are less adept at rigorously analyzing how we create and recreate ‘anthropologists’.” The intra-academic practices and discourses that naturalize ‘anthropology’ and ‘anthropologists’ include practices of authority/authorization which have resulted in the creation of particular regimes and concepts (such as ‘culture’ in ‘Anglo-American anthropology’ or ‘social system’ in ‘British anthropology’, or ‘ethnographic authority’ in both). We can also put it in terms of games of truth that define “[…] an intricately differentiated structure of authorities which specifies who has the right to say what on which subjects. As markers of this authority, we have distributed examinations, degrees, titles and insignia of all sorts” (Chatterjee 1997: 13).
'Dominant anthropologies’ are usually located in a relation of dominance or even hegemony with ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’ ‘Dominant anthropologies’ operate like *normalizing machines* that preclude the enablement of different anthropological practices and knowledge worldwide. To the extent that ‘dominant anthropologies’ operate from a paradigmatic and privileged epistemological position, they constitute apparatuses of erasure of difference and effect a given inscription of difference in the name of anthropological canons. This does not mean, however, that these canons are homogeneous, even in mainstream academic cores of ‘Anglo-American anthropology,’ ‘French ethnology,’ or ‘British social anthropology.’ Rather, their institutional and discursive conditions of existence must be understood as an unstable equilibrium of ongoing struggles within and against what appears to be the ‘cores’ of the anthropological establishment at a certain time. One of the effects that we would like to highlight here has been the consolidation of an academic elite and elite academic institutions that marginalize other anthropologists, institutions and anthropologies even inside the mainstream anthropological establishment.

There is a geopolitical dimension to anthropology that needs to be made visible. As we shall see below, ‘dominant anthropologies’ are part and parcel of the modern intellectual division of labor. That the modern regime of power is also a colonialist one has of course been considered by anthropologists, up to a point. However, some of the implications of this fact have escaped anthropological attention and can be brought into sharper focus through the notion of ‘coloniality’ being worked out by a group of Latin American authors. In these works, coloniality—defined as the subalternization of knowledge and culture of oppressed and excluded groups that necessarily accompanied colonialism, and which continues today with globalization—is seen as constitutive of modernity. There is no modernity without coloniality, so that the proper unit of analysis is not modernity (as in all intra-European analyses of modernity) but modernity/coloniality, or the modern/colonial world system. We shall derive more implications of this re-framing of modernity later in the paper. For now we can say that, broadly speaking, as in the case of other expert knowledges, ‘dominant anthropologies’ constitute an eurocentric technique for the construction of ‘reality.’ The specificity of these anthropologies in this regard has been its contribution to the domestication of (‘social’/‘cultural’) alterity; this has taken place in a double movement: first, and more conventionally, ‘familiarizing’ otherness; second, and more recently, exoticizing sameness.

It is also important to underscore that while we have emphasized the discursive and institutional dimensions of the normalization of anthropologies, these processes are part and parcel (simultaneously conditions of possibility and result) of political and economic conditions of dominance. In our conception of capitalist modernity, epistemic and politico-economic structures are inextricably intertwined, even if in this paper we have chosen to emphasize the former (see Ribeiro and Escobar In press for further discussion of the relation between anthropology and world systems of power). The laying down of knowledge infrastructures for the social sciences, including anthropology, and its relation to global structures of politico-economic power, particularly the rise and consolidation of US imperialism, has been thoroughly analyzed by Vincent (1990) and Nugent (ed., 2002). Ideologies of progress, modernization and development required both knowledge and cultural work that was provided and carried out by social scientists often times under the sponsorship of philanthropic organizations and state agencies, at least since the late nine-
teenth century. The type of US academic hegemony—and hence US hegemony in the discipline of anthropology—produced ‘dominant anthropologies,’ in this way, is very much part of the structures of global capitalism. The very size of the US anthropological establishment and the reason why it produces so many anthropologists is not independent of this double structural condition, a fact that with few exceptions goes on unproblematized in the discipline. This also goes a long way towards explaining the dominance of US universities in the social sciences (including the reification, without scrutiny, of the so-called “elite” or “top” anthropology departments). It is difficult to visualize ways in which these powerful material interests and structures could be transformed, but this should needless be part of a ‘world anthropologies’ project. Unfortunately, the institutional tendencies in Euro-American anthropology at present are not conducive to this aim (Brenneis 2003).

Finally, it is necessary to underscore (as a final caveat) that there have been both processes of dominance within ‘dominant anthropologies’ (in relation to particular paradigms, groups of practitioners, or even sub-fields such as ethnomusicology or folklore) and attempts at creating what Nugent (2002) has called “alternative academic canons” all throughout the history of the field. That the histories of dominant anthropologies have not been as monolithic as often assumed by critics of past periods has been shown for some cases, for instance by Vincent (1991) with respect to one of the normative periods par excellence, the Edwardian moment of Malinowski’s time. Our argument can be chastised for focusing on a selective (mainstream) tradition within ‘dominant anthropologies.’ Let us say that we see our discussion of the anthropologies without history as complementary to these attempts at bringing about moments of contestation and differentiation within the histories of the dominant strands.

II. ‘Dominant anthropologies’ and its discontents: critique, renewal, and re-institutionalization

Periods of ‘crisis’ and critique are not at all new in the anthropological domain. However, the loci of enunciation from which these critiques are articulated matters. This section is an attempt to remap broadly the critiques produced within ‘dominant anthropologies,’ focusing on the more well-known critiques in Anglo-American literature. Analytically speaking, these critiques have been articulated in three interwoven terrains: (1) the world at large, (2) epistemological and textual practices, and (3) institutional micro-practices within the academic establishment. Our argument here is that every round of critique, despite important insights and productivity, resulted in a new round of institutionalization and professionalization of the field. (In the next section, we maintain these same terrains and attempt to deepen the critiques.)

1. The world at large. The first kind of critique problematized anthropological practice with reference to the relations of domination and exploitation in the world at large. This critique was articulated in the 1960s and 1970s largely from a Marxist political economy perspective, and usually in the name of Third World struggles against colonialism and imperialism. One of the most radical expressions of this critique was, of course, Reinventing Anthropology (Hymes ed., [1969] 1974). Even though the contributions to this volume were unevenly developed and had different emphases, they shared the insistence on the need for a shift in the epistemological, institutional, and political foundations of Anglo-American anthropology.
Some (such as the contributions by Hymes, Scholte, and Diamond) went further. They questioned, for instance, the transitory hegemony of ‘departmental anthropology’ in Anglo-American anthropology and opened up the discussion about moving toward a non-academic anthropological practice. Others argued for a reflexive and emancipatory anthropology that would start by taking itself seriously as an anthropological object, recognizing that all anthropological traditions are culturally mediated and contextually situated (Scholte [1969] 1974). Others questioned the shortcomings of an indigenous anthropology that would only replicate elsewhere the templates of metropolitan schools. In short, Reinventing Anthropology did include a call to turn the ethnographical gaze toward the cultural grounds on which this gaze itself had been rooted; it engaged in a critical ‘anthropology of anthropology,’ and to this extent we may find in it the idea of ‘world anthropologies,’ albeit in statu nascendi.

Critiques of this type were articulated throughout the 1960s and 1970s by those who called for a politically engaged anthropology. As it is well known, some of these critiques focused on the relationship between ‘anthropology’ and ‘colonialism’ (Asad 1973, Lewis 1973, Copans 1975). Other critiques argued for a radical anthropological praxis sensitive to the struggles of liberation by Third World peoples, or for the development of indigenous anthropology as a partial corrective to anthropology’s eurocentrism (e.g., Fahim, ed. 1982). In the late eighties, this sort of critique raised the possibility of an anthropology more sensitive to class, racial and gender domination, one that would work “toward social transformation and human liberation... how cultural critique as politicized deconstruction of various hegemonic ideologies and discourses can be a significant and necessary component of broader struggles for equality, social and economic justice, and far-reaching democratization” (Harrison [1991] 1997: 8, 6). In sum, during this period the epistemological and political uniqueness of ‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ anthropologists, the demand for the de-colonization of anthropological knowledge, and the political role of anthropologists in the reproduction or contestation of the status quo were three of the pivotal points of the debate.

We can point today at some of the limits of these critiques. As South African anthropologist Archie Mafeje (2001) states in a remarkable analysis of metropolitan critiques, these critiques rarely question the taken-for-granted academic environment in which anthropology existed, nor could they adumbrate a post-anthropological era, so that the critics ended up being “conservative rebels” implicated in the reproduction of the academy. Although there were some exceptions, for Mafeje the agent of anthropological and social transformation continued to be the white westerner. Most failed to see the role of the colonized in decolonizing knowledge, something that has become acutely clear more recently. This is why perhaps what Asad (1973: 18) said of those anthropologists working under colonialism—that no matter how politically progressive they nevertheless chose to live “professionally at peace” with the system—would also generally apply to most metropolitan critiques. Despite their political importance and productivity, this “literature of anguish” (Ben-Ari 1999) is gladly over, and now other terrains of critique are being considered, particularly those which were among the blind spots of the political economy critiques, such as the micro-practices of the academy (below).

2. Epistemological and textual practices. In the mid 1980s, textual practices emerged as the object of intense debate mainly in Anglo-American anthropology (e.g., Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Clifford 1988). This chapter of in the history of critique within dominant anthropologies is well known, since it is the closest to us, and we will not dwell on
it save for showing some of its shortcomings from the perspective of our argument. Today, this critiques could be seen as effecting a set of displacements from *cultures-as-text* (interpretative turn), to *texts-about-culture* (writing culture and the politics of representation), ending up with *anthropology-as-cultural-critique* (critical cultural constructivism). Even though there were of course multiple and antagonistic tendencies within this ‘textual turn,’ there was a virtual consensus about the necessity of problematizing some of the main epistemological assumptions of mainstream anthropologies—including the hypertrophied position of epistemology itself (Rabinow 1986). Critiques focused on the modalities of authorship and authorization inscribed in rhetorical figures as well as the problems of representing cultural alterity. One of the main targets of this critique was the textual practices of the so-called realist ethnography. This opened up a moment for novel forms of writing that were more sensitive to the location of the author, the incompleteness of ‘anthropological data,’ the necessarily dialogic and power-laden nature of fieldwork (Page 1988), and the polyvocality of any representation of culture. The “postmodern” moment—as it came to be labeled by its critics—also influenced an entire critical trend on prevailing objectivist, essentialist, and reified conception of ‘culture’ which emphasized, conversely, the historicized, located, polyphonic, political and discursive character of any ‘cultural fact’ (e.g., Dirks, Eley and Ortner 1994; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Rosaldo 1989; Gupta and Ferguson, eds. 1997).

While the textual turn opened up important possibilities for post-anthropological ethnography and post-epistemological accounts of culture, it nevertheless sheltered academic anthropological practices (Fox, ed. 1991); it was also largely silent on anthropologies in the Third World (Mafeje 2001). This latter aspect was incorporated in what was in all likelihood the most important critique of the “writing culture” move, the feminist critique, including the subsequent and rich debate on feminist ethnography (see, e.g., Gordon 1988, 1991; Behar and Gordon, ed.1995; Visweswaran 1994; Knauf 1996: 219-248). From the outset, this trend rightly articulated the critique of epistemology coming from feminist theory with the social critique coming from women of color and Third World women. In this respect, the “women writing culture” and feminist ethnography trends contributed to destabilizing academic canons in ways that other critical perspectives did not. By raising the issue of what it meant to “decolonize feminist anthropology” (Visweswaran 1994: 101; Gordon 1991), that is, feminist anthropology’s relation to different kinds of women and women in other places, this group of anthropologists questioned feminist thinking and practices of ethnographic fieldwork and writing. In addressing the question of “what it means to be women writing culture,” they thus joined a critical epistemological reflection—including the relationship between anthropology and feminism (echoing an older argument by Strathern, 1987)—with a political reflection on power relations among women. As it is well known, *This Bridge Called My Back. Writings by Radical Women of Color* (Moraga and Anzaldúa, eds. 1983) provided a spark and a model for this rethinking, along with *Writing Culture*. Twenty years later, *This Bridge We Call Home. Radical Visions for Transformation* (Anzaldúa and Keatin, eds.2003) poses new challenges for feminist anthropology and anthropologies as a whole.

3. **Academic micro-practices.** The nineties brought with them a new domain of critique that had remained largely invisible within ‘dominant anthropologies’—the institutional relations and practices within the academic establishment. These micro-practices and relations include, among others, mechanisms of training, hiring and promotion, the construction of hierarchies and prestige linked to academic departments, events such as colloquia and conferences, hid-
den canons and exemplars for publication in leading journals, funding patterns and grant-writing practices, and so forth. This critique shifted the focus to the practices of production, circulation and consumption of anthropological discourses and subjectivities. The gaze was thus directed toward the conditions under which anthropological labor is produced (Fox, ed. 1991). This trend was in part a reaction to the over-emphasis on the textual aspects of anthropological work. As Abu-Lughod put it: “[…] the decolonization of the text […] leaves intact the basic configuration of global power on which anthropology, as linked to other institutions of the world, is based” (1991: 143). Trouillot proposed the concept of ‘electoral politics’ to refer to “[…] the set of institutionalized practices and relations of power that influence the production of knowledge from within academe: academic filiations, the mechanisms of institutionalization, the organization of power within and across departments, the market value of publish-or-perish prestige, and other worldly issues that include, but expand way beyond, the maneuvering we usually refer to as ‘academic politics’” (1991: 18). What was at stake with this critique was the very materiality of production and reproduction of the anthropological establishment as such, a project recently retaken by Brenneis, as we already mentioned.

Some of the consequences of this questioning remain to be studied further. For instance, if anthropological training inscribes subjects into certain intellectual traditions, the understanding of the reproduction and positioning of ‘dominant anthropologies’ involves a detailed description and analysis of this training. In this sense, Ben-Ari (1999) noted how the training of former colonial subjects in metropolitan centers has largely constituted a mechanism of expansion of dominant anthropologies throughout the globe. “By ‘allowing’—permitting, inviting, enticing—Third World scholars to join the discussions of academic anthropology are we not reproducing anew the power relations of colonialism?” (Ben-Ari 1999: 404). This view may be somewhat static, yet it points at important, and often invisible, processes of power and influence over anthropologies in many parts of the world (witness, for instance, the increasing “North-Americanization” of many Latin American anthropologies since the 1980s). For Ben-Ari (1999: 391), the model of an ‘authentic anthropology,’ defined in terms of the representations that anthropologists make about themselves, involves three domains or practice: fieldwork, writing (particularly the ethnographic monograph), and institutional activities (particularly an academic job). He notes how “[d]espite the variety of deconstructions, critiques and questioning that have been sounded in the past few years, it is a […] specific version of professionalism that we work with. This version is a ‘classic’ British or American one: an anthropologist does fieldwork, in an-other place, faces and overcomes difficulties, writes her/his findings in a text called an ethnography (juxtaposing theory and data), and is employed in an academic institution.” (Ben-Ari 1999: 390; emphasis in the original).

Fieldwork has also been placed under scrutiny. For example, from the point of view of some activists in the south, the practice of going abroad to ‘study other cultures or societies’ in order to write about them has always been another form of exploitation and, obviously, the expression of unequal power relationships. Moreover, this particular anthropological frame could be seen as the expression of the bourgeois imaginary of a ‘free individual’ who ‘decides’ by him/herself what he/she ‘wants’ to ‘study’, when, where, how, and for how long, while the people ‘studied’ are located in the ‘passive’ place of being observed, being the ‘informants,’ and so forth. Much has changed, of course, in this ideology; yet the fact remains that that dominant anthropological establishments and discou-
ses continue to operate as a political technology for the production—often domestication, as we shall see below—of alterity. To understand more fully this aspect we need to broaden our view of the contexts in which anthropology emerged and operates. What we hope to achieve in the next section is a certain deepening of the previous critiques in ways that allow us to make visible a project of decolonizing anthropology at three interrelated levels: epistemic, social, and institutional.

III. A further historicization of the production of anthropological knowledge

Anthropologists work within a political and epistemological context that shapes their practice and that are beyond the ethnographer’s immediate control (Fox, ed. 1991; Escobar 1993). We believe that it is important to revisit these conditions as a step towards imagining “other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.” What follows is a further, albeit brief, exercise in the sociology of production of anthropological knowledge, in the broadest terms we are able to imagine. We suggest that this broad contextualization has to incorporate at least the following dimensions: the modern intellectual division of labor within which anthropology emerged and within which it fits; the social and political contexts associated with this division of labor, i.e., what we have called here modernity/coloniality; and of course the academic milieu in which ‘dominant anthropologies’ are largely practiced. In what follows we present a succinct view of these factors, raising questions for ‘dominant anthropologies’ about each of them, with the aim to creating a space for ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’ (For the sake of simplicity, we will use anthropology in the singular in this section although it should be understood that we are referring to ‘dominant anthropologies’ as defined here.)

1) Anthropology and the modern division of intellectual labor. In our view, Foucault has provided the broadest possible framework for locating the emergence and development of the social and human sciences, including anthropology’s specificity (see especially 1973: 344-387). Anthropology can be located within the modern episteme, understood as a particular configuration of knowledge that coalesced at the end of the eighteenth century and that involved, among other features, the following: a) the emergence of the figure of (Western) Man as the foundation of all knowledge and its privileged subject, separate from the natural order (see also Heidegger 1977); b) a given configuration of the natural, social, and human sciences; c) a series of tensions (“the anthropological doubles”) that created a permanent instability in the structure of modernity and which, in Foucault’s analysis, might eventually result in the dissolution of Man and the modern episteme. Within this modern episteme, anthropology (ethnology, in Foucault’s account) and psychoanalysis function as counter-sciences—that is, as forms of knowledge that present the West with its own limits by confronting it with difference and the unconscious. They nevertheless find in Western ratio—and, hence, in European dominance—their reason for being.

There are two additional arguments to consider. First, within this modern division, anthropology was assigned the “savage slot,” an epistemological and political problematic that, despite important transformations, anthropology has not yet been able to transcend fully. In Trouillot’s critical contextualization, anthropology emerged within a larger enunciative field structured, after the Renaissance, around the figures of Order (the West as it
could be), and the Savage (the non-West). Anthropology ended up being entrusted with the Savage Slot—the study of savages and primitives (see also Stocking 1982). Today, “the direction of the discipline depends upon an explicit attack on that slot itself and the symbolic order upon which it is premised” (Trouillot 1991: 34). For Trouillot, the starting point of this project cannot be the crisis of anthropology but in the wider world, through a vindication of a multiplicity of others (rather than “an Other”) with their partial truths and political projects. There is a link to be made between this idea of multiplicity of worlds and ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’

Second, the modern division of intellectual labor fostered a phallogo-euro-centric approach to knowledge. Modernity entailed the triumph of logocentrism, understood as a belief that finds in logical truth the foundation for any rational theory of the world as made up of knowable and, hence, controllable things and beings (e.g., Vattimo 1991). Central to the phallogo-eurocentrism of “Man the Modern” (Haraway 1997) has been a fundamental concern with epistemology as the vehicle for assessing truth and objective knowledge. In emphasizing the situatedness and partiality of all knowledge, feminist epistemology articulates a frontal challenge to the modern knowledge order, including the concern with epistemology itself. This challenge is still to be fully worked into anthropology (feminist, subaltern, or otherwise). Can for instance a notion of “situated anthropologies” and ethnographies emerge from these frameworks?

2) Whether constitutive of anthropology or not, colonialism and imperialism have provided the overall context for the exercise of the discipline. This, however, does not need to be a “fatal” trait; it could also be—indeed has been at times—a condition of possibility for de-colonizing expert knowledge. The colonial context has not yet been fully shed. To understand the “total colonial fact” (Ben-Ari 1999) and to finally exercise it, anthropology has to find a point d’appui that problematizes the very fact of a modern episteme and a Western ratio—that is, it has to deal with both colonialism and coloniality. This means considering the knowledge and cultural effects of colonialism/imperialism—what we referred to above as ‘coloniality,’ or the colonial difference—plus Eurocentrism and the subalternization of knowledge that accompany these processes.

3) Anthropological practice takes place within modern disciplinary and institutional structures that account for the production of expert knowledge. As already pointed out, the main result of this feature is the idea of a single space within which valid anthropology is produced. We will see the implications of this observation for moving between the assumption of a singular space, that is, toward ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’

Let us now list some of the most important implications of this analysis. At the epistemic and epistemological levels, we may ponder the effectiveness with which anthropology has represented radical alterity—have these representations enabled a radical critique of the West, or have they become technologies for the domestication of alterity? If it could be argued that the relationship with colonialism might have been contingent (e.g., Foucault 1973: 377), that with eurocentrism was not. How can anthropology bring the “exteriority” of the West to bear more fully on the structures that made Man possible, including logocentrism? How can it foster a new dispersion of the human experience into a different play of differences and identities? Does the abandonment of “the Other” in favor of a multiplicity of others entail the need to abandon the anthropological project altogether, or rather the possibility of recasting it as an anthropology of others (anthropologies of
others), whose object(s) would be different historical subjects, in their irreducibility to any universal narrative (the West’s or any other)? The notion of situated knowledge also has implications that go beyond partial perspective and a politics of location. It raises the issues of translation of knowledge across sites that are linked by networks of connections among power-differentiated communities. How can anthropology both “see faithfully from another’s point of view” (Haraway 1988: 583), especially from the margins, on the one hand, and, on the other, enact a politics of translation that fully takes into account the power differentials across sites?20

At the social and political levels, one may wonder whether any “decolonization” of anthropology entails a “re-anthropologization,” and if so, at the service of what? What strategic alliances and networks could be established for this purpose? For instance, between critical discourses in North and South, among graduate students worldwide, dissident anthropologists, third world anthropologists, minority anthropologists, subaltern intellectuals of various kinds, activists? The question of the agents of such decolonization or radical transformation continues to be an important one. Some authors suggest subaltern social movements (Trouillot 1991), third world intellectuals in North and South (Harrison, ed. 1991), the subaltern themselves (Mafeje 1999). From the modernity/coloniality perspective it is possible to talk about (non-Eurocentric) epistemic perspective(s) that can be occupied by a host of social actors in many geo-political locations and in multiple ways; in this way, it is not the identity of the subject that matters most, but the subject’s ability to inhabit a border space of thought and practice. It could perhaps be claimed that historically and socially subaltern groups are more attuned to this epistemic perspective and thus more likely to occupy effectively the spaces of transformation (the borders of the modern colonial world system), but of course no identity guarantees a politics or a perspective, and non-subaltern actors might find enabling the project of boundary thinking.

Finally, in terms of academic practices, it is clear that these have emerged as a primary target and space for the transformation of anthropology. One may ponder then what the main parameters are for advancing such a project. Who/what needs to change? How? Why does this change not happen now? How far can one push in this regard? Is the most radical project that anthropology can visualize for itself the very dissolution of the modern intellectual division of labor under the dictates of logocentrism? What would it take for anthropology to fully take into account the fact that it is the product of micro-practices that profoundly affect the field? The questions would become even more complex if we add the connections between the academy and more explicit politico-economic interests and forces.

A world anthropologies landscape focused in reworking coloniality would attempt to deal with the various levels and layers of power and de-colonization: text, social reality, epistemic perspectives, academic practices (Escobar 1993). These are, of course, inter-related. We suggest that we can think theoretically and politically about a project of decolonization or transformation at three levels:

1) **Epistemic transformation**: aiming at configurations of knowledge and power that go beyond the paradigm of modernity, towards an other paradigm(s), an other way of thinking (Santos 2002, Mignolo 2000). At this level, the thrust could be said to be on...
2) *locating knowledge* – including locating dominant knowledge in order to make visible other worlds and knowledges – what in the modernity/coloniality perspective we have called ‘worlds and knowledges otherwise.’

3) **Social and political transformation**: locating anthropology explicitly within the power configuration defined by imperial globality and global coloniality (broadly, the modern/colonial world system; see also Escobar 2004b). At this level, we may discuss anthropologies’ role in technologies of production of alterity and the link between these and socioeconomic and political projects or dominion.

4) **Institutional transformation**, moving in two directions: beyond the disciplinary/undisciplinary boundary; and beyond the academic/non-academic divide. This would also entail *decolonizing expertise*.

The end result would be multiple spaces of interpretation (pluritopic hermeneutics, for epistemic delonization; see Mignolo 2000); pluriversality (for social and political decolonization); and “other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise” (for institutional decolonization and beyond). This would be the space of ‘world anthropologies.’ Let it be emphasized that these are provisional proposals intended to foster debate more than to provide a durable context for imagining beyond anthropology in the singular.

**IV. Envisioning world anthropologies**

“[…] we suffer increasingly from a process of historical amnesia in which we think that just because we are thinking about an idea it has only just started”

Stuart Hall (1997: 20)

We believe that in the last two decades we have witnessed a tendency toward a growing influence of the Anglo-American model of anthropology on many world anthropologies. It was already the case in the early 1980s that “proportionate to the world community of anthropologists, the numbers of Anglo (especially of North) American anthropologists are very large indeed” (Stocking, 1982: 174; see Ribeiro and Escobar In press for current figures worldwide; for instance, there are over 2,000 anthropologists in Japan alone, and close to the same number in several Latin American countries, and those of us in the USA, often including those that specialize in those areas, know little about them.) As Ben-Ari states, in this process of achieving hegemony, “[…] what happened was not the advent of any kind of world-wide consensus about the anthropological project, but rather that the basic terms and criteria which were (and still are) used in discussions and contentions about the profession were accepted by the overwhelming majority of anthropologists at the time” (1999: 396). This tendency is reflected in the production of anthropological subjectivities. As Colombian anthropologist Carlos Alberto Uribe (1997: 259-260) noted referring to anthropologists, among some of those who are subalternized there is often a tendency to emulate metropolitan practice. This hegemonic processes notwithstanding, as the WAN
(World Anthropologies Network) Collective put it (2003), a question that remains is whether the production of Southern and subaltern anthropologies can be fully described in terms of a metropolitan matrix, no matter how much this matrix might be seen as a negotiated outcome, or whether there are indeed different practices and knowledges that go beyond them. This is a call to take seriously the notion that differences matter regarding anthropologists and anthropologies themselves. These historical and cultural differences involve relations of power and practices of marginalization and invisibilization (Krotz 1997).

In other words, contestation of the subalternization associated with the taken-for-granted ‘dominant anthropologies’ is a necessary step towards the opening of a space of visibility and enunciability for ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’ This contestation is not only discursive given the dissimilar conditions in which the various world anthropologies are articulated and deployed. In order to realize the constitutive plurality of world anthropologies it is indispensable to reverse the asymmetrical ignorance that goes into the processes of hegemonization/subalternization. A number of authors have pointed out already the asymmetrical ignorance that characterizes the world anthropological landscape. Without going in detail into the historiography of dominant anthropology and the political economy of visibilities it upholds (past and present), it is fair to say that “histories of anthropology” are often histories of the “(three) great traditions,” with all other (usually national) “traditions” in a much secondary position (e.g. Ben-Ari 1999; Cardoso de Oliveira 1999/2000; Kant de Lima 1992; Krotz 1997; Stocking 1982; Uribe 1997; Ribeiro and Escobar In press for a more thorough discussion). This is why “anthropologists working at the ‘center’ learn quickly that they can ignore what is done in peripheral sites at little or no professional cost, while any peripheral anthropologist who similarly ignores the ‘center’ puts his on her professional competence at issue” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 27).

This ‘asymmetrical ignorance’ is related to a ‘metropolitan parochial mentality’ that, as Daniel Mato (2001: 20) notes, affects particularly intellectuals located in metropolitan contexts; there is a tendency either to imagine that what happens there is representative of what has happened in the rest of the world (or of what sooner or later will happen) or, alternatively, to assume that their interpretations have universal value. There is often a geopolitics of knowledge that reduces the ‘natives’ (even when they are anthropologists) to serving as sources of information, while those anthropologists firmly ensconced in the anthropological establishment are seen as producing theory or more valid descriptions about others.15

It is important to keep in mind how difficult it is to modify the discursive economy in which these processes take place. As Stuart Hall says, “changing the terms of an argument is exceedingly difficult, since the dominant definition of the problem acquires, by repetition, and by the weight and credibility of those who propose or subscribe it, the warrant of ‘common sense’” (1982: 81). A process of visibilization of silenced or subalternized anthropologies and anthropologists thus requires moving beyond the mere contestation of ‘dominant anthropologies’ and the terms in which they have been thought of as ‘anthropology.’ This process also goes well beyond a naïve claim for recognition on the part of the ‘dominant anthropologies’ establishment (to avoid falling into the master/slave dialectics described by Fanon, [1952]1967, among other reasons). As Mafeje puts it for African contexts: “[…] the deconstruction of Eurocentrism should not be constructed as an absolute rejection of the influence of European thinking on African scholars but rather as a rejection of assumed European intellectual hegemony” (2001: 14).
The future of ‘world anthropologies’ entails going beyond disciplinary and academic constraints -- at least as they exist today in the increasingly corporatized university world wide. A ‘world anthropologies’ project must move towards a recognition of what is both un/non-disciplinary and un/non-academic in world wide practices –in actuality or in potentia. First, the project needs to engage with un-disciplinary frameworks to the extent that these embody a radical critique of the canons of authority/authorization that reproduce the ‘dominant anthropologies’ establishment. Un-disciplinarity suggests that worldwide practices need to move beyond the mechanical addition or melding of ‘disciplines’ that is often involved in the terms ‘inter-’ and ‘trans-disciplinarity.’ Rather, an un-disciplinary horizon allows for the contestation of the modern/colonial epistemological assumptions of disciplinary expert knowledge. It operates with the goal of decolonizing expertise. In other words, a ‘world anthropologies’ non-disciplinary horizon would both subvert the existing politics of knowledge and take seriously the truth-effects enacted by plural, place-based anthropological discourses. In so doing, even the terms ‘anthropology’ or ‘anthropologies’ could be radically reconceptualized or abandoned altogether. The concept of ‘post-ethnological era” proposed by Mafeje (2001) points in this direction.

Second, in order to enable world anthropologies it is necessary to question the formative distinction between academic and non-academic realms. To some extent, this divide has operated like the state/civil society distinction analyzed by Mitchell (1991) and, more recently, by Hansen and Stepputat (2001). The divide suggests that there are two sides --academy and its outside-- with the former defined by a specific rationality and set of practices outside of, and different from, other realms of social life. Consequently, the discussion often centers on how to bridge or create connections between the academic and other orders. As Mitchell has suggested, the crucial issue is to realize that what produces and maintains this boundary is itself a mechanism that enables the deployment of a certain politics of knowledge. To make a parallel with the ethnography of the state, once you take into account the grounded practices of everyday re/production of academic knowledge, the radical boundary between academic and other realms of social life becomes inevitably blurred.

As an un-academic project, the enablement of ‘world anthropologies’ would entail a critique of the epistemological and politico-economic conditions that constitute the academic realm as if it were separate from (and a possible standpoint for) other practices and relations. By stating that ‘world anthropologies’ must be understood as not only academic, we would like to highlight the multiplicity of enunciative locations --in tandem with related notions such as situated knowledges, border thinking, or place-based epistemologies (Escobar 2001). Chakrabarty’s (2000) work is particularly relevant in this regard. His analysis of the relationships between ‘subaltern pasts’ and history as discipline can serve as a heuristic to think broadly about the relations between expert knowledge and ‘subaltern knowledges.’ Chakrabarty’s notion of ‘subaltern pasts’ and his proposal for ‘provincializing Europe’ push the limits of eurocentric grids of intelligibility (as his epigraph of Althusser indicates). Other authors similarly raise the issue of the incommensurability of subaltern and expert knowledges, and the impossibility of the former to be represented in its own terms by the latter --which was precisely the thrust of Spivak’s famous article, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ (see, e.g., Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2000; Coronil 1996; Guha 1983, 1994).
Were we to follow the subalternists’ analysis to its logical conclusions, would one have to admit that ‘dominant anthropologies’ have always been part of the prose of counter-insurgency (always reducing the insurgent/Other to a Western discourse and logic)? Or has it been able, now and then, to show that the insurgent/savage can be the subject of his/her own narrative, the protagonist of his/her own history? From the perspective of the academic/non-academic divide, have anthropologists’ customary translations of subaltern worlds into the abstract terms of logocentric discourse meant that they have inevitably done little more than “report on the subaltern,” or has this very translation not also at times been able to upset the self-confidence of the West and enable important subaltern resistances and reconstructions? If, as we adduced earlier, ‘dominant anthropologies’ most often than not operated as technologies for the domestication of alterity—translating subaltern worlds into Eurocentric terms—have they not produced also conditions for such alterities to exercise a critical function vis-à-vis the very system that makes them visible?

We pose these questions to problematize our own position, but also to suggest possible moves towards ‘world anthropologies.’ Mafeje (2001) has suggested a number of moves that are useful to work through these predicaments, including the following: a deconstructionist approach from an African perspective; non-disciplinarity—a sort of free borrowing from any field without concern for disciplinary rules, methods, etc.; a non-epistemological approach, beyond the adherence to a general “discursive method”; a practice of ethnography as made up of the subject’s own texts, decoded by the social scientist in their own context, under non-alienating and thoroughly political conditions, and in away that takes subjects as knowledge producers in their own right; and a “post-ethnological” approach to theory building—one that goes beyond the objectifying and classifying imperatives of anthropology; this would entail abandoning the concept of culture in favor of ethnography. What may emerge from these new practices is “new styles of thinking and new forms of organization of knowledge” (p. 60), bringing about a post-anthropological era, beyond what any project of “re-anthropologization” could accomplish.

Needless to say, Mafeje’s solutions are no panacea and are full of traps and tensions further down the line. Our aim in describing them is less to propose them as a model than to show a particular way of thinking that aims at pluralizing practices. This gives us the chance to remind us that anthropology could indeed be at the avant-garde of the transformation of the modern intellectual division of labor (i.e., of the system of the disciplines as we know it), if such a project were ever to be entertained seriously. It also brings to the fore the question of what ‘beyond epistemology’ entails. Is it possible to go beyond the preoccupation with criteria for assessing the truth, or the truth value of a statement, representations, etc. (that is, the process of reasoning and the validity of statements, what could be called the analytics of truth of Western logocentrism, as opposed to the Foucaultian project of the relation between truth telling and the exercise of power)? In what ways does ‘beyond epistemology’ also entail going beyond the dominance of principles such as cognitivism, positivism, logic, metaphysics, logocentrism? What would be the role of seemingly alternative styles of reasoning and argumentation (e.g., traditions of rhetoric, exegesis, oratory, performance, non-logocentric writing, etc.), the introduction of ‘subaltern epistemologies,’ or the recovery of non-dualist Western traditions, such as phenomenology?
A ‘world anthropologies’ horizon changes not only the taken-for-granted content of ‘dominant anthropologies’, but also—as in the case of the modernity/coloniality approach—the terms, conditions, and places of worldwide anthropological conversations and exchanges. ‘World anthropologies’ is an intervention toward the making possible of ‘other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise.’ This visualization entails a novel attempt at denaturalizing the doxa of ‘dominant anthropologies’. As Kant de Lima notes,

“[…] the control exercised over intellectual production in general and anthropology in particular as an academic, scientific discipline is not accomplished in the academy by censuring the contents of propositions, or, at least, not only by doing this. It involves the imposition of the academic form of expression which, in the final analysis, orients and organizes thought and imposes its limits on intellectual production, in the process of domesticating it. What is important is not whether or not the content of a proposition is revolutionary, but whether or not it can be neatly fitted into the forms of expression permitted by the academy, and whether or not it is a disciplined and docile product and, consequently, useful for the same academy” (1992:207; emphasis added).

We suggest that ‘world anthropologies’ constitutes an attempt to transform the uneven conditions of possibility of production/circulation of anthropological thinking at large. ‘World anthropologies’ takes seriously the idea that (cultural, historical, political and epistemological) differences matter, not only as an externality embedded in the so-called object of study, but also as constituent of any anthropological project. To this extent, ‘world anthropologies’ builds on, and extends in terms of its conceptual and political consequences, the radical potential of an anthropology of anthropology. In short, as a project, ‘world anthropologies’ is not more, but not less, than taking anthropological thinking seriously. Thus, the enablement of ‘world anthropologies’ involves a pluralizing, de-centering and re-historicizing of what usually appears as a single and non-problematic ‘anthropology’. ‘World anthropologies’ entails a rearticulation of anthropological thinking that enables it to take seriously the constitutive function of power and difference in the political economy of visibilities. In this sense, ‘world anthropologies’ aims towards a post-anthropological era, a moment beyond the dominance of ‘dominant anthropologies’. Here, as Gustavo Lins Ribeiro (2001:176) says, “the prefix ‘post’ suggest the possibility of drawing other cognitive maps […]” and, of course, making possible other conditions of intervention.

Anthropologies’ multiple changes and repeated crises reveals that it is a highly reflexive discipline that projects itself onto, and receives feedback from, the topics it studies. As a consequence, anthropology is finely attuned to the sociological changes of each period; in a globalized world this calls for more diverse international voices and perspectives actively participating in any assessment of the frontiers of anthropological knowledge. Studying each other as anthropologists becomes important from this perspective. Indeed, a globalized world is a perfect scenario for anthropologies to thrive since one of anthropology’s basic lessons is respect for difference. A discipline that praises plurality and diversity needs to foster these standpoints within its own milieu. This means a multicentered field in a polycentric world.
Turning to other anthropologists and anthropologies --and with an attentive eye to epistemic, epistemological and political differences-- is a sine qua non for ‘world anthropologies.’

It would be ironic if the project of world anthropologies came to be seen as a new attempt on the part of the “periphery” to strike back, as in some simplistic interpretations of the aims of the post-colonial critique vis à vis the former imperial powers. On the contrary, we think that this is a moment of enlargement of the anthropological horizon that will make anthropology a richer cosmopolitics, one that is capable of dealing with the challenges arising in the 21st century (Ribeiro and Escobar In press).

Notes

1. This paper has several sources. The initial idea of a plurality of anthropologies came up in conversations among the two authors and Marisol de la Cadena in Chapel Hill in Spring, 2001. We then drafted a text on the idea of a “world anthropologies network,” WAN (available at www.ram-wan.org). Several steps followed, including WAN graduate seminars taught at both Chapel Hill (by Arturo Escobar with Restrepo’s assistance) and the University of Brasilia (by Gustavo Lins Ribeiro) in Fall 2002. Ribeiro and Escobar also started working on a conference on “World Anthropologies” in Fall, 2001 which took place as a Wenner-Gren Symposium in Spring 2003, with the participation of several of those who had joined by then a lose “WAN Collective.” Informal discussions have been maintained on-line since, especially by five of us (de la Cadena, Susana Narotzky from Universidad de Barcelona, Ribeiro, Restrepo, and Escobar), which really enriched the paper. The WAN collective has since enlarged (see its short collective text in Social Anthropology, WAN Collective 2004); it has also engaged in a series of projects and presentations, so far chiefly in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, Europe and the US. We would also like to thank some of our WAN friends (Eeva Berglund, Eduardo Archetti, Sandy Toussaint and Esteban Krotz) for comments, and support from colleagues at the two institutions with which we are affiliated (particularly Dorothy Holland and Peter Redfield at Chapel Hill, Mauricio Pardo, María Victoria Uribe and Cristóbal Gnecco in Colombia) for giving resonance to the project. Finally, our thanks to four anonymous referees as well as the journal Editors for their useful comments and interest in the piece.

2. Both authors are affiliated with both the Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and the Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, ICANH, Bogotá.

3. We shall have more to say about this later on in the paper. A panel proposal for the EASA conference in Vienna in September 2004, for instance, called attention to the lack of awareness about the growing control of agendas, funding, publishing, and so forth by elite departments in the United States in ways that affect anthropology in the USA and beyond. “To what extent does this domination stifle intellectual creativity?” these anthropologists asked. “Does anthropologists’ lack of reflexivity reveal conceptual and theoretical weaknesses in their approach to politics?” The workshop was aimed at stimulating discussion “about the limits of anthropologists’ reflexivity vis-à-vis the production and reproduction of (social, institutional, editorial, linguistic) power structures within their own discipline”
More analyses of this sort are surfacing outside the US, and the problem begins to be tackled in the US itself. In his 2003 Presidential Address to the AAA, Donnal Brenneis analyzed at length the increasing intersections among scholarly knowledge, managerialist language and practice, and private capital that result in ever higher levels of privatization and normalization of knowledge. For him, these changes represent “profound transformations” that (Euro-American) anthropologists have failed to analyse. In our view, practices such as publishing and hiring are becoming even more normalized than in the recent past. Hiring practices are becoming so tightly controlled (with most positions going to those trained in a few elite departments), that it is reaching scandalous (albeit not formally discussed) levels. Publishing in some leading journals seem to obey a canon so strict that it is becoming a formula (one has to follow the formula for the paper to be published); papers in these journals also involve almost exclusively self-referential scholarly exchanges which silence or exclude the often extremely rich debates taking place in the locations where the anthropologist is working on precisely the same topics s/he is writing about. As geographer David Slater has pointed out (In press), there is a pervasive tendency in metropolitan scholarship to ignore the contributions of African, Asian, and North American intellectuals writing in those parts of the world, so that pointing at this absence and including those voices should be part of any critical postcolonial geo-political theory. That the influence of the US anthropology model is growing is also attested by simple observations such as increased attendance of non-US based anthropologists to the AAA meetings; and the desire (and some times need, given the prestige) to publish in English-speaking journals.

4. We have shifted several times our characterization of ‘dominant anthropologies’ over the past three years, from terms such as “metropolitan” and “central” to “straight” (from queer theory) and “hegemonic.” We finally settled for dominant in this paper, echoing Gramsci’s conceptualization but also Ranajit Guha’s notion of the dominance without hegemony achieved in manycolonialist social formations. We should make the caveat, however, than while the relation between ‘dominant anthropologies’ (again, particularly US) and many other world anthropologies can be described as one of dominance (and in some cases even hegemony), the kinds and degrees of contestation vary considerably. For instance, the degree of contestation of, and independence from, Anglo-American anthropology has been much greater in Brazil, Mexico or India than in most other Latin American anthropologies with which we are familiar. Colombian anthropologist Myriam Jimeno has made the argument that, unlike the case of some dominant anthropologies, the ineluctable link that exists between anthropologists and their societies and subjects of study in many Third World countries creates anthropologies where not only the contents but the very categories of anthropological work are contested; this contestation, in Jimeno’s analysis, includes the localization, radical transformation, and outright rejection of metropolitan categories (Jimeno 2003; see also Ramos 1999-2000; Das 1998 for Indian anthropology). There would be much more to say about the status of the discussion of the relation between ‘dominant anthropologies’ and subaltern, third world, or peripheral anthropologies than can be done here. We hope to take up this issue for the case of Latin American anthropologies in a subsequent work. Gianni Vattimo and Manuel Cruz (1999) have made the interesting argument that peripheral philosophies such as those of Italy and Spain are perhaps richer and more universal since they have to process all of the various metropolitan schools, which are only too busy building their own systems. Something of the sort happens with many anthropologies, particularly of the South, which engage by necessity with various dominant anthropologies and with other anthropologies of the South to create their own eclectic and.
less provincial practice. Finally, we will not deal here with interesting developments in recent years in some dominant anthropologies, particularly France (for further discussion on several European cases, see Ribeiro and Escobar, eds. In press), or developments in fields (such as science and technology studies, which are inducing important changes in dominant anthropological practices), or in particular schools (such as the anthropology of social movements being developed at Chapel Hill where concepts of ethnography, networks and theory itself are being rethought, to some extent articulating with the WAN project and with novel ways of integrating research and action).

5. For instance, there are certain fields within the countries where ‘dominant anthropologies’ are dominant (such as folklore, ethnomusicology, and visual anthropology) that have been subjected to subalternizing pressures. The same argument might apply in some normalizing and subalternization as well in all world anthropologies. However, we will not deal with this point here. ways to feminist and subaltern anthropologies. There are, of course, processes of normalization in all world anthropologies. However, we will not deal with this point here.

6. It is pertinent to recall Said’s statement on these practices of authority/authorization: “There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analyzed” (1979: 19-20).

7. Although we will not elaborate this idea here, we should mention that these anthropological regimes not only inscribe a specific order of knowledge and of the thinkable (or in Bourdieu’s terms: a doxa as well as its heterodoxas and orthodoxas), but that, as a form of expert knowledge, dominant anthropological practices and imaginations are connected with modern regimes of power, which refers, for instance, to the processes of governmentality described by Foucault (or, to appeal to another widely valorized theoretical horizon, the rationalization of the lifeworld).

8. Even if the work of this group, still largely unknown in the Anglo-Saxon academy, is important for the argument we are making, we cannot present it at any length here. We refer readers to Escobar (2004a), which contains a full bibliography and an extended presentation of the work of this group of authors. The group includes well over two dozen researchers, with a high concentration in the Andean countries, but also some working in the US on Latin America and Latina/o questions. The leading figures of this group at present are the Argentinean/Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel, the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano, and Walter Mignolo. The modernity/coloniality perspective includes, among other features: the adoption of a world perspective in the explanation of modernity, in lieu of a view of modernity as an intra-European phenomenon; the identification of the domination of others outside the European core as a necessary dimension of modernity; the notion of coloniality of power (Quijano 2000), a global hegemonic model and technology of power in place since the Conquest that articulates race and labor, space and peoples, according to the needs of capital and to the benefit of white European peoples; and a conception of Occidentalism (Coronil 1996) and eurocentrism as the knowledge structure and forms of modernity/coloniality—a hegemonic representation and mode of knowing that claims universality for itself. In sum, there is a systematic re-reading of modernity in terms of modernity’s “underside,” as Dussel
(1996) calls it. The main conclusions are, first, that the proper unit of analysis is modernity/coloniality—in sum, there is no modernity without coloniality, with the latter being constitutive of the former. Second, the fact that “the colonial difference” is a privileged epistemological and political space. In other words, what emerges from this alternative framework is the need to take seriously the epistemic force of local histories and the kinds of border thinking that are more likely to found in the political praxis of subaltern groups. Here is a further characterization of coloniality by Walter Mignolo (cited in Escobar 2004b):

“Since modernity is a project, the triumphal project of the Christian and secular west, coloniality is—on the one hand—what the project of modernity needs to rule out and roll over, in order to implant itself as modernity and —on the other hand— the site of enunciation were the blindness of the modern project is revealed, and concomitantly also the site where new projects begin to unfold. In other words, coloniality is the site of enunciation that reveals and denounces the blindness of the narrative of modernity from the perspective of modernity itself, and it is at the same time the platform of pluri-versality, of diverse projects coming from the experience of local histories touched by western expansion (as the Word Social Forum demonstrates); thus coloniality is not a new abstract universal (Marxism is imbedded in modernity, good but short-sighted), but the place where diversality as a universal project can be thought out; where the question of languages and knoweldges become crucial (Arabic, Chinese, Aymara, Bengali, etc) as the site of the pluriversal—that is, the "traditional" that the "modern" is rolling over and ruling out.”

The question of whether there is an “exteriority” to the modern/colonial world system is somewhat peculiar to this group, and easily misunderstood. It was originally proposed by Dussel in his classic work on liberation philosophy (1976) and reworked in recent years, including through Mignolo’s concept of “border thinking” (2000). In no way should this exteriority be thought about as a pure outside, untouched by the modern; it refers to an outside that is precisely constituted as difference by hegemonic processes. By appealing from the exteriority in which s/he is located, the Other becomes the source of an ethical discourse vis à vis a hegemonic totality. This interpellation of the Other comes from beyond the system’s institutional and normative frame, as an ethical challenge. This is precisely what most European and Euro-American theorists seem unwilling to consider; both Mignolo and Dussel see here a strict limit to deconstruction and to the various eurocentered critiques of eurocentrism.

9. For a more detailed and contemporary analysis of this topic see Van Bremen and Shimizu (1999); Pels and Salemink (1994); Ben Ari (1999)

10. This last aspect involves, of course, paying attention to the structuring forces of local/subjugated knowledge that impose unequal translations and exchanges; it involves “translations and solidarities linking vision of the subjugated” (p. 590; see also Santos 2002 and Mignolo 2000, for a similar statement from the perspective of the World Social Forum and border thinking, respectively).
11. ‘World and Knowledges Otherwise’ (WKO) became the title of the electronic journal that replaced Nepantla. Views from South, a journal that featured many of the debates on the coloniality of knowledge.

12. This tripartite division crystallized in a discussion at Chapel Hill with Walter Mignolo and Nelson Maldonado-Torres who had been thinking about these issues in the context of local knowledge and inter-religious dialogue. We are grateful to both colleagues for their engagement with our project.

13. There are additional inquiries derived from the Latin American modernity/coloniality framework that could be raised for anthropology, and which we hope to develop in a subsequent paper. Just to give an idea, consider the following issues: First, the need for more explicit anthropological narratives constructed from different epistemic positions, from the diversity of historical processes (since it is from this perspective that anthropology could best contribute to the articulation of macro-narratives from the critical perspective of coloniality). This means that ‘world anthropologies’ need to situate itself in the multiple (pluritopic) spaces enabled by border thinking. How might these anthropological narratives ‘from the epistemic border’ look like? What contemporary practices would have to change to accommodate such ‘anthropologies from the border,’ so to speak? Second, ‘world anthropologies’ requires a reorganization of anthropology as a field of knowledge lodged within a singular modernity, an openness to thinking from modernity’s underside, from the “other than modernity,” from the colonial difference. Yet everything—from historical forces to academic practices, including the dominance of English—seems historically oriented to make such a move improbable. What sorts of conditions—social, political, academic/intellectual, epistemological—could be more conducive to unfreezing the imaginary of the social sciences into new terrains and practices where it could think in an other logic and practice other epistemologies? Third, how could we think about the ethnographies of local histories enacting dominant global designs, side by side with ethnographies of subalternized and border knowledges, so as to release the potential radical value they could have in terms of moving beyond modernity? Ethnographic research could detect interesting sites where “double critiques” (de- and re-construction of modernity side by side with internal cultural critique by subaltern groups of their own cultures and practices) are taking place, so as to avoid the persistent dichotomy of “West versus the Rest.” The question, again, is: how can ‘world anthropologies’ effect changes in current practices and strategies to make such a project possible?

14. Even though it is important to keep in mind that there is no absolute consensus about what “anthropology” means inside the Anglo-American academy, it is reasonably safe to assert that there have been dominant concepts such as the ‘four fields’ and ‘culture’ (the disciplinary ‘object’ par excellence) that have been widely shared. To the extent that these can be said to constitute a dominant paradigm, it has been effected by what Hymes called a sort of ‘departmental anthropology,’ which accounts for a “[...] domestication [...] of anthropology as an academic discipline in this country” ([1969] 1974: 10). We see signs of a new round of domestication in the US and many countries in recent years, likely related to the growing neo-liberalization of the academy in most countries, heightened competition for
jobs, crisis in the academic publishing world, and of course the wider political climate that has put many academics and academic units on the defensive, if not under retreat. We would like to emphasize that this paper’s analysis is not a critique of individual anthropologists in the US or anywhere; many of them are, in our experience, progressive intellectuals with a tremendous sense of solidarity with struggles in the places where they work (as we ourselves try to do). Some manage to craft a radical practice vis-à-vis their home communities or those of the people with whom they work. The analysis is meant to examine the shortcomings, contradictions and aporias of professionalized academic practices, as currently defined, by locating them anew in a larger context.

15. Needless to say, this trait characterizes other disciplines as well; US Latin Americanist political science, for instance, has been notorious in making invisible those authors with whom they converse while in Latin America, and in whose works they often find inspiration.

16. The Latin American modernity/coloniality research program explicitly seeks to develop an un-disciplinary practice. While its members come from particular disciplines (philosophy, literary theory, sociology, anthropology, and law primarily), the collective effort is towards “un-disciplining” the disciplines, and to develop “theory without disciplines.” See Escobar 2004a for further discussion.

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ANTROPOLOGÍAS EN EL MUNDO

Eduardo Restrepo y Arturo Escobar

“Cuando despertó, el dinosaurio todavía estaba allí.”
Augusto Monterroso [1959] 1990

Introducción

Los antropólogos han periódicamente analizado con sofisticación las configuraciones epistemológicas, metodológicas y políticas que encuadran sus ‘objetos de estudio’. Más puntuales y escasos han sido, sin embargo, sus análisis del más amplio contexto de las estructuras y las prácticas que los han producido como antropólogos y en las cuales se han articulado las condiciones de operación y existencia del establecimiento antropológico en su conjunto. Nuestro objetivo en este texto es problematizar, aunque aún de forma general y provisional, la imagen de una tradición singular emanando de Occidente que define la antropología como una forma de conocimiento experto y una serie de prácticas institucionales. De acuerdo con esta perspectiva, la antropología ha sido universalizada a través de tradiciones nacionales y sub-nacionales que son, en mayor o menor medida, confinadas dentro del espacio epistemológico posibilitado por el campo moderno de conceptos y prácticas. Al contrario, nosotros argüimos que la disciplina requiere ser pensada desde un marco más amplio: el de las ‘antropologías en el mundo’. El concepto de ‘antropologías en el mundo’ involucra un reconocimiento crítico tanto del más amplio espacio epistemológico en el cual ‘la antropología’ emergió y continúa funcionando, como de las microprácticas y relaciones de poder en y entre las diferentes tradiciones y locaciones antropológicas. En otras palabras, para identificar y vislumbrar las disímiles relaciones de poder entre las diferentes locaciones antropológicas es necesario analizar las sutiles modalidades a través de las cuales han sido naturalizados ciertos modelos del establecimiento antropológico que han emergido y se han consolidado básicamente en determinadas ‘tradiciones’ asociadas con Gran Bretaña, Francia o Estados Unidos. Igualmente, en dicho proyecto necesitamos empezar a pensar sobre las condiciones que harían posible un paisaje plural de las antropologías en el mundo.

Este artículo se basa en la distinción analítica entre lo que uno puede denominar antropologías hegemónicas y antropologías subalternizadas. Esta distinción analítica no ha sido aún explorada, principalmente porque las críticas hechas hasta ahora —incluso aquellas radicales— han sido articuladas desde el mismo locus de enunciaci ón y a partir de los mismos supuestos que constituyen las antropologías hegemónicas. En otras palabras, éstas han sido críticas intra-disciplinarias (e intra-modernas, como veremos, de lo que es el paradigma de la modernidad). Antes que asumir que existe una posición privilegiada desde la cual una ‘antropología real’ (y en singular) puede ser producida y en relación a la cual todas las otras
antropologías deberían definirse a sí mismas, un encuadre sobre las ‘antropologías en el mundo’ toma seriamente en consideración las múltiples y contradictorias locaciones históricas, sociales, culturales y políticas de las diferentes comunidades de antropólogos y sus antropologías.


La parte I de este artículo presenta una suculenta visión de las antropologías hegemónicas. Dicha visión está situada en un contexto epistemológico y político más amplio que las diferentes críticas del pasado. La parte II examina las críticas de las antropologías hegemónicas desde su interior. Nuestro intento es ilustrar las deficiencias de estas críticas en términos de una pluralidad de antropologías, particularmente el hecho de que cada fase de la crítica parece ser seguida por una fase de renovada institucionalización y profesionalización. La parte III presenta un contexto más amplio para rearticular la práctica antropológica que ciertamente difiera de lo que usualmente ha sido considerado en las críticas intradisciplinarias. Nuestro objetivo en este plano es enfrentar una conceptualización lo más ampliamente posible, para revisar las posibilidades y limitantes del establecimiento antropológico convencional. Finalmente, la parte IV da los primeros pasos hacia un proyecto de empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo.

I. El contexto epistemológico y político de las antropologías hegemónicas

Discurso y práctica en las antropologías hegemónicas

Por antropologías hegemónicas entendemos las formaciones discursivas y las prácticas institucionales asociadas con la normalización de la antropología bajo las modalidades académicas principalmente en Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Francia. Por tanto, las antropologías hegemónicas incluyen los diversos procesos de profesionalización e institucionalización que han acompañado la consolidación de los cánones disciplinarios y las subjetividades a través de las cuales los antropólogos se reconocen a sí mismos y son reconocidos por otros como tales. Así, con el concepto de ‘antropologías hegemónicas’ buscamos abrir un espacio analítico y político para examinar las cambiantes, disputadas y heterogéneas microprácticas y tácitos acuerdos que constituyen lo que ciertos antropólogos han hecho y dicho en cuanto tales.
A pesar de su diversidad y heterogeneidad, las antropologías hegemónicas convergen en sus intentos de poner entre paréntesis la historicidad y especificidad cultural de sus propias prácticas discursivas. En consecuencia, las antropologías hegemónicas se han constituido a sí mismas como una serie de intervenciones de/diferenciante de lo que cuenta como ‘antropología’ y de quién es considerado un ‘antropólogo’. Estas modalidades de articulación de antropología están indisolublemente imbricadas a particulares ámbitos institucionales, los cuales regulan sutilmente la producción de posibles discursos y afectan la normalización de las subjetividades antropológicas. Las antropologías hegemónicas esbozan genealogías disciplinarias y fronteras que la sustentan no sólo discursivamente, sino que también a través de las cuales definen el control de la autor/izazzión de quien puede conocer y de lo que puede ser conocido. Existe una multiplicidad de prácticas académicas y comerciales (como la publicación) que constituyen mecanismos obvios de cierre de las condiciones de reproducción y consolidación del establecimiento de las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’. Más aún, estas antropologías son constituidas por el cambiante y siempre disputado orden de lo antropológicamente pensable, decible y haciéble, configurando no sólo el horizonte de inteligidibilidad sino también el de sus posibles transformaciones. Como lo veremos, mientras el análisis de estas prácticas académicas han sido mencionado durante las últimas dos décadas en las antropologías hegemónicas, estos han sido realizados de una manera bastante parcial y anecdótica. Para desarrollar esta crítica más profundamente, proponemos recontextualizar el diablo y las relaciones de poder que le subyacen entre antropologías hegemónicas y las antropologías subalternizadas.

Las antropologías hegemónicas han sido posibles por una serie de modalidades de producción y regulación de los discursos y de prácticas institucionales. Estas modalidades y prácticas están ancladas en un dominio disciplinar. Como Foucault lo anotaba: “[…] la disciplina es un principio de control de la producción de discurso. Ella fija sus límites por el juego de una identidad que tiene la forma de una reactualización permanente de las reglas” (1973: 31). En tanto discurso, “la antropología es un sistema de enunciados gobernado por reglas (una formación discursiva en el sentido de Foucault) que sistemáticamente construye ‘hechos’ en formas que tienen al menos tanto que ver con los objetivos de la disciplina y con la organización que la sustenta como con el mundo ‘allá afuera’” (Escobar 1993: 379). Estas modalidades de control disciplinario son difusas, pero altamente eficientes. Como Kant de Lima lo ha mostrado, las restricciones disciplinarias están “mucho más referidas al control de la forma de cómo cualquier conocimiento es producido antes que en lo que no debería ser dicho” (1992: 194).

Por tanto, las antropologías hegemónicas deben ser entendidas en términos de ‘juegos de verdad’ que no son reductibles a sus dominios discursivos. Esto significa que necesitamos prestar mayor atención a los variados mecanismos y prácticas mediante las cuales las antropologías hegemónicas son efectivamente re/producidas; naturalizando qué es o no ‘antropología’ y quién ‘antropólogo’. Las prácticas de autoridad/autorización,5 por ejemplo, han operado a través de la creación de un régimen particular que ha producido sus objetos y conceptos (tales como ‘cultura’ en la ‘antropología anglo-americana’ o ‘lo social’ en la ‘antropología británica’). Este régimen constituye el orden de lo decible, pero es él mismo garantizado por un constitutivo afuera: lo no-decible y lo no-pensable. Dicho régimen discursivo antropológico no sólo inscribe un específico orden de pensamiento y de lo pensable (o en términos de Bourdieu: una doxa al igual que sus heterodoxias y ortodoxias), sino que, en tanto forma de conocimiento experto, está estrechamente entrelazado con las prácticas no discursivas, específicamente con aquellas asociadas con las tecnologías de individuación/normalización de los cuerpos y poblaciones. En otras palabras, las prácticas e imaginarios de las antropologías hegemónicas deben ser analizadas como componentes cruciales de un régimen moderno de poder, el cual refiere a los procesos de gubernamentalidad descritos por Foucault (o, para apelar a otro horizonte teórico, a la colonización del mundo vida en términos de Habermas).6

Que este régimen moderno de poder es también uno colonial ha sido, por supuesto, considerado por algunos antropólogos (como lo expondremos más adelante). En algunos trabajos latinoamericanos recientes, la colonialidad —definida como la subalternización de los conocimientos y culturas de los grupos oprimidos y excluidos que necesariamente acompaña el colonialismo, y que continúa hoy con la globalización— es constitutiva de la modernidad. No hay modernidad sin colonialidad, por lo que la unidad de análisis acertada no es la modernidad (como en todos los análisis intra-europeos de la modernidad), sino la modernidad/colonialidad o el sistema mundo moderno/colonial.7

Desde esta perspectiva, diríamos que el régimen de poder moderno/colonial es parcialmente re/producido a través de una serie de ‘juegos de verdad’ que definen “[…] una estructura intrínsecamente diferenciada de autoridades que especifica quién tiene el derecho de decir qué sobre cuales temas. Como marcadores de esta autoridad, hemos distribuido examinaciones, grados, títulos e insignias de todo tipo” (Chatterjee 1997: 13). En las sociedades modernas/coloniales, en síntesis, el conocimiento experto constituye una moneda crucial para configurar e interpretar el mundo. Por ejemplo, expertos de todos tipos proveen las monedas con las cuales el estado y las clases dominantes articulan las ‘necesidades’ de la gente convirtiéndolas en objetos de administración del estado (Escobar 1993: 386). Extraeremos más consecuencias de este encuadre de la modernidad luego. Por ahora queremos decir que, en términos generales, como en el caso de otros conocimientos expertos, las antropologías hegemónicas constituyen una técnica eurocéntrica para la construcción, colonización y reificación de la ‘realidad’. La especificidad de estas antropologías ha sido la domesticación de la alteridad (‘cultural’/‘social’); esto ha sido desplegado en un doble movimiento: primero, y más convencionalmente, ‘familiarizando’ la otredad; segundo, y más recientemente, exotizando la mismidad.

Las antropologías hegemónicas han sido localizadas en una relación de poder con respecto a las antropologías subalternizadas. Las antropologías hegemónicas emergen como una disciplina académica con una serie de procedimientos de formación, investigación,
escritura, publicación y contratación entre otras. Estos procesos de normalización han creado unas modalidades de hacer ‘antropología’ desde las cuales otras modalidades son invisibilizadas o consideradas derivadas. Así, las antropologías hegemónicas operan como *máquinas normalizantes* que optan el empoderamiento de las prácticas y conocimientos antropológicos producidos en múltiples locaciones en el mundo. En tanto que las antropologías hegemónicas se visualizan a sí mismas como paradigma y en posición epistemica privilegiada, constituyen aparatos de borramiento de la diferencia en nombre del establecimiento y cánones antropológicos. Esto no significa, sin embargo, que dichos cánones son homogéneos, incluso en los centros académicos convencionales de la ‘antropología anglo-america’, ‘etnología francesa’ o ‘antropología social británica’. Al contrario, sus condiciones de existencia institucionales y discursivas deben ser entendidas como un equilibrio inestable de luchas permanentes en y en contra de lo que aparece como los ‘centros’ del establecimiento antropológico en un momento determinado. El efecto ha sido la consolidación de unas elites académicas e institucionales que marginalizan otras antropologías, instituciones y antropólogos incluso al interior del establecimiento antropológico metropolitano.

Antes de terminar este aparte, consideramos necesario clarificar dos puntos que pueden facilitar malentendidos innecesarios. En primer lugar, no pretendemos darle un tono moral a la distinción entre antropologías hegemónicas y subalternizadas. Aunque asumimos que el creciente posicionamiento de la disciplinación y normalización agenciadas por las antropologías hegemónicas como una maquina de/diferenciadora (o como un aparato de captura en la terminología de Deleuze), amerita ser problematizado y resistido desde el empoderamiento de las antropologías subalternizadas en el mundo en general, esto no significa que consideremos que las antropologías hegemónicas sean rechazadas en bloque o que las subalternas representen una pura exterioridad al poder donde afloran una ‘verdad’ o ‘radicalidad’ prístina garantizada por su posición de subyugación, marginalidad e invisibilidad. La ‘adecuación’ o los efectos políticos de un enunciado sobre el mundo no está garantizado por el lugar de su origen o articulación. No obstante, los entramados de prácticas y discursividades que hegemonizan y subalternizan a las diferentes antropologías deben ser subvertidos en aras de posibilitar unas condiciones de existencia de un real y efectivo diálogo crítico entre los antropólogos y antropologías en el mundo en general.

En segundo lugar, la distinción de antropologías hegemónicas y subalternizadas es una distinción que no se superpone con la de ‘Norte’/‘Sur’ ni con la de metropolitana/periférica. Las antropologías hegemónicas se encuentran tanto en el ‘Norte’ como en el ‘Sur’. De la misma manera, en múltiples antropologías y antropólogos son subalternizados tanto en el ‘Norte’ como en el ‘Sur’. Igualmente, las antropologías hegemónicas no son reproductas en las metrópolis, sino que también, aunque diferencialmente, en las periferias; así como se hayan antropologías subalternizadas en las metropolis como en la periferia.

II. Antropologías hegemónicas en los estados unidos y sus descontentos: críticas, renovación y re-institucionalización

Los períodos de ‘crisis’ y las críticas asociadas a éstos no son para nada nuevos en el terreno antropológico. Sin embargo, el diferente *loci de enunciaci*ón desde el cual estas crisis y críticas son articuladas importa. Esta sección es un intento por mapear de forma general
las críticas producidas \textit{al interior} de las antropologías hegemónicas. Esta cartografía se enfocará, sin embargo, en la literatura metropolitana estadounidense. En términos analíticos, se puede plantear que estas críticas han sido articuladas en tres terrenos entrelazados: (1) el mundo en general, (2) las prácticas epistemológicas y textuales, y (3) las micro-relaciones y prácticas institucionales dentro del establecimiento académico. Nuestro argumento es que cada ciclo de crítica, a pesar de sus importantes contribuciones y productividad, resulta en un nuevo ciclo de institucionalización y profesionalización del campo (en la próxima sección, nosotros mantendremos estos mismos terrenos e intentaremos profundizar las críticas).

1. \textit{El mundo en general}. El primer tipo de crítica problematizó el conocimiento y práctica antropológica con referencia a las relaciones de dominación y explotación en el mundo en general. Esta crítica fue articulada en los sesenta y setenta en gran parte desde el encuadre de la economía política (mayormente marxista); y básicamente en nombre de la gente del Tercer Mundo y de sus luchas contra el colonialismo e imperialismo. Una de las expresiones más radicales de esta crítica fue, por supuesto, \textit{Reinventing Anthropology} (Hymes ed., [1969] 1974). Aunque las contribuciones a este volumen fueron desigualmente desarrolladas y tenían diferentes énfasis, compartían la insistencia en la necesidad por un giro en los fundamentos epistemológicos, institucionales y políticos de la ‘antropología anglo-americana’. Algunas contribuciones (como las de Hymes, Scholte, y Diamond) fueron mucho más allá. En ellas se cuestionaba, por ejemplo, la naturaleza transitoria de la hegemonía de la ‘antropología departamental’ en la definición de la antropología anglo-americana, abriendo así incluso la discusión sobre la opción de moverse hacia una práctica antropológica no-académica. Otros argumentaban por una antropología reflexiva y emancipatoria que empezaría por tomarse a sí misma como objeto antropológico reconociendo que todas las tradiciones antropológicas son mediadas culturalmente y situadas contextualmente (Scholte [1969] 1974). Otros cuestionaron incluso los defectos de una antropología indígena que sólo replicaría en otros lugares las plantillas de las escuelas metropolitanas. En síntesis, \textit{Reinventing Anthropology} incluyó un llamado para que la mirada etnográfica se posara sobre los fundamentos culturales desde los cuales ella misma era posible. En otras palabras, la demanda aquí era por una ‘antropología de la antropología’ y, en este sentido, podemos hallar en dichos esfuerzos una idea de antropologías en el mundo, aunque \textit{in statu nascendi}.

Las críticas de este tipo fueron articuladas a lo largo de los sesenta y setenta por quienes clamaban por una ‘antropología políticamente comprometida’. Como es ampliamente conocido, algunas de estas críticas se enfocaron en las relaciones entre ‘antropología’ y ‘colonialismo’ (Asad 1973, Lewis 1973, Copans 1995). Desde esta perspectiva, “[…] la antropología es hija del imperialismo. No sólo jugó un crítico papel en la subyugación de las gentes del Tercer Mundo, sino que también fue establecida desde la premisa de la alteridad i.e. se basó en la epistemología de sujetos y objetos” (Mafeje 2001: 23). Otras críticas argumentan por una radical práctica antropológica sensible a los procesos de liberación y confrontación de las políticas occidentales de dominación y explotación económica (Harrison [1991] 1997), o por el desarrollo de antropologías indígenas como un correctivo parcial (e.g., Fahim, ed. 1982). Hacia el final de los ochenta, junto con la clase y el orden colonial, este tipo de crítica posibilitó la emergencia de una antropología radical más sensible a asuntos raciales y de género, una antropología que trabajaría “hacia la transformación social y la liberación humana” (Harrison [1991] 1997: 8). Estos tipos de críticas localizaron a la antropología como un proyecto político radical comprometido con la liberación y la transformación social: “[…] ya que la crítica cultural como deconstrucción de varias ideologías y discursos hegemónicos.
puede ser un significante y necesario componente de las más amplias luchas por igualdad, justicia social y económica, con importantes repercusiones hacia la democratización" (Harrison [1991] 1997: 6). En síntesis, durante este periodo el privilegio epistemológico y político de los antropólogos ‘indígenas’ o ‘nativos’, la demanda por descolonización del conocimiento y prácticas antropológicas, y la necesaria posicionalidad política de los antropólogos en la reproducción o enfrentamiento del status quo fueron los tres pivotes del debate.

Estas críticas encontraron pronto sus límites. Como el antropólogo Surafricano Archie Mafeje (2001) lo argumenta, al no cuestionar estas críticas el ambiente académico en el cual la antropología existía no pudieron alumbrar una era post-antropológica, por lo que los críticos terminaron siendo unos ‘rebeldes conservadores’ que reprodujeron la academia. Aunque hubo algunas excepciones, el agente de la transformación antropológica y social se continuó asumiendo como el occidental blanco. La mayoría falló en visualizar el rol del colonizado en la descolonización de las formas de conocimiento, algo que ha devenido extremadamente claro más recientemente —un punto sobre el que retornaremos luego en el artículo. En este sentido, podemos interpretar el planteamiento de Asad (1973: 18) sobre que el cuestionamiento de aquellos antropólogos trabajando bajo el colonialismo —sin importar cuán políticamente progresistas son, ellos no obstante escogieron vivir ‘profesionalmente en paz’ con el sistema— debería también ser generalmente aplicable el grueso de las críticas metropolitanas. Esta ‘literatura de la angustia’ (Ben-Ari 1999) ha sido afortunadamente superada y ahora otros terrenos de la crítica comienzan a ser considerados, particularmente aquellos que fueron los puntos ciegos de las críticas de la economía política, tales como las micro-prácticas de la academia (que ampliaremos más adelante).

2. Prácticas epistemológicas y textuales. En la mitad de los ochenta, las prácticas textuales fueron objeto de intenso debate, principalmente en la antropología estadounidense (e.g. Clifford y Marcus 1986, Marcus y Fischer 1986, Clifford 1988). Este capítulo de la historia de la crítica es ampliamente conocido, y no nos detendremos en él salvo para mostrar algunos de sus defectos de importancia para nuestros propósitos. Existieron una serie de desplazamientos de las culturas-como-textos (giro interpretativo) a los textos-sobre-la cultura (las políticas de la representación) terminando con la antropología-como-critica cultural (constructivismo cultural crítico). Aunque por supuesto existieron múltiples y contradictorias tendencias al interior del ‘giro textualista’, hubo un virtual consenso sobre la necesidad de problematizar algunos de los principales supuestos epistemológicos de las antropologías convencionales —incluyendo la hipertrófia/diáspasia posición de la epistemología en sí misma (Rabinow 1986). Las críticas se centraron en gran parte en las modalidades de autoría y autorización sutilenmente inscritas en las figuras retóricas así como en la problemática de la representación de alteridad cultural. Uno de los principales objetivos en este tipo de crítica lo fueron las prácticas textuales de la denominada etnografía realista. Esto abrió un momento para las formas experimentales de escritura más sensibles a la locación del autor, la incompletud de los ‘datos antropológicos’, la naturaleza necesariamente dialógica y cargada de poder del trabajo de campo (Page 1988), y las voces polifónicas que constituyen la representación de las culturas. Así fue reforzada una tendencia crítica sobre la prevalente concepción objetivista, normativa, esencialista y reificada de cultura, enfatizando el carácter historizado, localizado, polifónico, político y discursivo de cualquier ‘hecho cultural’ (e.g., Dirks, Eley y Ortner 1994: 3-4; Comaroff y Comaroff 1992; Rosaldo 1989; Gupta y Ferguson, eds. 1997).
Mientras el giro textual abrió importantes posibilidades para la etnografía post-antropológica y unas consideraciones post-epistemológicas de la cultura, encubrió las prácticas académicas antropológicas (Fox, ed. 1991) y fue en gran parte silencioso sobre las antropologías en el Tercer Mundo (Mafeje 2001). Este último aspecto fue incorporado en lo que fue la más importante crítica del movimiento de ‘escribiendo cultura’ (written culture): la crítica feminista, incluido el subsiguiente y rico debate sobre etnografía feminista (véase, e.g., Behar y Gordon, ed. 1995; Visweswaran 1994; Knauff 1996: 219-248). Desde el principio, esta tendencia articuló la crítica de la epistemología desde la teoría feminista con la crítica social proveniente desde las mujeres de color y las mujeres del Tercer Mundo. En este sentido, las ‘Mujeres Escribiendo Cultura’ (Women Writing Culture) y las tendencias de la etnografía feminista, particularmente en los Estados Unidos, contribuyeron a desestabilizar los cánones académicos en formas que otras perspectivas críticas no lograron. Por introducir el asunto de lo que significaba “descolonizar la antropología femenina” (Visweswaran 1994: 101), esto es, la relación de la antropología feminista con diferentes tipos de mujeres y las mujeres en otros lugares, este grupo de antropólogas cuestionaron tanto el pensamiento feminista como las prácticas del trabajo de campo y la escritura etnográfica. Al asumir la pregunta por “qué significa ser una mujer escribiendo cultura”, ellas entonces ligaron una reflexión epistemológica crítica —incluyendo la relación entre la antropología y el feminismo (haciendo eco de un viejo argumento de Strathern, 1985)— con una reflexión política sobre las relaciones de poder entre mujeres. Como es ampliamente conocido, This Bridge Called My Back. Writings by Radical Women of Color (Moraga y Anzaldúa, eds. 1983) proveyó una muestra y modelo de este replanteamiento junto con Writing Culture. Veinte años después, This Bridge We Call Home. Radical Visions for Transformation (Anzaldúa y Keatin, eds. 2002) plantea nuevos retos para la antropología feminista y las antropologías en conjunto.

3. **Micro-relaciones institucionales y prácticas al interior del establecimiento académico.** Los noventa trajeron un nuevo dominio de crítica que había permanecido en gran parte invisible al interior de las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’ estadounidenses —las relaciones institucionales y prácticas al seno del establecimiento académico. Estas micro-prácticas y relaciones incluyen, entre otras, los mecanismos de formación, contratación y promoción; la organización del estatus y relaciones de poder en y entre departamentos; los eventos colectivos como coloquios y conferencias; y los cánones implícitos para la publicación en las principales revistas. Esta crítica se enfoca hacia las prácticas de producción, circulación y consumo de los discursos antropológicos y las subjetividades asociadas. La mirada fue entonces dirigida hacia las condiciones bajo las cuales la labor antropológica es producida (Fox, ed. 1991). El análisis de las micro-prácticas de poder al seno de la academia fue en parte una reacción al sobre-énfasis en la textualización del trabajo antropológico. Como lo anota Abu-Lughod: “[…] la descolonización del texto […] dejó intacta la configuración básica del poder global en el cual la antropología, en tanto asociada a otras instituciones del mundo, se basa” (1991: 143). Trouillot propuso el concepto de ‘políticas electorales’ para referirse a “[…] la serie de prácticas institucionales y relaciones de poder que influencian la producción de conocimiento desde el interior de la academia: las filiaciones académicas, los mecanismos de institucionalización, la organización del poder entre los departamentos, el valor de mercado del prestigio del publica-o-perece, y otros asuntos mundanos que incluyen, pero expenden, las maniobras que usualmente son referidas como ‘políticas académicas’” (1991: 18). Lo que está en juego con dicha crítica ha sido la materialidad misma de la producción y reproducción del establecimiento antropológico como tal.
Las consecuencias de este cuestionamiento, sin embargo, permanecen como objeto de posteriores estudios. Si la formación antropológica inscribe sujetos y subjetividades en ciertas tradiciones intelectuales normativas, el entendimiento de la re-producción y posicionamiento de las antropologías hegemónicas involucra una detallada descripción y análisis de dicha formación. En este sentido, Ben-Ari (1999) anota cómo la formación en los centros metropolitanos de quienes eran los sujetos coloniales constituye un mecanismo de reproducción y expansión de las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’ a través del globo. “¿Al ‘permitir el acceso’ —aceptando, invitiendo, tentando— de escolares del Tercer Mundo a participar en las discusiones de la antropología académica no estamos reproduciendo una nueva forma de relaciones de poder del colonialismo?” (Ben-Ari 1999: 404). Esta visión puede ser de alguna manera estática, aunque indica un importante, y a menudo invisible, proceso de poder e influencia sobre las antropologías de muchas partes en el mundo (atestiguando, por ejemplo, el incremento de la ‘gringanización’ de las antropologías en Latinoamérica desde los ochenta). Para Ben-Ari (1999: 391), el modelo de una ‘antropología auténtica’, definida como lo que configura las representaciones que las antropologías hacen sobre sí mismas, involucra tres dominios o prácticas principales: el trabajo de campo, las prácticas textuales (particularmente la monografía etnográfica), y las actividades institucionales (particularmente un trabajo académico). Ben-Ari anota cómo “[a] pesar de la variedad de deconstrucciones, críticas y cuestionamientos que han sido enunciados en los últimos años, es una […] versión específica de profesionalismo con la que trabajamos. Esta versión es una Británica o Americana ‘clásica’: un antropólogo hace trabajo de campo, en otro lugar, enfrenta y supera dificultades, escribe sus hallazgos en un texto denominado una etnografía (yuxtaponiendo teoría y datos), y es empleado en una institución académica” (1999: 390; énfasis en el original).

El trabajo de campo ha sido nuevamente puesto bajo escrutinio. Por ejemplo, desde el punto de vista de algunos activistas en el sur, la práctica de viajar fuera del país para ‘estudiar otras sociedades o culturas’ en aras de escribir o publicar sobre ellas es otra forma de explotación y, obviamente, la expresión de desiguales relaciones de poder. Más aún, este particular encuadre antropológico parece ser la expresión del imaginario moderno de un ‘individuo libre’ que ‘decide’ por sí mismo lo que ‘quiere’ estudiar, cuándo, dónde, cómo y por cuánto tiempo, mientras que la gente ‘estudiada’ son situadas en un ‘pasivo’ lugar de ser observadas, ser ‘informantes’ (quienes dan información), etc. En este aspecto el establecimiento antropológico también ha devenido en una tecnología política de domesticación de la alteridad. Para entender más completamente este aspecto necesitamos ampliar nuestra visión del contexto en el cual las antropologías hegemónicas emergen y operan. Lo que esperamos lograr en la próxima sección es una profundización en las críticas previas en formas que nos permitan visibilizar un proyecto de descolonización de las antropologías en el mundo en tres planos relacionados: epistémico, social e institucional.

III. Modernidad/colonialidad como posibilidad de existencia de las antropologías hegemónicas y subalternizadas

Hasta ahora hemos proveído no sólo una visión particular de lo que son las antropologías hegemónicas y de cómo funcionan, sino también de los alcances y limitaciones de las críticas intra-disciplinarias articuladas en los Estados Unidos. Debería ser claro ahora que críticas internas cómo las anteriores de las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’ son insuficientes para enfre-
tar el rango de los asuntos suscitados por la adopción de un encuadre de las antropologías en el mundo. También es claro el hecho que los antropólogos trabajan bajo un contexto político y epistemológico que configura tanto sus prácticas como sus objetos de estudio que está fuera de su control (Escobar 1993: 378). Pensamos que es importante revisar estas condiciones como un paso indispensable hacia la descolonización de las antropologías en el mundo. Lo que sigue es un más profundo, aunque corto, ejercicio de sociología de producción del conocimiento antropológico. Sugerimos que esta amplia contextualización tiene que incorporar al menos las siguientes dimensiones: la división moderna del trabajo en la cual las antropologías hegemónicas emergen y a la cual se ajustan; el contexto social, político y epistémico asociado con esta división del trabajo, i.e. lo que hemos llamado aquí modernidad/colonialidad; y por supuesto el milieu académico en el cual las antropologías son en gran parte practicadas. En lo que sigue presentaremos una visión sucinta de estos factores, introduciendo la pregunta por las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’ para cada uno de ellos, prestando atención en crear un espacio para las antropologías subalternizadas. (En aras de la simplificación, usaremos antropología en singular en esta sección aunque debe entenderse que nos referimos a las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’ como han sido definidas aquí).

1) La antropología y la división moderna de la labor intelectual. Foucault ha proveído el más amplio encuadre posible para localizar la emergencia y desarrollo de las ciencias sociales y humanas, incluyendo la especificidad antropológica (véase especialmente 1973: 344-387). La antropología puede ser localizada en la episteme moderna, entendida como una configuración particular de conocimiento consolidada al final del siglo XVIII y que involucró, entre otros rasgos, los siguientes: a) la emergencia del la figura del Hombre (occidental) como el fundamento de todo conocimiento y su sujeto privilegiado, separado del orden natural; b) una configuración dada de las ciencias naturales, sociales y humanas; c) una serie de tensiones (‘los dobles antropológicos’) que crearon una inestabilidad permanente en la estructura de la modernidad y las cuales podrían eventualmente resultar en la disolución del Hombre y la episteme moderna. Dentro de esta episteme moderna, la antropología (etnología para Foucault) y el psicoanálisis funcionan como contra-ciencias —esto es, como formas de conocimiento que presentan a Occidente sus propios límites al confrontarlo con la diferencia y lo inconsciente. No obstante, ellas encuentran en la ratio Occidental —y, aquí, en la dominación Europea— su razón de ser.

Hay dos adicionales argumentos para considerar. Primero, al interior de esta división moderna, a la antropología le fue asignado el ‘lugar del salvaje’, una problemática epistemica y política que, a pesar de sus importantes transformaciones, la antropología no ha sido capaz de trascender completamente. En la crítica contextualización de Trouillot, la antropología emergió, después del Renacimiento, en un más amplio campo enunciativo estructurado alrededor de las figura del Orden (lo que Occidente es), la Utopía (lo que Occidente podría ser), y el Salvaje (el no-Occidente). La antropología terminó siendo confiada con el Lugar del Salvaje —el estudio de los salvajes (véase también Stocking 1987). Hoy, “la dirección de la disciplina depende en un ataque explícito a dicho lugar en sí misma y el orden simbólico en el cual se fundamenta” (Trouillot 1991: 34). Para Trouillot, este proyecto no se puede limitar a la antropología sino asociarse al mundo en general, a través de una reivindicación de la multiplicidad de otros (antes que ‘un Otro’) con sus parciales verdades y proyectos políticos. Existe un cierto enlace por establecer entre este idea de multiplicidad de mundos y las antropologías subalternizadas.

Segundo, la moderna división de la labor intelectual fomentó un enfoque fálico-
euro-centrista de la mayoría de formas del conocimiento experto. La modernidad acarrea el triunfo de la metafísica y el logocentrismo, entendidos como la creencia que encuentra en la verdad lógica la fundación para cualquier teoría racional del mundo constituido de cosas y seres cognoscibles y, por tanto, controlables. Central al falogo-eurocentrismo del “Hombre el Moderno” (Haraway 1997) ha estado un interés fundamental con la epistemología como el criterio para evaluar la verdad y el conocimiento objetivo. Al enfatizar la situacionalidad y parcialidad de todo conocimiento, la epistemología feminista articula un reto frontal al orden epistemológico moderno, incluyendo el interés mismo por la epistemología. Este reto está por ser trabajado completamente en antropología (feminista, subalterna, o de otra manera). ¿Puede, por ejemplo, una noción de ‘antropologías situadas’ emerger desde estos encuadres?

2) Sean constitutivos o no de la antropología, el colonialismo y el imperialismo han proveído el contexto envolvente para el ejercicio de la disciplina. Este contexto no ha sido completamente eliminado. Para entender el “hecho colonial total” y para finalmente exorcizarlo, la antropología tiene que encontrar un punto d'appui que problematice el mismo hecho de la episteme moderna y de la ratio Occidental —esto es, tiene que enfrentar tanto el colonialismo como la colonialidad. Esto significa considerar el conocimiento y los efectos culturales del colonialismo/imperialismo —lo que hemos referido arriba como ‘colonialidad’ o la diferencia colonial— más el eurocentrismo y la subalternización del conocimiento que acompaña dichos procesos.

3) La práctica antropológica se despliega al interior de las estructuras disciplinarias e institucionales modernas que dan cuenta de la producción del conocimiento experto. Como ya ha sido indicado, el resultado principal de este rasgo es la idea de un espacio singular desde el cual es producida la antropología ‘verdadera’ o valida. Veremos las implicaciones de esta observación para moverse del supuesto de un espacio singular, esto es, hacia ‘otras antropologías y antropologías de otra manera’.

Permitáns ahora listar algunas de las más importantes implicaciones de este análisis. Dada la participación de la antropología (entendida, nuevamente, como las antropologías hegemónicas) en la episteme Occidental y su encerramiento en el lugar del salvaje, debemos hacernos las siguientes preguntas:

1) En los planos epistémico y epistemológico:

- Al enfrentar la alteridad, ¿la antropología ha dado convincente cuenta de dicha alteridad para cuestionar significativamente la sobre-confidente estructura del Hombre (Occidental)? ¿La antropología ha representado la alteridad radical en este plano de una forma efectiva? O, al contrario, ¿ha reducido dicha alteridad a una versión de lo Mismo, reforzando así la posición del Hombre? En síntesis, ¿la antropología ha operado como posibilitadora de una crítica radical al Occidente o ha devenido en una tecnología de domesticación de la alteridad?

- Originada desde una ratio occidental, la antropología provee un enlace teórico entre Occidente y otras culturas. Este enlace fue necesariamente establecido desde la perspectiva de la dominancia histórica del pensamiento europeo. Si, pudiera ser argumentado, la relación con el colonialismo ha sido contingente (Foucault 1973;??), aquella con el eurocentrismo no lo fue. La antropología mantiene una relación crítica
con este contexto, pero no escapa al mismo incluso si, al describir la diferencia cultural, tiende a mostrársela a Occidente la historia que ha hecho su propio conocimiento posible. ¿Sería posible concebir un rol cultural-político más radical para la antropología dado este dilema? ¿Cómo puede la antropología problematizar más efectivamente “el estricto desdoblamiento de la cultura occidental de acuerdo con la necesidad impuesta sobre si misma al comienzo del siglo XIX” (Foucault 1973: 384)? ¿Cómo puede acoger una nueva dispersión de la experiencia humana en un diferente juego de diferencias e identidades? En síntesis, ¿cómo puede la antropología “poner el Hombre en cuestión”? 11

En tanto la antropología ha entendido la historia (o, mejor, ¿las historicidades?) que subyace en las formas del conocimiento en las cuales otras culturas comunican con otras sociedades y formas de vida, ¿la antropología ha entendido la diferencia subalterna y la ha desplegado creativamente contra Occidente (más allá de la ‘crítica cultural’) o, al contrario, siempre ha caído en “la prosa de la contra-insurgencia” (Guha 1988), esto es, en la representación de los otros desde la perspectiva de otras historias y las historias de otros?

¿El abandono del “Otro” a favor de una multiplicidad de otros entraña la necesidad de abandonar el proyecto antropológico totalmente, o más bien la posibilidad de recrearlo como una antropología de otros (antropologías de otros), cuyo objeto(s) serían los diferentes sujetos históricos en su irreductibilidad a cualquier narrativa universal (Occidental o alguna otra)? En el primer caso, ¿cual sería una estrategia interesante/constructiva de disolución? En el segundo, ¿cuáles serían los requerimientos epistemológicos (e.g, acerca de los discursos y epistemologías nativas o subalternas), metodológicos (e.g. etnografía) e institucionales?

La noción de conocimientos situados implica más que una perspectiva parcial y una política de locación. Dicha noción introduce asuntos sobre la traducción de conocimientos entre sitios que están enlazados por redes de conexiones entre comunidades de poder diferencial. ¿Cómo puede la antropología “ver fielmente desde el punto de vista del otro” (Haraway 1988: 583), especialmente desde la periferia, sin romántizar dicho punto, de un lado, y del otro, llevar a cabo una política de la traducción que tome completamente en cuenta los poderes diferenciales entre los sitios? Este último aspecto incluye, por supuesto, prestar atención a las fuerzas estructurantes del conocimiento local/subyugado que impone “traducciones e intercambios desiguales”; esto también implica “traducciones y solidaridades enlazando la visión de los subyugados” (p. 590).

¿Son las relaciones sociales y de poder entre “el Occidente y el Resto” de tal naturaleza que —como en el caso del feminismo (Strathern 1985)— invalidan cualquier intento de una antropología del Otro? ¿Aquellos interesados en el Otro no estarían mejor si colocan sus esfuerzos en otras empresas, basados en el reconocimiento de la imposibilidad de una relación equitativa con el Otro (como en el feminismo antropológico antes que una antropología feminista), esto es, en una práctica política con los subalternos antes que un proyecto intelectual basado en/con ellos? O, ¿pueden estos dos proyectos ser compatibles? ¿Pueden los antropólogos
subaltermemente-orientados “cambiar el discurso” como lo sugiere Strathern? ¿En qué formas?

2) En los planes social y político

- ¿Una ‘descolonización’ de la antropología acarrea una ‘re-antropologización”? y, si así es, ¿al servicio de qué? ¿Qué tipos de alianzas estratégicas podrían establecerse para avanzar este proyecto? Por ejemplo, ¿entre los discursos críticos en el Norte y Sur?, ¿entre estudiantes de postgrado en el mundo entero?, antropólogos disidentes, antropólogos del tercer mundo, antropólogos pertenecientes a minorías, intelectuales subalternos de diferentes tipos, otros?

- ¿Existe (debería existir) un agente privilegiado para la descolonización de la antropología y su transformación radical? Algunos autores sugieren los movimientos sociales subalternos (Trouillot 1991), los intelectuales tercermundistas en el Norte y el Sur (Harrison, ed. 1991), los subalternos mismos (Mafeje 1999). ¿O deberíamos más bien hablar sobre perspectiva(s) epistémicas (no-Eurocentricas) que pueden ser ocupadas por huéspedes de los actores sociales y en múltiples formas? ¿Podría esquivarse que histórica y socialmente los grupos subalternos estén más sintonizados para esta perspectiva epistemológica y así es más probable que ocupen efectivamente los espacios de transformación (los bordes del sistema mundo colonial o los que tiene usted)? ¿Qué encontrarían los variados actores modernos de poderoso o posibilitante en este proyecto?

3) En términos de las prácticas académicas

- Las prácticas académicas han emergido como un objetivo primordial para la descolonización de la antropología. ¿Cuáles son los principales parámetros para avanzar tal proyecto? ¿Quién/qué necesita ser cambiado? ¿Cómo? ¿Por qué este cambio no ha sucedido? ¿Qué tan lejos puede uno llevar este punto? ¿Es la disolución misma de la división moderna del trabajo intelectual y lo que dicta el logocentrismo el proyecto más radical que la antropología puede imaginar para sí misma? ¿Qué implicaría para la antropología tomar en consideración el hecho de que ella es producto de un modo industrial de producción en términos de las microprácticas de la academia (Fox ed. 1991)?

Un paisaje de unas ‘post-colonialiales’ antropologías en el mundo intentarían enfrentar las varias capas del poder o des-colonización: el texto, la realidad social, las perspectivas epistémicas, las prácticas académicas. Estas capas se encuentran, por supuesto, interrelacionadas. Sugerimos que teóricamente y políticamente puede pensarse un proyecto de descolonización y su articulación en tres planos:

1) Descolonización epistemica: encaminado a configuraciones de conocimiento y poder que van más allá del paradigma de la modernidad, hacia un/os paradigma/s otro/s, una otra forma de pensar. En este plano, el empuje puede ser dicho estaría en la localización del conocimiento —incluyendo la localización del conocimiento dominante en aras de hacer visibles otros mundos y conocimientos.
2) **Descolonización social y política**: localizando la antropología explícitamente al interior de la configuración de poder mundial definido por la globalidad imperial y la globalidad colonial (ampliamente, lo que hemos denominado aquí el sistema mundo moderno/colonial; véase Escobar en prensa). En este plano, podríamos hablar sobre la descolonización social y política, y discutir el papel de las antropologías en las tecnologías de la producción de la alteridad y su enlace con los proyectos socioeconómicos y políticos.

3) **Descolonización institucional**, moviéndose en dos direcciones: más allá del límite disciplinario/no-disciplinario, y más allá de la división académico/no-académico. Este podría también acarrear la descolonización de lo experto.\(^\text{12}\)

Los resultados finales podrían ser múltiples espacios de interpretación (‘hermeneutica pluritópica,’ para la descolonización epistemica); pluriversalidad (para la descolonización social); y antropologías subaltenizadas (para la descolonización institucional y más allá).\(^\text{13}\)

### IV. Empoderando las antropologías en el mundo

“[…] los antropólogos privilegiados, como el grueso de la gente privilegiada de cualquier lugar, evitan el escrutinio detallado de un sistema del cual se benefician”


“La antropología está deviniendo de hecho en una comunidad de argumentación transnacional que se desarrolla en un contexto de alcance mundial de dominación y confrontación. Esta comunidad puede ser provechosamente pensada en términos de una matriz antropológica compartida —una serie de teorías, conceptos y prácticas que han sido históricamente producidas y continúan ejerciendo su influencia en múltiples formas” (Ribeiro y Escobar 2003:1). Esta ‘comunidad de argumentación transnacional’, sin embargo, ha sido profundamente signada por lo que ha devenido en un no marcado y naturalizado modelo de ‘antropología auténtica’, en torno a la expresión de unas pocas tradiciones dominantes, principalmente la antropología social británica, la antropología cultural estadounidense y la etnología francesa (Stocking 1982: 174-175).

Creemos en las dos últimas décadas hemos atestiguado una tendencia hacia la dominación mundial de un modelo de antropología estadounidense.\(^\text{14}\) En términos cuantitativos, “proportional a la comunidad mundial de antropólogos, el número de antropólogos anglo (especialmente norte) americanos es bien grande” (Stoking, 1982: 174).\(^\text{15}\) Más importante, existe una tendencia hacia la hegemonía de la antropología estadounidense. Como ha sido planteado por Ben-Ari, en este proceso de lograr hegemonía, “[…] lo que pasa no es el advenimiento de ningún tipo de consenso mundial sobre el proyecto antropológico, sino más bien que los términos y criterios básicos usados en las discusiones y controversias sobre la profesión han sido aceptados por la amplia mayoría de los antropólogos en un tiempo dado” (1999: 396). Más aun, esta tendencia de la hegemonía es inscrita en la producción de subjetividades y deseos. Por tanto, como el antropólogo colombiano Carlos Alberto Uribe (1997: 259-260) anota, entre algunos de quienes son sub-
alternizados existe la tendencia de desear ser-como-el amo, de desear convertirse en un Otro. No obstante, en estos procesos hegemónicos, como el colectivo WAN (Red de Antropologías en el Mundo) lo afirmaba: “Una cuestión que aún no ha sido planteada […] es si la producción de las antropologías del sur o subalternas puede ser completamente descrita en términos de la matriz metropolitana, si importar cuánto de esta matriz se vea como un resultado negociado, o si existen en efecto diferentes prácticas y conocimientos que van mucho más allá […]” (2001:2). Esto significa asumir seriamente la noción de que las diferencias importan no solamente para aquellos que son estudiados por los antropólogos, sino también para los antropólogos y las antropologías mismas. Estas diferencias históricas y culturales incluyen y son configuradas por relaciones de poder y prácticas de marginalización e invisibilización (Krotz 1997).

En otras palabras, la confrontación de este proceso de subalternización asociada con la naturalización de las antropologías hegemónicas es un paso necesario hacia la apertura de un espacio de visibilidad y enunciabilidad para las antropologías en el mundo. Es importante no olvidar que esta confrontación no es sólo discursiva dadas las disímiles condiciones de existencia y conversación en las cuales las múltiples antropologías en el mundo son articuladas y desplegadas. En aras de asumir la situacionalidad y constitutiva pluralidad de las antropologías en el mundo es indispensable revertir la asimétrica ignorancia que atraviesan estos procesos de hegemonización/subalternización. Múltiples autores han indicado la asimétrica ignorancia que caracteriza el mundo antropológico. Sin entrar en detalles de la historiografía de las antropologías hegemónicas y de la economía política de las visibilidades que defienden (pasadas y presentes), es justo decir que las ‘historias de la antropología’ son a menudo historias de las ‘(tres) grandes tradiciones’, con todas las otras ‘tradiciones’ (usualmente nacionales) en una posición muy secundaria (e.g. Ben-Ari 1999, Cardoso 1999/2000, Kant de Lima 1992, Krotz 1997, Stocking 1982, Uribe 1997). Esto es por lo que “los antropólogos trabajando en el ‘centro’ aprenden rápidamente que ellos pueden ignorar que se ha hecho en los sitios periféricos con un bajo o ningún costo profesional, mientras que cualquier antropólogo periférico que simulan ignorar el ‘centro’ pone en duda su competencia profesional” (Gupta y Ferguson 1997: 27).

En otros términos, esta ‘asimetrica ignorancia’ refiere la ‘mentalidad parroquial metropolitana’ que, como Daniel Mato (2001: 20) anota, afecta particularmente a los intelectuales localizados en los ‘contextos metropolitanos’; donde hay una tendencia ya sea a imaginar que lo que sucede en las metrópolis es representativo de lo que pasa en el resto del mundo (o de lo que tarde o temprano pasará) o, alternativamente, a asumir que sus interpretaciones tienen un valor universal y no son marcadas por los dominios institucionales y sociales desde los cuales emergen y en los cuales son desplegados. Esto es a menudo una geopolítica del conocimiento que reduce los ‘nativos’ (incluso cuando ellos son antropólogos) a servir como fuentes de información, mientras que aquellos antropólogos firmemente empotrados en el establecimiento antropológico son vistos como produciendo teoría o descripciones más válidas sobre sus ‘nativos’. Indicar que los diferentes dominios institucionales y sociales desde los cuales se articulan las disímiles antropologías son relevantes para entender sus especificidades y las relaciones de poder que las estructuran en su conjunto, significa cuestionar las narrativas modernas que imaginan una exterioridad entre el locus de enunciación del sujeto y el conocimiento producido por el mismo. Así, entonces, un encuadre que piense las antropologías en el mundo problematiza la pretensión universalista y sin sujeto del grueso de las antropologías hegemónicas que pretenden borrar...
los locus de enunciació y las ataduras institucionales y sociales desde las cuales son producidas. Examinar las antropologías desde esta geopolítica del conocimiento que historiza y localiza un supuesto conocimiento con pretensiones de universalidad y sin sujeto no es, sin embargo, una apología al relativismo o solipsismo epistémico.\textsuperscript{17}

Es importante no olvidar cuán difícil es modificar la economía discursiva en la cual estos procesos toman lugar. Como Stuart Hall anota, “cambiar los términos de un argumento es excesivamente difícil, ya que las definiciones dominantes de los problemas adquiere, por repetición, y por el peso y la credibilidad de aquellos que los proponen o los suscriben, la garantía del ‘sentido común’” (1982: 81). Un proceso de empoderamiento de las antropologías y antropólogos silenciados y subalternizados requiere ir más allá de la mera confrontación de las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’ y de los términos en los cuales han sido pensadas como ‘antropología’. Este proceso de empoderamiento no se circunscribe un ingenuo llamado por el reconocimiento por parte del establecimiento de las antropologías hegemónicas. Eso sería correr el riesgo de reproducir la dialéctica maestro/esclavo descrita por Fanon ([1952]1967). Esta dialéctica, recordemos, introduce una configuración asimétrica en la cual el término no marcado (amo/blanco) define el marcado (esclavo/negro) a través de la inscripción del deseo de reconocimiento del esclavo por –y de ser como (o en el lugar de)— el amo. Como Mafeje lo plantea para el contexto africano: “[…] la deconstrucción del eurocentrismo no debería ser definida como un rechazo absoluto de la influencia del pensamiento europeo sobre los escolares africanos, sino más bien como el rechazo a la asumida hegemonía intelectual europea” (2001: 14).

El futuro de las antropologías en el mundo implica ir más allá de las restricciones disciplinarias y académicas —al menos como existen hoy en la universidad corporativa. Un empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo debe dirigirse hacia un reconocimiento de las prácticas no disciplinarias y no académicas en el mundo en general —las que se efectúan actualmente o \textit{in potentia}. Primero, en las prácticas de las antropologías en el mundo requieren ser visualizadas desde la no-disciplinariedad. Los encuadres de la no-disciplinariedad constituyen una crítica radical de los cánones de la autoría/autoridad/autorización que reproduce el establecimiento de las antropologías hegemónicas. La no-disciplinariedad sugiere que para entender las prácticas antropológicas en el mundo en general se requiere ir más allá no sólo de las adiciones mecánicas de disciplinas, que es a menudo implicado en el término de ‘inter-disciplinariedad’, sino también más allá del llamado para la fusión de las ‘identidades disciplinarias’ connotadas en el término ‘trans-disciplinariedad’. Al contrario, un horizonte no-disciplinario permite la confrontación de los supuestos epistémicos modernos/coloniales de la disciplinariedad y del conocimiento experto. Opera con el objetivo de descolonizar lo experto. En otras palabras, un horizonte no-disciplinario de las antropologías en el mundo subvierte las políticas de conocimiento existentes y asume seriamente los efectos de verdad encarnados en la pluralidad y locación de los discursos antropológicos. Al hacer esto, incluso términos como ‘antropología’ o ‘antropólogos’ pueden ser radicalmente reconceptualizados o acaso abandonados. El concepto de una era ‘post-antropológica’ propuesto por Mafeje (2001: 66) apunta en esta dirección.

Segundo, en aras de empoderar las antropologías en el mundo es necesario desmantelar las distinciones fundacionales entre ámbitos académico y no académico. En cierto sentido, esta división ha operado como la de estado/sociedad civil analizada por Mit-
chell (1991) y, más recientemente, por Hansen y Stepputat (2001). La división sugiere que existen dos lados —academia y su afuera; con el primero definido por una racionalidad específica y una serie de prácticas afuera de, y diferente de, otros ámbitos de la vida social. En consecuencia, la discusión a menudo se centra en cómo tender un puente o crear conexiones entre la academia y otros ámbitos. Como Mitchell ha planteado, el asunto crucial es comprender que lo que produce y mantiene esta frontera es el mismo mecanismo que permite el desarrollo de ciertas políticas de conocimiento. Para hacer un paralelo con la etnografía del estado, una vez uno toma en cuenta las prácticas cotidianas de re/producción del conocimiento académico, la frontera radical entre académico y otros ámbitos de la vida social se hacen borrosos.

En tanto un proyecto no académico, el empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo debería involucrar una crítica de las condiciones epistemológicas y políticas que constituyen el ámbito académico como si este fuese separado de otras prácticas y relaciones. Al afirmar que las antropologías en el mundo deben ser entendidas como no solamente académicas, queremos subrayar la multiplicidad de locaciones enunciativas —asociadas con nociones como conocimientos situados (Haraway 1988), pensamiento de frontera (Mignolo 2002), o epistemologías basadas-en-lugar (Escobar 2001). El trabajo de Chakrabarty (2000) es particularmente relevante en este asunto. Sus análisis de las relaciones entre ‘pasados subalternos’ e historia como disciplina pueden servir para pensar las más generales relaciones entre conocimiento experto y conocimientos subalternizados. La noción de ‘pasados subalternos’ de Chakrabarty y su propuesta de ‘provincializar a Europa’ empuja los límites de las rejillas de inteligibilidad eurocéntricas al extremo (como su epígrafe de Althusser indica). Otros autores plantean similarmente el asunto de la incommensurabilidad de los conocimientos subalternos y expertos, y la imposibilidad de que el primero sea representado en sus propios términos por el segundo —lo cual fue precisamente el punto del famoso artículo de Spivak “¿Pueden los subalternos hablar?” (véase e.g., Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2000; Coronil 1996; Guha 1983, 1994).

Si seguimos los análisis subalternistas hasta sus lógicas conclusiones, ¿no debería uno admitir que la antropología (o, mejor, las antropologías hegemónicas) han sido parte del la prosa de la contra-insurgencia (siempre reduciendo el insurgente/Otro a el discurso y lógica Occidental)? ¿O ha sido la antropología capaz, ahora y entonces, de mostrar que el insurgente/salvaje puede ser sujeto de su propia narrativa, el protagonista de su propia historia? Desde esta perspectiva de la división académico/no académico, ¿han sido los antropólogos traductores necesarios de los mundos subalternos en términos abstractos de discurso logocéntrico que ellos han inevitablemente hecho más que “reportar sobre el subalterno”, o no ha sido algunas veces también esta traducción capaz de perturbar la auto-confianza de Occidente? Sí, como lo aducimos anteriormente, las antropologías hegemónicas operan en parte como unas tecnologías de domesticación de la alteridad — traduciendo los mundos subalternos en términos eurocéntricos— ¿no han producido ellas también condiciones para que tales alteridades ejerciten una función crítica vis a vis el sistema mismo que las hace visible?

Planteamos estas cuestiones no sólo para problematizar nuestra propia posición, sino también para sugerir direcciones posibles hacia el empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo. Maféje (2001), por ejemplo, ha insinuado un número de movimientos que son útiles para elaborar estos predicamentos, incluyendo los siguientes: un enfoque deconstructi-
vista desde una perspectiva africana; una no-disciplinariedad —una suerte de préstamo libre de cualquier campo sin preocuparse por las reglas disciplinarias, métodos, etc.; un enfoque no-epistemológico, más allá de la adherencia a un general “discurso del método”; una nueva práctica de etnografía como el sujeto de sus propios textos, decodificado por el científico social en su propio contexto, bajo condiciones políticas no alienantes y en una forma que tome los sujetos de conocimiento como productores en su propio derecho; un enfoque “post-antropológico” para la construcción teórica —uno que va más allá de los imperativos objetivantes y clasificantes de la antropología y que podría acarrear el abandono del concepto del cultu a favor de una novedosa concepción de la etnografía. Lo que pude emerger de estas nuevas prácticas son “nuevos estilos de pensamiento y nuevas formas de organización el conocimiento (p. 60), trayendo una era post-antropológica, más allá de lo que podría lograr cualquier proyecto de ‘re-antropologizacion’.

No sobra decir que las soluciones propuestas por Mafje no son una panacea y que están llenas tensiones. Nuestra meta es menos proponerlas como un modelo que mostrar una manera particular de pensar que tiende hacia la pluralización de prácticas. Esto también nos da la oportunidad para recordarnos que la antropología puede en efecto ser la vanguardia del desmantelamiento de la moderna división de la labor intelectual (i.e. de los sistemas de disciplinas como los conocemos), si tal proyecto es considerado seriamente. Esto también resalta la cuestión de lo que (el más allá de) la epistemología acarrea. ¿Es posible ir más allá de la preocupación por evaluar la verdad, o el valor de verdad de un enunciado, representación, etc. (esto es, el proceso de razonar y validez de los enunciados, lo que uno podría llamar la analítica de la verdad del logosentrismo occidental, como opuesto al proyecto foucaultiano de la pregunta por el enunciador de la verdad y la relación entre el enunciador de la verdad y el ejercicio de poder)? ¿En qué formas el “más allá de la epistemología” también implica ir más allá del cognitivismo, positivismo, lógica, metafísica y logosentrismo? ¿Cuál sería el papel de los estilos alternativos de razonamiento y argumentación (e.g. tradiciones retóricas, exégesis, oratoria, etc.), la introducción de ‘epistemologias subalternas’, o la recuperación de tradiciones Occidentales no-dualistas, tales como la fenomenología?

Un horizonte de antropologías en el mundo, en suma, cambia no sólo los contenidos y nociones tomadas por sentados por las antropologías hegemónicas, sino también los términos y las condiciones de las conversaciones e intercambios antropológicos en el mundo en general. El empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo es una intervención hacia hacer posible ‘otras antropologías y antropologías de otra manera’. Esta visualización involucra un nuevo intento por desnaturalizar la doxa y los efectos normalizantes de las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’. Como Kant de Lima indica,

“[…] el control ejercitado sobre la producción intelectual en general y en la antropología en particular como una disciplina académica, científica no es logrado en la academia mediante la censura de contenidos de proposiciones o, al menos, no haciendo sólo esto. Ello involucra la imposición de la forma académica de expresión que en el análisis final orienta y organiza el pensamiento e impone sus límites en la producción intelectual, en el proceso de domesticarlo. Lo que es importante no es si el contenido de una proposición es revolucionario o no, sino si puede o no ser cuidadosamente ajustado en las formas de expresión permitidas por la académica, y si es o no un producto disciplinado y dócil y, en consecuencia, útil para la misma academia.” (1992: 207; énfasis agregado).
Empoderar las antropologías en el mundo entonces constituyen un intento por trasformar las condiciones inequitativas de posibilidad de producción/circulación del pensamiento antropológico en su conjunto. El encuadre de las antropologías en el mundo asume seriamente la idea que las diferencias (culturales, históricas, políticas y epistemológicas) importan, no sólo como una externalidad ligada al denominado objeto de estudio, sino también como constitutiva de cualquier proyecto antropológico. En este sentido, las antropologías en el mundo constituyen, y amplían en términos de sus consecuencias conceptuales y políticas, un potencial radical para una antropología de la antropología. En corto, como proyecto, el encuadre de las antropologías en el mundo no son más, pero tampoco menos, que tomar seriamente el pensamiento antropológico. Entonces, el empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo involucra una pluralización, descentramiento e historización de lo que usualmente aparece como una antropología singular y no problemática. El encuadre de las antropologías en el mundo acarrea una rearticulación del pensamiento antropológico que posibilite asumir con seriedad la constitutiva función del poder y la diferencia en la economía política de las visibilidades. En este sentido, dicho encuadre de las antropologías en el mundo tiende hacia una era post-antropológica, un momento más allá de la dominancia de las ‘antropologías hegemónicas’.

Notas


2. Somos conscientes de una tensión sustancial que estructura el presente texto: aunque se hace un llamado a la descolonización de ciertas modalidades dominantes de antropología en aras de contribuir al empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo, el texto se encuentra escrito en un lenguaje académico anclado en el establecimiento estadounidense. No obstante, escoger este lenguaje académico responde a la decisión de intervenir estrategicamente en/desde las antropologías hegemónicas. Esta intervención no pretende, sin embargo, la búsqueda de un re-conocimiento de las antropologías en el mundo por parte del establecimiento antropológico dominante estadounidense. Tampoco consideramos que la es-
critura de textos en lenguaje canónico de las antropologías hegemónicas sea la única forma de intervenir en las relaciones de poder entre diferentes modalidades y locaciones antropológicas. Antes bien, el propósito del texto es el de plantear la pluralización, decentramiento y descolonización de las prácticas de normativización disciplinaria en uno de sus terrenos y términos privilegiados como una de las tantas estrategias necesarias hacia el empoderamiento de las antropologías en el mundo.

3. Nuestros conceptos de antropologías hegemónicas y subalternizadas hacen eco del trabajo de Gramsci. En contraposición a una lectura no gramsciana que superpone hegemonía con dominación absoluta, nosotros entendemos con Gramsci que hegemonía es una relación historicamente localizable de consentimiento (no de dominio por medio de la fuerza ni de consenso mediante la ideología) que no borra la diferencia sino que la reorganiza en un equilibrio inestable que apela a amplias alianzas a través de un liderazgo político e ideológico que constituye los términos desde los cuales se produce un consentimiento activo o pasivo (una voluntad colectiva).

4. Por intervenciones de/diferenciadoras entendemos aquellas prácticas de obliteración la diversidad y singularidad en aras de establecer una exterioridad desviada y un umbral de lo pensable de la diferencia y mismidad.

5. Es pertinente retomar el planteamiento de Said sobre estas prácticas de autoridad/autorización: “No hay nada de misterioso o natural sobre la autoridad. Ésta es formada, irradiada, diseminada; es instrumental, persuasiva, tiene estatus, establece cánones de gusto y valor; es virtualmente indistinguible de ciertas ideas que ella dignifica como verdad y de tradiciones, percepciones y juicios que forma, transmite, reproduce. Sobre todo, la autoridad puede, y debe, ser analizada” (1979: 19-20).


8. ‘Locus de enunciación’ es un concepto desarrollado por Mignolo como parte de su teorización de las ‘geopolíticas del conocimiento’ (2000). Brevemente, este concepto problematiza el supuesto espacio no marcado y trascendental (la “visión del ojo de dios viendo todo desde un no lugar”, en la maravillosa formulación de Haraway 1988) desde el cual la filosofía Occidental y el conocimiento científico ha sido articulado.


11. Por ejemplo, en el plano de las disímiles antropologías filosóficas basadas en la experiencias de otras culturas, y siguiendo los detalles del argumento de Foucault, ¿la antropología ha entendido las posibles maneras en las cuales otras culturas han elaborado —o escapado totalmente— el problema de los ‘dobles’ del Hombre? ¿Cómo otras culturas enfrentan lo impensado (¿cómo una forma distinta de siempre traerlo al dominio del cogito?)? ¿Están otras culturas interesadas en la necesidad por la búsqueda del origen y la experiencia siempre como un retiro auto-reflexivo? ¿Sienten ellas la necesidad de construir verdades trascendentales que son buenas de una vez y para todo? Si no, ¿la antropología ha representado las prácticas correspondientes como una frontal cualificación de la preocupación occidental? ¿Muchas otras culturas tienen, de alguna forma, el mismo interés con la Muerte, el Deseo y la Ley…? ¿Construyen ellas discur sus sobre ‘la vida, el trabajo y el lenguaje’…? En síntesis, ¿estas culturas erigen al Hombre como Occidente lo ha hecho?

12. Discutimos esta división tripartita en una de nuestras reuniones sobre el encuadre de la modernidad/colonialidad con Walter Mignolo y Nelson Maldonado (Duke University). La división cristalizo en esta discusión alrededor de los conceptos de “localizando el conocimiento” y “descolonizando lo experto” que Maldonado y Mignolo habían estado discutiendo con sus colegas de Duke en la preparación de un evento sobre conocimiento local, particularmente en el contexto del dialogo inter-religioso. Estamos agradecidos con ambos colegas por su compromiso con nuestro proyecto.

13. Existen otras series de pesquisas derivadas del encuadre latino Americano de la modernidad/colonialidad que podrían ser fecundos para la antropología, que esperamos desarrollar en un posterior artículo. Solo para dar una idea, pueden ser consideradas las siguientes cuestiones. Una posible lección que se sigue de la conceptualización de la modernidad/colonialidad es la necesidad de mas narrativas antropológicas explicitas construidas desde diferentes posiciones epistemológicas, desde la diversidad de procesos históricos. Es solo desde esta perspectiva que la antropología pude contribuir a la articulación de macro-narrativas desde la perspectiva crítica de la colonialidad. Esto significa que las ‘antropologías en el mundo’ necesitan situarse ellas mismas en los múltiples (pluritopicos) escenarios posibilitados por el pensamiento de fronteras. ¿Cómo podrían parecer estas narrativas antropológicas “desde el borde epistémico”? ¿Qué prácticas contemporáneas tendrían que cambiar para acomodar tales “antropologías desde el borde”, por así decirlo? Segundo, las Antropologías en el Mundo requiere la reorganización de la antropología como un campo de conocimiento alojado en una singular Modernidad, una apertura para pensar desde el lado oscuro de la modernidad, desde lo “otro antes que la modernidad”, desde la diferencia colonial. Todavía todo —desde las fuerzas históricas hasta las practicas académicas, incluida la dominancia del inglés— parecen históricamente orientadas a hacer tal movimiento imposible. ¿Qué tipos de condiciones —sociales, políticas, académicas/intelectuales, epistemológicas— pueden ser más apropiadas para descongelar el imaginario de las ciencias sociales en nuevos terrenos y practicas donde pueda pensarse en una otra lógica y practica de otras epistemologías? Tercero, como podemos pensar sobre las etnografías de historias locales enacting designios globales, lado a lado con las etnografías de los subalternizados y conocimientos de frontera, así como liberar el potencial valor radical
que ellos pueden tener en términos de moverse más allá de la modernidad (más allá del lugar del salvaje, y hacia “colocar el Hombre en cuestión”)? ¿La investigación etnográfica podría detectar interesantes sitios donde la “doble crítica” (de- y re-construcción de la Modernidad y la crítica cultural interna) tienen lugar, evitando así la persistente dicotomía de “Occidente versus el Resto”? La pregunta es, nuevamente: ¿cómo pueden las antropologías en el mundo efectuar cambios en las prácticas y estrategias contemporáneas para hacer tal proyecto posible?

14. Aunque es importante no olvidar que no existe un consenso absoluto sobre lo que ‘antropología’ significa al interior de la academia anglo-americana, es razonablemente acertado afirmar que existe un paradigma dominante constituido por el modelo parroquial de las ‘cuatro ramas’ y por la reificación de la ‘cultura’ como objeto disciplinario y concepto por excelencia. Este paradigma dominante ha tenido efecto en lo que Hymes denomina ‘antropología departamental’, el cual da cuenta de una “[…] domesticación […] de la antropología como una disciplina académica en este país” ([1969] 1974: 10). Vemos signos de una nueva vuelta de domesticación en muchos países en recientes años, probablemente relacionado con la creciente neo-liberalización de la academia, la incrementada competencia por trabajos, la crisis en el mundo académico de las publicaciones, y por supuesto el más amplio clima política que ha puesto muchos académicos y unidades académicas en su defensa, sino bajo retirada. Vemos claros signos de la creciente influencia de la antropología estadounidense en muchas antropologías en el mundo en, por ejemplo, la ‘gringanización’ de la antropología en múltiples países Latinoamericanos, el constante incremento de la participación extranjera en los congresos de la AAA de los Estados Unidos, y el deseo por publicar en revistas estadounidenses, entre otros. Quisiéramos enfatizar que el análisis de este texto no es una crítica a antropólogos particulares. Muchos de los antropólogos basados en los Estados Unidos son, en nuestra experiencia, intelectuales progresistas. Algunos logran labrar prácticas radicales vis a vis en sus comunidades o con la gente con la cual ellos trabajan en diferentes lugares. Nuestro análisis pretende examinar los defectos, contradicciones y aporías de las prácticas académicas profesionalizadas, como son actualmente definidas, por localizarlas en un contexto más amplio.

15. Sin embargo, existen más de 2.000 antropólogos sólo en Japón y cerca del mismo número en Brasil, que son poco conocidos por los antropólogos en los Estados Unidos, a menudo incluidos los especializados en esas áreas.

16. No sobra decir, que este rasgo caracteriza también a otras disciplinas; la politología latinoamericana de los Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, ha sido notoria en invisibilizar aquellos autores con quienes ellos conversan en Latinoamérica, y en cuyos trabajos a menudo hallan inspiración. De otro lado, ha sido demostrado como Boas tuvo un tratamiento como ‘informantes’, mas que colegas, a aquellas mujeres profesionales étnicamente marcadas como Nora Zeal Hurston y Ella Cara Deloria (véase Behar and Gordon, eds., 1995).


18. Acá, como Gustavo Lins Ribeiro (2001: 176) dice “el prefijo ‘post’ sugiere la posibilidad de dibujar otros mapas cognitivos […]” y, por supuesto, hacer posibles otras condiciones de
intervención.

Referencias citadas


Abstract:

This essay examines the emerging World Anthropologies Network (WAN) as a global, plural, and open-ended project whose objective is to critique and reconsider the hegemonizing tendencies of mainstream Anthropology in a broader theoretical perspective. Specifically, the WAN collective is dedicated towards the inclusion of lesser-known but equally important local anthropological traditions in the anthropological discipline as a whole. It is my intention to look at the main theoretical debates surrounding the constructed dialogues within this network and how these discourses eventually permeate outwards, reaching the sphere of anthropology at large. The politics of anthropology as a whole is of crucial importance in this discussion, for the WAN project seeks to redimension anthropology and anthropological scholarship as a multi-faceted, pluralistic practice open to other non-conventionalized forms of knowledge and knowledge-production. This vision of less exclusivity and greater inclusiveness argues for a self-conscious re-evaluation of anthropology on a global scale, emphasizing the need to reconcile the divergences in power and authority that certain dominant mainstream anthropologies have over more peripheral, marginalized ones.

Introduction

In retrospect, it is fair to say that anthropology has gone through some major transformations in its theoretical orientations and epistemologically-grounded basis. Several paradigm shifts occurred in different periods since its first inception as a discipline committed to the study of mankind. With the benefit of hindsight, it is opportune to make some deliberations concerning the development and establishment of a seemingly coherent, metropolitan discipline of anthropology. It is no strange fact that anthropology is reputed to be essentially a Western-form of practice, based originally on Western ideals of progress, modernity and development that have in turn inscribed a Western cosmology of thought patterns and knowledge-production methods within the discipline. Within the sustained growth of the discipline, Escobar notes that, “anthropology has failed to construct a politics that problematizes this dependence and the relationship between the knowledge that it makes possible and the social positioning from which it operates and which it tends to reinforce” (Escobar, 1992:28).

Nevertheless, the political landscape that shapes and forms a demarcated anthropological field of practice has been a contested area, challenged by certain paradigmatic elements of great relevance. Some of the most influential and deeply resonant shifts that have offset and critiqued anthropology’s systematic dependence on Western forms of knowledge-production are post-modernism, post-colonial and subaltern studies, as well as the call for a ‘native anthropology.’ These historical patterns have, in their own ways, contributed to a re-evaluation of anthropology and anthropology’s Western epistemological
basis. Presently, with the emergence of a heightened globalization rhetoric, a new set of forces have come to the forefront to enable the formation of a unique opportunity structure that allows for the reconsideration of anthropology on a global, non-localized level. It is precisely within this moment in the relations between anthropology and globalization that a reconsideration of the discipline is being made from within by the collective organization known as the World Anthropologies Network (WAN).

In this essay, I wish to situate this emerging collective network in the context of larger developments that have instituted an unequal dynamic between localized forms of anthropological traditions such that a growing disparity between rich and poor has surfaced even within academia. Within this peculiar framework, it will be important to look at the various pronouncements that the WAN collective makes on changing these dynamics with particular attention to the inherent rhetorical strategies present within these conversations.

The World Anthropology Network (WAN) Collective

The WAN collective is an ensemble of intellectuals and non, whose aim is to orchestrate a reconsideration of the normalizing practices and standardizing influences that a dominant hegemonic anthropology enacts on local forms of knowledge production. The collective movement takes its impetus to generate a constructive critique from Appadurai’s observation of a growing disparity between an ‘anthropology of globalization’ and a ‘globalization of anthropology.’ This marked divide is appropriated by WAN to construct a basic framework for their claims towards a rapprochement with the various anthropologies. The network’s vocation is to create a constructive space in which such a disjuncture between globalization and anthropology can be reconsidered, negotiated and actively responded to. This constructive space is bound by a set of prerogatives that combine both theory and practice meaning that, the WAN collective is not merely focused on a theoretical reconsideration of anthropology. Rather, the fundamental theoretical developments that WAN is actively engaged with are also accompanied by a set of proposals aimed at changing the way in which anthropological practices are carried out as well (such as the implications behind ‘doing fieldwork’ and the expansion of the conclave-nature of certain epistemic communities to include non-academics and other cultural informants). Before looking at both the theoretical debates and the proposal to revise these standardized forms of practice, it is important to situate the WAN project in its appropriate context, namely that of a heightened stage of globalization.

The Globalization Rhetoric

The era of globalization is heralded by many as an entirely novel phase in the way social relationships, networks and linkages are established among a variety of actors and agents. Transcending the local, larger forces (those of globalization) are keen on opening up frontiers and borders liberating those whose identities were relegated to local sites of imprisonment. Although it is not the intention here to espouse the multitude of views and opinions regarding globalization and its various discourses, it is enough for purposes of analysis to restate in a generic fashion what has been commonly said about globalization from an an-
thropological perspective. Namely, globalization is described as a process involving new agents of power and a new set of channels that connect distant places and peoples. Taking advantage of the advent of new information technologies, one of the defining characteristics of this age of globalization is the empowerment of local actors and the ability to contest the inherent sovereignty of the state and the institutions working within it. This has given rise to a heretofore-unknown area of development, the transnational arena of collective activism, which brings together participants as diverse as the countries and territories on the world map. This sphere of collective action, mobilizing around a common campaign, is indicative of the grassroots movements and forms of resistance that comprise just one of many agents involved in the interplay of the global arena. Yet, transnational coalitions, social movements and advocacy networks are all emergent properties provided by the favorable conditions of globalization and the skillful appropriation of this emerging political opportunity structure has led to their continued existence and eventual proliferation.

The WAN collective embodies some of the characteristics found in transnational social movements, organizations and advocacy networks. In some ways, it could even be considered as a self-proclaimed transnational movement that is conscious of its own formation processes, as a network that comprises both scholars and academics. An important insight that needs to be made on the formation of WAN is that its emergence is consolidated, if not outright based on the globalization rhetoric prevalent in anthropological discourse. By calling attention to the various ‘anthroscapes’ that travel from one region to another, WAN employs a language of plurality that is much en vogue in current anthropological debates concerning globalization. In order to gain legitimacy as an emerging movement aimed at pluralizing the hegemonic tendencies prevalent in the anthropological theory and practice, the WAN collective will have to pay close attention to avoid becoming a standardized form of knowledge-production inspired by a heightened awareness of globalization. Thus, it remains to be seen whether or not WAN will be able to move beyond anthropologically accepted norms and ultimately create a new discursive space that is sensitive to local, more peripheral anthropologies.

Mainstream Anthropology and its discontents

How do we account for these disparities of power? How is it that a mainstream (American or Western) anthropological tradition holds so much sway over other regional anthropologies? One set of answers to these questions can be found within the WAN collective, which in its very essence is a critique of the unequal power relations that exist between a ‘mainstream anthropology’ and its localized counterparts. Taking inspiration from Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and Foucault’s idea of totalitarian power, proponents of WAN call attention to the disparities in weight, power and status that are attributed to various anthropological traditions. WAN is aptly critical of the favorable position enjoyed by certain anthropological traditions, not because of their uniqueness and novelty in the ideas that they espouse, but because of their ability to marginalize and lessen to a considerable extent the work that is carried out in other traditions. The resulting interplay between these various anthropological traditions can rarely be described as egalitarian, and it undoubtedly pass as naïve to think that such is the product of random, unplanned forms of action. These dominant anthropologies are described with various terminologies, such as hegemonic anthropology, mainstream anthropology and anthropologies of the North versus anthropologies of the South (Krotz, 1997). Such terms are synonymous with one another in the various dualism that they present
and yet, WAN’s critique of these dominant anthropologies unleashes, once again, a persistent language of globalization, a language that is not territory-based and one that resounds with a totalitarian view of ‘Empire.’ Stated differently, proponents of WAN argue that the standardizing influences of a dominant ‘mainstream anthropology’ is not based exclusively on the unequal relations between national anthropological traditions, but rather they assert that this relationship is also inclusive of other, more important global dimensions.

The WAN collective defines hegemonic ‘mainstream anthropology’ as a tradition that leans towards exclusivity, based upon certain centers of power that have maintained a leading role due to a favorable set of historical circumstances. Upon further analysis it can be discerned that the centers of ‘mainstream anthropology’ are not exclusively American, European, or First-World anthropological canons and traditions (WAN Collective, 2001). Rather, these hegemonies take shape in other locales as well, such as in metropolitan centers in the Third-World that are able to appropriate these standardizing influences to suit their own purposes of power and hegemony. Furthermore, it must be noted that the disparity between ‘mainstream’ and ‘out-of-stream’ anthropology is not based on just a singular ‘mainstream anthropology’ versus various local anthropologies. In the language of globalization, this disparity is seen to occur between multiple sites of domination that can be both in the metropolitan West and in regions delineated as peripheral.

The demarcation of dominant anthropologies versus local, marginalized anthropological traditions leave much room for further analysis and debate. First and foremost, the theoretical debates that proponents of WAN bring up in regards to the influential, dominant anthropology are not essentially new in character. Such claims, as proponents of WAN duly note, have been in the making for several decades within the discipline, often disguised under various rubrics such as ‘native anthropology’ and ‘anthropology of the South’ (Krutz, 1997 and Narayan, 1995). While past attempts to criticize dominant forms of anthropological thought and practice have not been so successful -an example being the native anthropological perspective which claims that a native insider is the only one capable of seeing the essence of his/her native culture, falling in the common trap of established dualities between us and them, First-World and Third-World - the current effort made by the WAN project goes beyond such dualities by adopting a larger perspective of pluralism in the form of a plurality or multitude of visions.3

Mainstream hegemonic anthropology are defined as ‘the set of discursive formations and institutional practices associated with the normalization of academic anthropology’ (Escobar and Ribeiro). The history of the formation of worldwide, country-based anthropologies is a problematic issue that is considered by those participating in the WAN project. In the international symposium organized by Gustavo Lins Ribeiro and Arturo Escobar entitled, ‘World Anthropologies: Disciplinary Transformations within Systems of Power,’ the main focus of the conference was to recapitulate the question of what makes certain anthropologies more dominant than others. The symposium brought together anthropologists from various regions and each one was able to contribute his or her own perspective on the development of regional, country-based anthropologies. The historical circumstances of empire building, nation-state formation were both delineated with a development of national anthropological traditions. Many examples were brought forth in the
symposium including examples from China, Japan, Mexico and Peru. In all of these regional developments, the common experience of the formation of national anthropology was based, according to the participants of the symposium, on the discipline’s embeddedness within processes of empire and nation building. What is important to note in this observation is how a mainstream anthropology is conceptually defined. Unlike previous dualities such as the ones found in ‘native anthropology,’ participants of the WAN-sponsored symposium noted how mainstream anthropologies were in the making in regional, somewhat autonomous ventures and developments. In other words, multiple strands of a dominant anthropology were in the making and this was initiated with the advent of regional anthropologies in the past century, particularly after World War II when these regional anthropologies and their formation were embedded within processes of modernity, nation building and colonial projects.

By this token, ‘mainstream anthropology’ finds its basis across multiple locales and consequently, WAN presses for a re-consideration of the relations between these centers of power and the subjugated, marginalized anthropology that lie at the fringes of the discipline. WAN’s critique of a ‘mainstream anthropology’ is two-fold: there is the dynamic opposition of Western hegemonic anthropologies (predominantly U.S. and British anthropology) versus other national anthropologies and secondly, within each national setting, the disparity in power and authority between a centralized mode of anthropological practice versus more subordinated, marginalized schools and traditions. In order to break this multiple divide, proponents of WAN have coalesced on a transnational dimension with each one bringing his or her own region-based perspective to the forefront. The broad concept of a ‘mainstream anthropology’ and the fact that participants of WAN come from various schools of anthropological traditions invites us to make certain considerations. To begin with, it is almost self-evident that the WAN collective is made up of intellectuals that are embedded within a greater scheme of power relations between dominant and subservient anthropologies. The WAN collective brings together academics from the First World (U.S. and Europe) and academics from other regions that do not enjoy the same amount of prominence in the anthropological world-map (such as Brazil, Colombia and Japan).

In response to this, WAN brings to the debate the objection that identities are not singular but formed and constituted by a set of ‘multiplex subjectivities’ (Narayan 1995). This is also the case for anthropologists and anthropologies that are deemed transnational. By asserting that, ‘most anthropologies have always been transnational, even diasporic…and transnationalism has been an important dimension of power in anthropology’ (Escobar and Ribeiro, p. 7), WAN argues that internal as well as external dynamics have developed that contains both repressive and liberating structures. In other words, singular tendencies that give rise to a dominant mainstream anthropology are in opposition to counter-tendencies that have worked to differentiate and pluralize regional anthropologies. This latter set of opposing forces is what WAN calls particular attention to and there is a consensus on the belief that this transnational dimension can work to ensue a greater dynamic between those situated within mainstream anthropology and those that are somewhat in the margins.

WAN’s self-conscious formation as a movement and network that aims to appease the disparity in power and status between anthropologies creates quite a trivial, perplexing situation. This situation can be further elucidated if we consider a set of questions that seem quite relevant. The question that I wish to bring forth is the following: How does the WAN collective situate itself within this anthropological divide, taking into account the fact that
exponents of this project are distinguished professors working within such dominant frameworks of anthropology?

Although not everyone supporting the WAN project works within such a ‘mainstream academia,’ most if not all of the proponents hold important positions in national universities within their own countries of appartenance. This raises another set of problematic issues, which will be elaborated in due course. However for the present, it is important to begin looking at the ways in which WAN is able to engage dynamically with its own subjective constituencies and identity politics. While conducting preliminary research into the WAN project, it was important for me to collect personal views and opinions from the various proponents of this collective organization. Marisol de la Cadena and Eduardo Restrepo were kind enough to provide me with some valuable feedback. Both of them argue that the WAN project should not be considered as a movement that tends to break away from the larger discipline of anthropology. They aptly note that along with their colleagues, WAN-based intellectuals are embedded in their own subjectivities within the so-called ‘mainstream academia.’ Professor Restrepo goes on to state that a significant aspect of the WAN project is to redefine the participants own ‘subjectivities and practices in their concrete contexts, beyond what mainstream anthropology does or says about them.’ In other words, a self-conscious reappraisal with the discipline’s own methods is what WAN tries to embody by its emergence as a collective movement whose force comes from the strands within dominant anthropological circles.

One of the main objectives of the WAN project is to challenge the taken-for-granted, favorable position of dominant anthropology. This is carried out in an indirect fashion by gaining consistency internally within the grounds of its own constituent elements rather than on insisting on providing a set of guidelines for how anthropology ‘ought to be.’ Before WAN is able to establish itself as a self-sufficient, legitimate and sound network that advocates for ‘planetary modes of inquiry,’ a major hurdle within the structure of the network will have to be overcome. This obstacle is encountered as part of a continuous, unresolved theoretical debate regarding the persistent divide between centers and peripheries in the anthropological traditions. This divide is inclusive of three major oppositions and they are based on an overarching, incumbent First-world mainstream anthropology versus ‘out-of-stream’ regional/national anthropologies, a mainstream national anthropology that is present within these regional centers versus marginalized lesser known, more peripheral anthropologies and transittively, the divide between First-world and further peripheralized, local anthropologies. This divide exists between dominant anthropologies and also within regional centers; an example being the dominant position that the AAA (American Anthropological Association) enjoys over other national associations and the innate hierarchies that exist within such national organizations.

In order for WAN to actively engage and possibly change the power relationships inherent in these sets of oppositions, the transnational dimension that WAN advocates must take due notice and be carefully aligned with regional and sub-regional developments. WAN does call for an indirect re-evaluation of these hegemonies by calling for a horizontal, non-hierarchical association between members of the academy and in light of this, it is important to note that subjectivities and their embedded nature within a greater scheme of power relations must be cognizant of their own position in the anthropological world map. For
WAN to gain legitimacy and to pursue the role of being a transnational collective movement, proponents of WAN will have to note that collective action cannot take place by incorporating a transnational dimension to an already present local movement, precisely because hegemony is so diffused and totalitarian. Centers of anthropological traditions are already undermined by a hegemonic dominant anthropology and furthermore, peripheries within these centers of power are involved in a process of discursive argumentation with regional centers as well as with the more dominant mainstream anthropological centers that diffuse their influence from outside national confines. WAN tries to subsume and undermine this problematic division by appealing to a transnational dimension under the rubric of ‘planetary modes of inquiry.’

Planetary Modes of Inquiry

The push for plural ‘planetary modes of inquiry’ is the second, most prominent feature espoused by the WAN collective. This is connected to the re-evaluation of where anthropology stands on a global level in that the WAN project considers local forms of knowledge and knowledge production just as important as those produced at the centers of the discipline. These modes of inquiry are inclusive of a variety of methods and research processes. By introducing the idea of ‘planetary modes of inquiry,’ WAN attempts to introduce a creative aspect that moves beyond the common boundaries of anthropology and anthropological practice. On a theoretical level, WAN is concerned with bridging the existent divide between those that hold pen and pencil and carry out research and those that lend their voices as cultural informants. WAN believes that the relationship fostered between the researcher and the informant is, in and of itself, a specific cultural process, just one of the many available paths leading to the production of knowledge. The lack of attention paid to this detail by a dominant anthropology has, according to WAN, given rise to a ‘sense in which anthropology in the dominant centers is still produced by “us” about “them”—while simultaneously producing a “planetary effect,” that creates an impression of being global (WAN Collective, 2001). The divide between subject-object, transcriber-narrator that constitutes one of the most important frameworks on which anthropology has developed as a discipline is called into question because it not only subordinates the position of those providing testimonies but, more importantly, it shuts away other possible areas and ways to conduct sound, anthropological research. The production of knowledge should not limit itself to conventional means and methods conforming to rigorous academic standards, but it should be more attuned to emerging actors within a transnational space. Such spaces are inclusive but not confined to subaltern sites in which local groups such as NGOs, social movements, epistemic and non-academic communities may participate in the production of cultural knowledge.

‘From a WAN perspective, there are also other aspects to be considered, including the question of non-academic and non-anthropological work on culture. An important feature of the resistance to a normative anthropology is that within the spheres of subaltern anthropologies, academia is often times only one among many sites of knowledge production. Similarly, being an academic is only one among many possible modes of being an intellectual. This feature, which we believe distinguishes dominant and subaltern anthropologies (at all levels) is central to our argument and should constitute a crucial property of the network’ (WAN Collective 2001).
The assertions of this project may seem bold and aspiring towards a utopian vision, however the political dimension that it raises does in fact resonate with past efforts to pluralize anthropology. Such attempts that gained a period of prominence are inclusive of regional developments such as the emergence of South Asian Subaltern Studies, warranted by a rise in the interest in post-colonialism, and the creation of a new narrative genre, *Testimonio*, by non-academic Latin American intellectuals. WAN’s proposed model of incorporating ‘planetary modes of inquiry’ is inclusive of such developments and it attempts to further interweave the connections between such regional claims on a transnational level. Incorporating non-academics within this discursive space is appealing on a theoretical level, and many would welcome such developments as liberating and potentially legitimizing their own work as non-academics. What remains to be seen is how this can be accomplished on a practical, physical level.

The World Anthropologies Network has been established to contest the conventional separation between theory and practice. It aims to accomplish this by going beyond the academia, beyond the limits of what is considered as such by creating an opportunity structure of inclusion rather than exclusion. Based on network theory, the WAN collective sees the possibilities of linking local regions, local actors and local initiatives on a non-hierarchical, horizontal plane of action. Egalitarianism, the possibility for equal opportunities and common aspirations are all part of a vocabulary that WAN is fully resonant with. It is my belief that most of the claims put forth by proponents of WAN are legitimate, well-articulated, and in need of greater consideration by others working in the field. Certainly, a reconsideration of who gets credit for research conducted, especially ethnographic research, in a host setting is always needed. This has been brought up before within the paradigm of a ‘native anthropology’ (Hussein and Helmer, 1980). WAN diverges from a native critique of the foreign ethnographer by its concern with the ascribed worth and value in the multitude of ways of conducting research, whether it is academic or not. However, the network has not provided for practical ways in which to bridge this problematic divide. The theoretical debates that it has set forth and opened are intended to be the basic framework in which this network plans to operate. On a practical level, the road ahead for WAN to implement this proposal is one with many possibilities and opportunities for change. Developments that have taken place until now have yielded a set of concrete (formal and informal) events, and a network has already been established, which is in need of growth and expansion, between academics (academics and non), cultural informants, and other subjectivities from both the centers and peripheries of a mainstream anthropology.

**Concluding Remarks**

The WAN collective, established on the subaltern side of the debate concerning a hegemonic anthropology, risks of becoming engulfed, or as Prof Restrepo put it, ‘cannibalized’ by a dominant anthropological tradition. Taking this into consideration, in order for it to gain a greater sense of authority and legitimacy, it will need to redefine its own position vis-à-vis mainstream anthropology. Globalization and the language it espouses has a certain fashionable appeal, and WAN does benefit considerably by taking use of its empowering and liberating language. The transnational dimension that links the various adherents of WAN provides a certain leverage in promoting a plurality of visions. The multiple lens of a world anthropology are important in bringing about a change in how knowledge (in its wider sense) is produced and reproduced on a global scale.
Questioning the attributed worth of anthropological knowledge in such a global framework is an important aspect of challenging the existing hegemonies in a dominant anthropological tradition. Countering the hegemonic tendencies of mainstream anthropology, it is crucial for members of WAN to consider their own subjectivities within this matrix. Aligning themselves on the subaltern side, their vested authority is still present within their voices and by countering mainstream academia, by moving beyond the prescribed boundaries of the discipline, it will be essential for the WAN collective to situate their own individual identities within the discipline and its persisting traditions.

The call for a reconsideration of world anthropologies in terms of unequal power relations and hegemonic tendencies is most needed in today’s globalized world. Specifically, WAN’s provision for rethinking the politics of anthropology and anthropological practice urges for the establishment of greater affiliations and flows between consolidated and marginalized anthropological schools of thought. To illustrate this, I will cite an example from the South Korean case that affirms the continued existence of a disparity in weight, power and prestige between the various anthropological traditions. Korean anthropology is, on a comparative note, still in its infancy and it is progressively maturing to establish itself as a more renowned anthropological school in East Asia. From my own experiences here, without taking recourse to proper fieldwork notes and observations, it is my impression that the discipline relies heavily on the American anthropological tradition, primarily because it is ascribed with a certain status of novelty, which translates as being on the cutting-edge of research and applied methods. American anthropology has an enormous influence in present day anthropological studies, so that there is a sense, on the conscious level, to follow and keep up with the continuing tradition of American anthropology. To make this point even clearer, I can honestly say that most, if not all classes that teach anthropology or a specific branch of anthropology (anthropology of politics, of religion, post-colonialism), rely solely on American textbooks and articles. There is an underlying implicit belief that the best way to teach anthropology is to adopt and use English-based texts that have been published in recent years. Rarely have I encountered original Korean texts that were not introductory texts to the field of anthropology written by Korean professors or that were translations of foreign, English-texts.

This contextual example illustrates one of the various causes of discontent that WAN emphasizes, namely that there is too much reliance on Western-based texts and authoritarian scholarship. There is no simple solution to the matter, for one cannot merely discredit American or English-based scholarly texts and stop using them. There is a subtler critical dimension that needs to be touched upon, and WAN has laid the first stepping-stone that hopefully will provide impetus for more considerations to be made in this direction.

Notes

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1. The WAN collective is an open-ended organization that adheres to a loosely defined principle of non-exclusivism. The WAN collective consists of Eduardo Archetti (University of Oslo), Eeva Berglund (Goldsmiths’ College), Marisol de la Cadena (UC-Davis), Arturo Escobar (UNC-Chapel Hill), Penelope Harvey (Manchester University), Susana Narotzky (Universitat de Barcelona), Eduardo Restrepo (ICANH-Colombia; UNC-Chapel Hill), Gustavo Lins Ribeiro (Universidad de Brasília), Sandy Toussaint (University of Western Aus-
tralia) and the participants in the WAN Seminars (Fall 2002) at UNC-Chapel Hill and at the University of Brasilia.

2. Taking use of the various terminologies developed by Appadurai, I find this term ‘anthroscapes’ appropriate for several reasons. First, the term finds parallels with what Appadurai envisions as global flows of people, technologies, ideologies and so forth. The flow of world anthropologies that WAN strives to achieve should not be taken on just a physical landscape or dimension. These ‘anthroscapes’ intend to serve a political purpose by traveling across both physical and psychological space. By psychological space, I intend the more intimate space within each and every individual. The flow of a world anthropologies consciousness, beginning in this more intimate sphere, would serve the purpose of raising awareness and sympathy towards the cause that WAN actively supports. As a result of this, the hegemony that runs counter to the claims of the WAN collective would be criticized from within, and eventually spread outwards. Secondly, I find this term ‘anthroscapes’ to be an appropriate example of WAN’s criticism of ‘mainstream’ anthropology’s use and dissemination of fashionable terms and definitions. Thus I intend it to be taken as an ironic twist based on this form of criticism.

3. For a comprehensive analysis of the nativist claims behind a ‘native anthropology,’ see Narayan influential essay, ‘How Native is a ‘Native’ Anthropologist?’ The article by Fahim and Helmer, ‘Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries: A Further Elaboration’ is of particular interest here for it provides a range of discourses that have been going on concerning the unequal divide between anthropologies in Western and non-Western contexts.

4. I have been in correspondence with Professor De la Cadena, Escobar, and Restrepo; and they were kind enough to provide me with some of their own insights on the WAN project. I asked them three questions that seemed relevant and they are stated as follows: Firstly, without denying the novelty and originality behind WAN, I was wondering if you knew of any other such movements that have, either in the past or in recent times, formed outside of main anthropological circles. Secondly, how do you think WAN will be received by ‘mainstream academia,’ and in what way would ‘mainstream anthropology’ react to this type of network? Lastly, in what ways can WAN engage dynamically with ‘mainstream academia’ in such a way that WAN would benefit- without losing its scope of being an alternative, grassroots initiative- in providing flows between less pronounced local anthropologies and anthropologists?

References cited


Dossier: anthropologies of the South
ANTHROPOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH:
THEIR RISE, THEIR SILENCING, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

Esteban Krotz*

Abstract
Traditionally, the southern part of the world has been considered largely as the privileged field for anthropological research carried out from the perspective of the North, where anthropology had its roots as a scientific discipline. There is still little awareness that in the South an increasing number of particular anthropological traditions has emerged and consolidated during the last decades. This article tries to identify the principal reasons for the silencing of these processes and to point out some important elements for the characterization of the new 'anthropologies of the South'. Their study will not only be a contribution to the knowledge of specific traditions of culture contact and anthropological sciences, but also to that of worldwide anthropology of which these specific anthropologies are a part.

The rise of anthropologies in the South

Cultural contacts are as old as cultures themselves and, as far as we know, just as ancient is human reflection on the different aspects of cultural contact and cultural diversity. Thus understood, anthropological sciences constitute only one particular (and quite recent) form of knowledge that developed within a certain civilization and during a specific period: in 19th-century Europe and its western (North America) and eastern (the Tsarist empire) 'annexes', and which was definitely consolidated as such during the last third of last century. 1

The long history of encounters between Europe and its 'others' overseas, which has always been the main source of cultural otherness faced by the then emerging anthropological discipline, has never been a uniform flow of similar situations. The rhythms and the intensity of these contacts varied during different periods. We must remember, too, that only after the early Middle Ages did something like an identifiable European subject as such start being outlined. There were situations that branded this history more than others and many anthropologists agree that one of the most fundamental ones was the arrival of Europeans in America. 2 The well-known debate on the human character of the inhabitants of the New World, which from the start mixes religious with reason-of-the-state motives, the thirst for knowledge with economic interests, and humanism with the obsession for conquest, already involves many elements which became manifest more strongly three centuries later, when anthropology emerged as a science.

The establishment of anthropology as a scientific discipline took place at the crossroads between two previously unseen processes. One was the expansion at a planetary scale of one single civilization, a movement among whose motives we find nationalism and militarism, Christian mission and racism, the capitalist-industrialist search for markets and raw materials and the intellectual eagerness to take an inventory of all the phenomena in the world. The other was the hegemonization of a specific, recently created type of knowledge,
characterized by a certain social organization of those who practice it and by consensus among them about certain procedures for generating and validating propositions about empirical reality and for accepting determinate results of research. Anthropology arose as a particular field within the social sciences, showing variations derived from the somewhat different political and academic traditions of the northern nations who divided up the world among themselves at that time. It began its existence undertaking the task of ordering the huge amount of data on other cultures—overseas, in the interior of Europe, in the past—accumulated for centuries through collections and reports, libraries and museums, which were being enlarged from the 18th century onwards with ever faster-growing amounts of new information.

The comparison of data about different cultures, and the search for an explanation of cultural diversity according to the parameters widely accepted as scientific in those days, gave birth to what we call the first - and up until now only-anthropological ‘paradigm’: 19th-century evolutionism. The admission of the first recognized representatives of the new science to the universities, the places most identified with scientific knowledge which since then has widely come to be considered synonymous with ‘true knowledge’, the beginning of the systematic professional education of the future members of the anthropological community and the publication of the first anthropology textbooks are rightly considered the culmination of the initial phase of the new discipline.

It is ironic that the establishment within the North Atlantic civilization of an ever more prosperous and successful scientific discipline, dedicated particularly to cultural diversity, has come hand in hand with a strong and sustained tendency of the same civilization to annul this diversity: religious mission and modern technique, the nation-state with its schools and administrative devices, the requirements of an ‘efficient’ industrial production, the scorn for anything which from a North-Atlantic-centered conception of progress could (and can) only be considered as inferior and destined to disappear - all this has come together since then to diminish and even erase cultural heterogeneity in favor of an ever growing universal homogeneity.

However, it is obvious that this goal has not been achieved. Moreover, the contradictions inherent in the North Atlantic model of civilization created new heterogeneities in the North, in the South, and at a world level. Today, the most profound of these, which was obscured for decades by the East-West conflict, is reappearing with new faces. It is now even clearer than before that we are not merely facing a passing technological, economic or informational inequality gap, but a much deeper and more encompassing one, and that its analysis must include different spheres such as the political and military, world view and knowledge, language and gender, the patterns of everyday life, feelings and corporeality, identity formation and socialization. In other words, the North-South conflict also means a cultural division of the world's societies. It is the division that was defined during the 18th and 19th centuries by opposing terms such as ‘civilization’ and ‘savagery/barbarism’; later they were substituted by the binomials ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’, ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, ‘domination’ and ‘dependency’, ‘metropolis’ and ‘periphery’, ‘globalism’ and ‘localism’. To a great degree, all these aspects are included in the metaphor of
the opposition North-South. Its geographical appearance must not let us forget that there are ‘Northern’-type zones in many cities in the South, and that most of the countries in the South contain internal differences that are somewhat similar and even parallel to those which exist at a world level. On the other hand, it has been widely documented that typical ‘Southern’ situations of poverty and misery, marginalization and alienation exist - and are recently extending - in countries which belong to the North.

In the second part of our century many original efforts have also been undertaken in the South, particularly in Latin America, to analyze this worldwide difference and its consequences. Undoubtedly, their main achievement was to demonstrate that the situation of the South was not one of ‘delayed development’ in terms of some objective parameter or in comparison to the North’s situation, but that the socio-cultural conditions of the South vastly responded to the transforming pressure exerted by the North upon the South and, by the same token, that the position achieved by the North was to a large degree a result of its merciless and secular exploitation of the South. But since, during the 1960s and 1970s, most social scientists - at least, in almost all parts of the South - considered the socio-economic aspects the crucial ones for explanation and for political action, cultural aspects were usually disregarded in their analyses.

This is why there still is no awareness of many layers of our socio-cultural reality and of many of the cultural changes produced by the development of worldwide and mostly capitalist industrialism. One of the changes resulting from over a century of world domination by the North Atlantic model of civilization, which has hardly been studied, is precisely this article’s subject matter: the fact that anthropology rooted itself and acquired its own life in the South itself, which traditionally had been only the main habitat of the objects of study of anthropological science. Although in some countries there were earlier beginnings, it is particularly during the last three or four decades that in many parts of the South all sorts of academic institutions have been established, as well as periodic congresses and museums, specialist journals and professional associations, long-term publishing projects and research programs. Most recently, a good number of the traditional undergraduate programs have been complemented by masters and doctoral studies courses in anthropology.

All this has made commonplace a previously almost non-existent situation: anthropology practitioners coming from the cultures of the North meet in ‘their’ traditional places of study not only informants, but also native colleagues and students. At the same time, there is in the growing anthropological communities of the South an increasing awareness that certain scientific difficulties which are ignored by the traditional bibliography of their discipline are not passing or marginal, but might have to do with the ‘use’ of anthropology in situations where the socio-cultural phenomena dealt with are not ‘others’ in the same way as they are in the anthropology originated in the North, and where researchers are in another way part of what they study.

**The silencing of the anthropologies of the South**

However, when one examines the discipline’s histories, the most published and translated textbooks and the main journals, the anthropologies generated in the countries of the South, and their institutions and practitioners, hardly exist. This is true for the most widespread anthropology, that is, the one written in English and French, and even more for...
anthropology produced in German-speaking countries and the somewhat peripheral areas of the Scandinavian, Mediterranean and Slavic countries.

When the anthropology of the South becomes present, for example, in the context of international events, a knowledge about it can never be found that is equivalent to that concerning the history and the contemporary debates of the anthropology of the North, that is, the anthropology of the countries where anthropological sciences originated. And if there is a kind of awareness of its existence, is it not true that one can generally perceive a tacit consensus that it must be something as ‘underdeveloped’ as the countries of the Third World, where it is taking place? More benign versions conceive it as a kind of ‘echo’ or diluted version of ‘the’ anthropology, which is and continues to be only the one generated in the countries of the North, the one documented by their journals and books and transmitted in their universities.

But things are even worse. The anthropology of the South hardly ever appears in the South. Academic courses taught at universities on ‘anthropological thought’, as well as the historical segments of courses on special themes, usually present the anthropology generated in the countries of the South almost exclusively as the result of a permanent and worldwide process of diffusion of ideas, methods and debates, which has had and continues to have its only origin in the heart of North Atlantic civilization; whence it seems to arrive in a South which is almost entirely lacking in any proper reflection on cultural contact, cultural otherness and cultural diversity. Even when some universities in the South add a course on ‘Mexican anthropology’ or ‘Latin American anthropological thought’ to the courses on ‘anthropological theory’, the former continue to privilege the images of ‘extension’ or ‘adaptation’ in a way which often makes any proper profile of the anthropologies of the South invisible. We still have to see how the frequent opposition over many years to the anthropology generated in the North as a ‘bourgeois’ and even ‘imperialist’ science contributed to this restricted vision of things in the South, for only in few cases were in-depth criticisms of anthropology produced, and, when they were, they generally did not have the concrete socio-cultural or academic situation of the South as a point of reference, but only certain currents of critical thought generated precisely in the countries of the North where the object of criticism had originated.

Another aspect of this silencing of the anthropology of the South is that the often intrinsically tense relationship between Southern and Northern members of the anthropological community is not dealt with in an explicit manner. By this I do not mean that personal contacts between them are always conflictive. I am not concerned here with possible personal problems, but rather with the contradictions caused by the development of anthropology in a world shaped, until now, by the power of the very same nations that also generated our discipline and which continue to determine almost completely its guidelines or patterns. But tensions are felt daily in many places and, insofar as they are not openly discussed and dealt with, they continue to reinforce this silencing of the anthropologies of the South. Consider, for example, a typical attitude of Northern anthropologists towards their colleagues from the South. How often is it essentially paternalistic? Don’t they invariably – although sometimes more implicitly than explicitly and often in a subjectively well-meaning way– rate them as second class, condemn them to be permanent apprentices of the owners of the ‘true’ anthropology? How often do we find here only a new variation of the well-known international division of labor, where the ‘native anthropologist’ becomes a sort of ‘key infor-
mant’, who loans his or her services in exchange for an occasional co-authorship or invitation to one of the ‘holy’ places of so-called world anthropology? And something similar happens in the South. How often is the colleague from the North less a guest received in friendship than a coveted source of all sorts of resources and a possible means of access to the ‘really significant’ publications and events? How often is he or she treated with a mixture of incoherent mistrust (for his or her possible links with colonial inheritance or actual imperialist strategies) and aprioristic admiration (derived more from his or her physical closeness with the most recent debates in, let’s say California, Paris and Manchester, than with the proven quality of his or her scientific work)?

Another example of this appraisal of the anthropologies of the South on which academics from the North and the South agree in fact, and which equally contributes to hide the existence of an anthropology of the South, is the seldom analyzed attraction which the academic centers of the North have for postgraduate studies and sabbatical stays. Of course, the reasons for that are obvious and this remark does not seek to justify the lamentable provision of libraries, laboratories and electronic devices in most of the universities of the South, let alone certain Southern discourses which defend a lack of scientific rigor and low standards by means of a vague reference to a hypothetical originality, legitimated as such only by the geo-cultural situation of the place where it is produced. But the fact is that for the overwhelming majority of anthropologists from the North (including students), to pass a certain time at a university in the South is seen, in the best of cases, as a sort of fieldwork, while an extraordinary number of anthropologists from the South have only been students or visiting professors in countries of the North and never of the South. This situation may be changing now because of the previously mentioned increase in postgraduate studies in the South in recent years, but in most parts of the South the present leading generation of anthropologists has a better knowledge of the Northern than of Southern anthropological communities, journals, etc., even those of neighboring countries. Apart from everything else, this situation undoubtedly inhibits the awareness of the very existence of an anthropology of the South both among locals and foreigners. And it leads, in the event in case that it is noticed, to a conception of the anthropologies of the South as at best the ‘poor relations’ of ‘the true’ anthropology.

Four ‘critical issues’ for the characterization of the anthropologies of the South

Naturally, having recognized the North Atlantic origin of anthropological science towards the end of the last century, its presence - better, the beginning of its presence - in countries of the South must be seen as the result of a diffusion process. However, in the present situation, the anthropologies of the South can no longer be reduced to mere ‘extensions’ or ‘replicas’ (somewhat imperfect ones) of one original anthropological model. Rather, we find ourselves looking at different forms of producing and using anthropological knowledge which have particular characteristics. Some of them are shared only by the anthropologies of a certain region marked by some common historical situations and developments that differ from those of other regions. For instance, the centuries of similar colonial experience of most Latin American countries, the anticolonial struggle of many African countries during the 1950s and 1960s, and their post-independence problems with establishing nation-state institutions, the involvement of several Asiatic countries in the Vietnam War and the recent fast economic development of others in the same continent, have all marked in different ways the anthropologies created in these regions. But in spite of these diversi-
ties, some common characteristics can be recognized in the whole South. To defend this hypothesis does not mean looking for a uniform distribution of these characteristics. Moreover, only comparative research can produce valid information about the existence of these characteristics and their dimensions and, thus, also, about the depth and the breadth of the differences between the anthropologies of the North and of the South.

The following four ‘critical issues’ for an incipient, tentative and fragmentary characterization of the anthropology of the South are formulated principally, as already indicated, from a Latin American perspective. Regardless of the national and regional peculiarities present throughout the so-called ‘subcontinent’, it seems not too difficult to recognize a certain group of common traits that could be found also in other regions of the South. Therefore they can also be seen as part of a future agenda for anthropological research on anthropological science and, especially, on the anthropology of the South.

With regard to this, it should always be remembered that the production of scientific knowledge is a process of cultural creation similar to other processes of cultural creation. That means that, as in other cases, it cannot be analyzed only as a symbolic system separate from other aspects of a more comprehensive social reality. This would mean reducing anthropology to the results of this production process and restricting its history to the development of ‘anthropological thought’.

An immediate implication of this is that the production of anthropological knowledge must not be studied as a process without a subject. Any analysis of anthropological science must include as something fundamental the study of the characteristics of the scientific communities which generate, use and distribute anthropological knowledge. It is crucial to be aware that the generators of this knowledge (which are always collectives), as well as their organizational and communicational structures and their links with more comprehensive social reality, are not something ‘external’ to anthropological knowledge, but rather, that they are elements that are as intrinsically constitutive of it as, for example, are the argumentative dynamics of the scientific debate.

Those studying and those being studied are citizens of the same country

One of the characteristics which, at first glance, distinguishes ‘classical’ anthropology from the one practiced at the present time in the South is that, in the latter, those studying and those being studied are citizens of the same country. This is obviously not a matter of geography, although often the physical closeness between the places where the empirical information is being collected and the places where these materials are being analyzed, discussed and the results of the research published, is important. It is more fundamentally important that, today, even relatively distant indigenous and peasant communities can have access to the results of anthropological studies generated about them in another part of the country, and that they can establish several types of interaction with the authors of those studies. Of course, this situation is made easier by the existence of official national languages in which the anthropological books and articles are usually written. On the other hand, the fact that those studying and those being studied are affected (although not necessarily in the same way) by the political and economic decisions which come from the public institutions in
 whose configuration and legitimation they both participate, creates a significant link between the professional interests and the social and political interests of anthropologists. Here also are we dealing with a situation that is very different from the relationship that a visiting researcher may establish with a group of persons he or she studies during a certain number of months. Finally, when we assume that the socio-cultural origin (socioeconomic stratum, religion, region, ethnic group, and even gender and age group, etc.) of the authors of anthropological studies influences the study’s point of departure, development and results, this influence will vary when the researchers are part of the same national (socioeconomic, religious, regional imbalance, ethnic, gender and age group, etc.) system as those they study, or when they usually live in individual and socio-cultural conditions totally different from those of the people that they are temporarily observing or even living with.12

Conceputalizations and valuations of science and social science

A crucial aspect which distinguishes most countries of the South from the countries where anthropology once originated is the social appraisal of scientific knowledge in general and of scientific anthropological knowledge in particular. While the economic, political and military dominance of the latter is based more and more on the creation and use of knowledge (and control over it), in the countries of the South most of the scientific and technological knowledge considered useful is imported and, accordingly, very often even the production and diffusion of traditional and locally generated knowledge is blocked. In effect, which civil servant, businessman, politician or even university professor in a country of the South really believes that the universities and research centers of the South will produce important scientific knowledge for the future of the nation or the region? Although this lack of appreciation for the science produced in the countries of the South is seldom expressed explicitly, the social status of scientific researchers and the fact that so few university workers in the South can dedicate themselves full time to academic activities are eloquent enough indicators. Another is the lack of effective diffusion mechanisms for the results of research. Also, observing the classrooms in most of the universities in Latin American countries, where a lot of academic programs in archaeology and linguistics lack laboratories and where postgraduate studies in ethnology continue to be introduced without any thought for the provision of books and journals, grants and organized training in the field, so that students are sometimes limited to learning from the notes they take in class, anyone who has been able to visit universities in Europe and North America may wonder if the word ‘university’ has the same meaning in the North and in the South.13 Thus, the specific academic and intellectual context of academic teachers and researchers –and, of course, of the students - is also rather different from that of their colleagues in the North.

Different alterities

As already noted, anthropological science was not born as an abstract way of thinking about cultural difference and cultural contact in general (and it is important to repeat that it couldn't have been born like that!), but originated as part of the intellectual and social effort of a specific civilization to understand, with the cognitive means available to it at that time, the relationships between different cultures and civilizations in space and time. What we usually call positivism, scientism or empiricism has made an important contribution to the avoidance of questioning the conditions of the possibility of ‘using’ or ‘applying’ anthropology everywhere and always in the same manner, obscuring the possibility of un-
derstanding other types of cultural diversity and intercultural relations and, perhaps, of understanding them from other perspectives. It should be asked to what extent anthropologies in the South are different because of the different quality of the socio-cultural otherness which anthropologists in the countries of the South are facing today (distinct from the period of the dawn of the discipline and distinct from the otherness contemporary North Atlantic civilization is confronted with). Is it possible to consider anthropological science as a ‘neutral’ cognitive instrument, that is, to strip it completely of the conditions that gave rise to it? Like all instruments, does it not retain traces of its source, and like every instrument does it not foreshadow or even shape the reality it works on? If this is so, how must it be transformed in order to be used in different—and new—situations of cultural otherness? How could this transformation be organized? What effects would it have upon the general idea of and practice of scientific knowledge?

Sometimes these questions are answered simply by saying that in the South anthropology has turned, at the end of the extended process of diffusion during the past decades, into a special type of ‘native sociology’. But at least two facts quickly show us how inadequate these types of answers are. The first is the permanence of a more or less clear disciplinary differentiation in most universities and job markets in the South, where anthropology continues to exist as a distinctive academic tradition along with sociology, political science, and others. The second is that the anthropological treatment of socio-cultural alterity is always and necessarily done from the point of view of a certain culture (and each fieldwork experience, the central method of anthropology, reproduces this fact in a condensed and highly reflexive fashion).

Once again we must refer here to worldwide and omnipresent homogenizing forces. Here it is enough to underline the two mentioned in the previous sections. On the one hand, it is a well-known fact that the Latin American nation-states have tried to suppress cultural heterogeneity by many means, from resorting to open genocide and ethnocide to the implementation of diverse educational and social policies. On the other hand, precisely the existence of university-type institutions and practices has been a powerful factor in the creation of a collective consciousness that Latin America (or at least the population that considers itself in some way ‘educated’) is simply and clearly a part of ‘Western civilization’, although an ‘underdeveloped’ part. Either way, there is a reinforcement of the frequently expressed idea that, except for some rather insignificant relics in some distant corners of the countries, there does not exist any real socio-cultural alterity within Latin America. Moreover, as in other parts of the South, these ‘premodern relics’ are usually considered causes of the ‘underdevelopment’ of the indigenous population and of the whole country. This is why it is highly significant that it is precisely some of the so-called ‘survivals’ of several indigenous cultures (for example, in the areas of medicine, agriculture and housing but also in world view and organization of social relations) and the demands by certain American indigenous groups which have lately become more audible that have contributed to the recovery of a perception of the existence of a cultural alterity within all Latin American countries. Obviously this alterity does not restrict itself to the actually living indigenous peoples—its presence can also be observed in wide segments of the ‘mestizo’ population. Therefore it is not surprising that the anthropological study of political processes and social movements, of urban culture and of popular religion, reveals that there are problems when conceptual molds and methodolo-
Anthropological tools inherited from the dominant anthropological traditions are simply and plainly ‘applied’ instead of ‘recreated’. And, of course, it is different to study cultural alterity from a position of neutrality or general respect for indigenous peoples in a faraway country and to be involved by these studies in the claims for rights of human groups of one’s own country, whose legal recognition may affect the anthropologist’s own social, political or even economic interests.

Rediscovering the own antecedents

The three aspects we have already mentioned are intrinsically related to the problem of the local ‘antecedents’ of the present anthropologies of the South. When the biographies of the first persons dedicated since the late 18th century to the study of the cognitive and practical problems of cultural diversity, are narrated, when their works are analyzed and when their efforts to create communication circuits with the other emerging specialists are described, the citizens of the powerful countries of those days and of today are usually considered ‘forerunners’ of the discipline, while those of the countries of the South are no more than simple ‘amateurs’.

Is belonging or not belonging to the societies where anthropology was born as a scientific discipline enough to justify these classifications? Up to a certain degree it is, because anthropology initially developed in North Atlantic civilization and not in the South. The danger lies in the concealment brought about by the unreflexive use of this kind of classification. For in consequence, the very existence of the anthropologies of the South is once again ignored. And as long as the value of their own antecedents is diminished, it is harder for them to recognize themselves as traditions with a proper profile.16 On the other hand, the deep transformation which anthropology has undergone since it started is hidden. Repeating the point very schematically: during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, anthropology only had one center. Any scientific anthropological practice was, above all, albeit to different degrees, an extension and ramification of the impulses generated in the center. But during the second half of this century, many of these transplants have started revealing themselves as roots, as forms of anthropological life which in different ways combine the influences from a long North Atlantic anthropological discussion with their own efforts, made in the past and the present, to understand the cultural diversity within different civilizations and among all of them.17

Conclusion: the need for an anthropology of the anthropologies of the South

It is not difficult to formulate the conclusions from all of this. In the first place it is obvious that every time we speak of ‘the anthropology of the South’, we are talking, in fact, in the plural: the anthropologies of the South are as manifold as the different ‘schools’ or ‘currents’ which are acknowledged within the anthropology of the North, or even more so. However, just like the latter, they share certain characteristics. These are not very clear yet, but naturally they have to do with the situation of having been traditionally the place of the ‘object’ of the original anthropology and with the principal worldwide inter-civilizational conflict that in our day divides the planet into two different and in a certain sense opposing spheres: the North and the South.
The systematic study of the anthropologies of the South has hardly begun. Its best-known incipient expression is an interesting and growing variety of articles and symposia that appear now and again in almost all countries of the South and which aim to establish an ‘assessment of progress’ or ‘state of the art’ account of the discipline, of some subfield or of some specific question, or to trace its development within its own national anthropological community. It seems that this is a task for more specialized anthropologists and for other experts dedicated to the study of science. But it is also important to try to create a more general awareness in the South of the necessity of this work, because every specific anthropological study can contribute in one way or another to the discovery of the profile and the dynamics of the anthropologies of the South and to bringing the perspectives born in the South into international anthropological debate. The results of these efforts will make clearer the characteristics of the anthropologies of the South, their theoretical and methodological potential will be improved, and their findings and propositions better sustained.

This does not mean, necessarily, the construction of an anti-Northern ‘anthropology. On the contrary, these efforts will, finally, contribute to eliminating the still widely accepted unilinear conception of the evolution of worldwide anthropological science, where one type of anthropology - the Northern one - is used to hide the otherness of others - the Southern ones - by measuring the latter in terms of what they lack with respect to the former. Thus, they will lead towards a truly planetary perspective on anthropological sciences. Thus, the anthropological study of the anthropologies of the South may lead to a recognition that the discipline dedicated to the study of diversity in all the ambit of socio-cultural reality is itself also diverse.

Notes


1. A first version of this text was presented at the symposium ‘Anthropology of the South: Problems and Perspectives in the Construction of Anthropological Knowledge’ (13th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Mexico City, August 1993; see Alteridades 3(6), 1993 [published during the second part of 1995], which contains most of the revised versions of the papers of this symposium). I wish to express my gratitude to the Department of Anthropology of the Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana and to Montica Mayer for their support in preparing this English version and to John Gledhill and an anonymous referee of Critique of Anthropology for their comments on a previous draft.

2. So, for example, the Catalan-Mexican anthropologist Angel Palerm (1974: 90) has pointed out that ‘modern anthropology rises from this effort to understand and interpret the New World’, agreeing up to a certain point with Claude Levi-Strauss (1975: 16 ff).

3. By ‘anthropology’ I mean the whole group of subdisciplines formed by ethnology/sociocultural anthropology (including so-called European ethnology), pre-history/archaeology, ethnohistory/anthropological history, bio-anthropology and anthropological linguistics, although the perspective of the first branch will be privileged here.
it must be enriched and/or modified.

5. Again with respect to Latin America, it is interesting to see how important and well-known writings that strongly emphasized the cultural consequences of colonialism - such as those of Franz Fanon - did not find much of an echo in anthropological research. Others, like those which introduced the term ‘culture of poverty’, even became an obstacle to a properly cultural perspective in anthropology.

6. A good indicator of the rapid changes in this sector is given by the comparison between the early 1970s when in Spanish-speaking Latin America there were only two places where it was possible to obtain an MA degree in anthropology (Peru and Mexico), and today, where in Mexico alone there exist more than ten of these programs (see the related sections of the new yearbook *Inventario antropológico* 1, Mexico City, 1995).

7. ‘Native’ means here just citizens of countries of the South; the existence of anthropologists that belong - and recognize themselves as belonging - to indigenous groups of these countries is still a very infrequent and recent development.

8. Of course, some names of famous Southern anthropologists are always known — in the North and/or in the South — but usually only by some colleagues with a specialist interest in a particular country (or with a special relationship to its anthropological community) and only very exceptionally because of his or her contribution to general anthropological debate and theory.

9. It seems important to register that something similar happens not infrequently within the almost always highly centralized countries of the South with respect to the relationships between the members of the anthropological community that live and work in the capital and those of the ‘provinces’ or ‘interior’.

10. One important reason for this is that in the South there exist real ‘transplants’ from the North. Other reasons for the heterogeneity of the anthropologies of the South are: the differing influence of distinct subcenters of Northern anthropology (USA, Europe; several Marxist currents); the varied endurance of these influences; different relationships between Southern anthropological communities and the political structure of their countries (ranging from close cooperation between both to temporary suppression of the former); types and strength of intellectual traditions within a region or country; and last but not least, the relative importance and distribution of an indigenous population, which is also, in most countries of the South, an important focus of anthropological work.

11. This idea resists the well-known opposition between ‘externalist’ and ‘internalist’ approaches (see Krotz, 1987). With respect to this problem see also the considerations of David Scott (1992: 376).

12. Here it may be convenient to remember some of the well-known features of the traditional relationships between Latin American intellectuals and the state that also influence the anthropological communities: the scant importance that governmental officials are accustomed to give to the results of academic research (a fact that is sometimes hidden by their interest in social sciences as a device for elementary data collection, conflict manage-
ment or legitimation of political decisions); the frequent suspicion that social research and training centers are over-politicized; the not infrequent appointments of once independent social scientists to important administrative or political positions; the difficulties of surviving as a critical social scientist in the face of different types of censorship and even personal menace.

13. It may be remarked here that this situation goes hand in hand with the widespread conviction that any kind of ‘education’ is a major means of general progress and individual socio-economic improvement. One consequence of this apparent paradox is the lack of systemic criticism of modern sciences as hegemonic forms of knowledge, another the general idea of universities as institutions for the transmission, but not for the creation, of knowledge.

14. The manifold ‘indigenist politics’ (official acculturation strategies with regard to the indigenous population) in Latin America constitute a very interesting difference in comparison with the history of many African and Asian countries, which must be considered in a general analysis of the anthropologies of ‘the South’.

15. This aspect has been emphasized especially by the Mexican anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil, most of whose work was dedicated to demonstrating the contemporary vitality of models of civilization rooted in the indigenous traditions of Latin America (see Bonfil, 1987, 1993).

16. Here it also would be important to remember the somewhat different distinctions between social research, political essay, philosophy and novel in Europe and in Latin America or the varying relationships between socio-cultural studies and philosophical and religious traditions in East and West.

17. This means that we are not using the term ‘transplant’ here in the sense given to it by Brazilian anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro in his important analysis of worldwide European expansion. Rather, we would have to apply a category similar to that of the ‘new peoples’ which are composed of ‘ethnic entities which are distinct in their constitutive matrices’ (Ribeiro, 1972: 35).

18. There have also been some initial efforts to produce comparative pictures of anthropology in Latin America: see the collective volumes Anthropology in Latin America (Leite, 1990), Balance of the Anthropology in Latin America and the Caribbean (Arizpe and Serrano, 1993) and Styles of Anthropology (Cardoso de Oliveira and Ruben, 1995). For several years, Current Anthropology has also been an importance place to obtain information about the anthropologies of the South.

19. During the Congress mentioned earlier (see note 1), it was decided to launch the bulletin Antropologias del Sur/Anthropologies of the South, although so far it has only been possible to publish two issues.

20. In this sense, these efforts will match two important contemporary currents in Northern anthropology. One is the fast-growing interest in the history of the discipline. The other is
the different attempts made by Northern anthropologists to study their own societies from an anthropological perspective (e.g. ‘anthropology at home’) and to re-establish the connection between the study of European popular culture and folklore with the ‘overseas’ ethnology/anthropology (e.g. ‘European ethnology’).

References cited


El surgimiento de las antropologías del Sur

Los contactos culturales son tan antiguos como las culturas mismas y, hasta donde se tiene conocimiento, igualmente antigua es la reflexión humana sobre los diferentes aspectos del contacto cultural y la diversidad cultural. Vistas así, las ciencias antropológicas constituyen solamente una forma particular (y bastante reciente) de tal reflexión que nace en el seno de una civilización determinada y en una época específica: en la Europa decimonónica y sus “ánexos” occidental (Norteamérica) y oriental (el imperio zarista) y se consolidan definitivamente como tales en el último tercio del siglo pasado.

La larga historia de los encuentros y desencuentros de Europa con los “otros” de ultramar, la principal fuente de la alteridad cultural a la que se enfrentaba la disciplina antropológica naciente, no se dio como flujo uniforme de situaciones semejantes entre sí. Diferentes fueron en distintas épocas los ritmos y la intensidad de estos contactos, para cuya consideración hay que tomar en cuenta que sólo a partir de la temprana Edad Media puede vislumbrarse algo así como un sujeto europeo identificable como tal. Hubo coyunturas que marcaron más que otras esta historia y muchos antropólogos concuerdan en que una de las situaciones estelares fue originada por la llegada de los europeos a América. El conocido debate sobre el carácter humano de los habitantes del Nuevo Mundo, en el cual se mezclan desde sus inicios cosmovisión con razón de Estado, ganas de saber con intereses económicos, humanismos con delirios de dominación, contiene ya muchos elementos que se manifestaron de modo más marcado tres siglos después, cuando la antropología se hizo ciencia.

El establecimiento de la antropología como disciplina científica se produce en el entrecruzamiento de dos procesos nunca antes vistos. Uno es la expansión a escala planetaria de una sola civilización en la que se conjugan nacionalismo y militarismo, misión cristiana y racismo, búsqueda capitalista de mercados y de materias primas y afán de inventariar todos los fenómenos del globo terráqueo. El otro es la hegemonización de un único tipo de conocimiento, caracterizado por una determinada organización social de sus practicantes y por el consenso en el seno de éstos acerca de ciertos procedimientos para generar y validar enunciados sobre la realidad empírica. Con variaciones derivadas de las tradiciones políticas y académicas un tanto diferentes de las naciones que repartieron en aquella época el mundo entre sí, surgió la antropología como un campo de conocimiento propio dentro del conjunto de las ciencias sociales. Éste se dio a la tarea de ordenar la gigantesca cantidad de noticias acerca de otras culturas acumulada desde hacía siglos en colecciones y relatos, bibliotecas y museos, a la que se agregaban desde fines del siglo XVIII caudales crecientes de nuevas in-
formaciones. La comparación de los datos sobre las diferentes culturas y la búsqueda de una explicación de la diversidad cultural acorde con los parámetros aceptados ampliamente como “científicos” en aquel tiempo llevó al nacimiento de lo que podría llamarse el primer –y hasta ahora único– “paradigma” antropológico, el evolucionismo decimonónico. Acertadamente se suele considerar el ingreso de los primeros representantes de la nueva ciencia a los recintos más típicos del conocimiento científico desde entonces hegemónico, las universidades, el inicio de la formación profesional sistemática de los futuros miembros de la comunidad antropológica y la publicación de los primeros compendios de antropología, como la culminación de la fase inicial de la nueva disciplina científica.

No deja de ser curioso que el establecimiento en el seno de la civilización noratlántica de una cada vez más próspera y exitosa disciplina científica dedicada especialmente a la diversidad cultural, ha ido a la par del esfuerzo masivo y sostenido de esta misma civilización por anular tal diversidad. La misión religiosa y la técnica “moderna”, el Estado nacional con sus escuelas y sus aparatos administrativos, la dinámica propia de la producción industrial “eficiente”, el desprecio rotundo por todo lo que, desde una concepción eurocéntrica del progreso, sólo se puede considerar inferior y destinado a desaparecer –todo esto se ha conjugado desde entonces para disminuir e incluso borrar la heterogeneidad cultural a favor de una creciente homogeneidad universal.

Es sabido que ésta no se ha logrado. Es más, las contradicciones propias del modelo civilizatorio noratlántico crearon nuevas heterogeneidades a nivel mundial. Hoy en día, la más honda de éstas, opacada largamente por el conflicto Oeste-Este, vuelve a aparecer con rostros nuevos. Ahora es más visible que antes que no estamos meramente ante una desigualdad pasajera de carácter tecno-económico, sino que se trata de una división mucho más profunda y envolvente cuyo análisis debe incluir las esferas de lo político y lo militar, la cosmovisión y el conocimiento, las pautas de la vida cotidiana, los sentimientos y la corporalidad –en fin, que se trata de una división de carácter también cultural–. Es la división que durante el siglo XIX se nombraba en los términos de la oposición civilización y salvajismo/barbarie; posteriormente fue sustituida por los binomios desarrollo y subdesarrollo, modernidad y tradición, dominación y dependencia, metrópolis y periferia, globalización y localismo. Todos estos aspectos están comprendidos en los términos metafóricos de la oposición Norte-Sur. Su aparición geográfica no debe hacer pasar por alto que hay zonas del tipo del “Norte” en muchas ciudades del Sur y que en la mayor parte de los países del Sur se observan declives internos de alguna manera semejantes y hasta paralelos a los que existen a nivel mundial; por otra parte, es ampliamente documentado que situaciones típicamente “sureñas” de pobreza y miseria, marginación y enajenación existen –y, al parecer, recientemente se extienden– en el seno de los países pertenecientes al Norte.

Durante varios lustros, especialmente en América Latina se desarrollaron muchos esfuerzos originales para analizar esta diferencia de carácter planetario y sus consecuencias. Su principal logro consistió, sin duda alguna, en la demostración de que la situación del Sur no era una de “retraso” en términos de algún parámetro objetivo o con respecto al nivel de la situación del Norte, sino que el carácter sociocultural del Sur respondía en alto grado a la presión transformadora ejercida sobre el Sur por el Norte y que complementariamente, el estado de cosas logrado por el Norte se debía en buena medida a su explotación secular del
Sur. Sin embargo, en estos análisis predominaba el economicismo y los aspectos de tipo cultural no solían ser tomados en cuenta.

Es por esto que muchos planos de la realidad sociocultural y muchos cambios que se produjeron en ella, no se hicieron conscientes. Uno de los cambios resultantes de más de un siglo de dominación mundial del modelo civilizatorio noratlántico, que han sido poco tematizados es precisamente el tema de este ensayo. Consiste en el hecho que en este Sur, tradicionalmente el hábitat principal de los objetos de estudio de la ciencia antropológica, se arraigó la antropología y cobró vida propia. Aunque en algunos países hay antecedentes tempranos, es particularmente en el último cuarto de siglo que en muchas partes del Sur se han establecido instituciones académicas de todo tipo, congresos periódicos y museos, revistas especializadas y asociaciones profesionales, proyectos editoriales y programas de investigación de largo aliento; más recientemente un buen número de los tradicionales programas de licenciatura se ha visto complementado por maestrías y doctorados en antropología. Todo esto ha vuelto casi regular una situación antes inexistente, a saber, que los practicantes de la antropología formados en y provenientes de las culturas del Norte se encuentren en sus lugares de estudio no sólo con informantes, sino con estudiantes y colegas nativos. A su vez, en las crecientes comunidades antropológicas del Sur se extiende la conciencia de que ciertas dificultades no tratadas en la bibliografía tradicional no son pasajeras o marginales, sino que tienen que ver con la “utilización” de la antropología en situaciones donde los fenómenos socioculturales abordados no son de la misma manera “otros” como en la antropología nacida en el Norte y donde las y los investigadoras/es forman ineludiblemente parte de lo que estudian.

El silenciamiento de las antropologías del Sur

Sin embargo, cuando uno revisa las historias más usuales de la disciplina, los libros de texto y las principales revistas antropológicas más difundidas, la antropología generada en los países del Sur, sus instituciones y practicantes casi no existen. Esto vale para la antropología más conocida, es decir, la escrita en los países de habla inglesa, francesa y alemana, pero lo mismo se observa en las áreas un tanto periféricas de los países escandinavos, mediterráneos y balcánicos. Y cuando la antropología del Sur se hace presente, por ejemplo, en el contexto de eventos internacionales, pocas veces se advierten conocimientos de ella comparables con los referentes a los países originarios de la ciencia antropológica. Además, ¿no puede percibirse no pocas veces un consenso tácito de que trata de algo tan dependiente y “subdesarrollado” como los países del Tercer Mundo, en los que se desenvuelve? Versiones más benignas la conciben como una especie de “eco” o versión diluida de la antropología propiamente dicha que es y sigue siendo únicamente la generada en los países originarios de la disciplina, documentada en sus revistas y empresas editoriales, producida y transmitida en sus universidades.

Empero, usualmente tampoco en el Sur suele aparecer la antropología del Sur. Los cursos impartidos en las universidades, tanto los de “pensamiento antropológico” como los segmentos históricos referidos a temáticas especiales, suelen presentar a la antropología de los países del Sur fundamentalmente como resultado de un proceso de difusión permanente a escala mundial, que tuvo y sigue teniendo su origen único en el seno de la civilización noratlántica y que llegó a lugares exentos de reflexión sobre contacto y diversidad cultural. Por más que a veces se agrega un curso de “antropología mexicana” o “pensamiento antro-
pológico latinoamericano” a los cursos de “teoría antropológica”, los primeros no dejan de privilegiar de modo tal la situación de “reflejo”, “extensión” o “adaptación” que se pierde de vista cualquier perfil propio de las antropologías del Sur. Todavía está por verse en qué medida, la durante muchos años frecuente impugnación de la antropología generada en el Norte como ciencia “burguesa” e incluso “imperialista”, contribuyó a esta restringida visión de las cosas, ya que sólo en pocos casos se produjeron críticas detalladas y cuando éstas se intentaban, solían tener como punto de referencia no tanto la situación del Sur, sino determinadas corrientes de pensamiento generadas exactamente en los mismos países del Norte de los cuales provenía el objeto de la crítica.

Otro aspecto de este silenciamiento de la antropología del Sur se encuentra en que usualmente no se problematiza la relación intrínsecamente tensa entre miembros norteamericanos y suramericanos de la comunidad antropológica. Con esto no quiere afirmarse que los contactos personales entre éstos sean de hecho altamente conflictivos. Además no se trata aquí de problemas entre personas concretas, sino se quiere llamar la atención sobre contradicciones provocadas precisamente por el desarrollo de la antropología en un mundo configurado, hasta este momento, por el poder de las mismas naciones que también generaron nuestra disciplina y que siguen determinando casi por completo la pauta de este desarrollo. Estas tensiones se dan a diario en muchas partes y en la medida en que no son tematizadas y resueltas, ellas mismas contribuyen a reforzar este silenciamiento. Por ejemplo, en relación a la actuación de los antropólogos y las antropólogas del Norte. ¿Cuántas veces su actitud típica para con sus colegas del Sur es de carácter esencialmente paternalista, lo que asigna a estos últimos inevitablemente un lugar de segunda, condenados a ser aprendices permanentes de quienes son los dueños de la antropología verdadera? ¿Cuántas veces nos encontramos aquí ante una nueva variante de la conocida división internacional del trabajo, en la cual el “antropólogo nativo”, adquiere el papel de una especie de “informante clave”, que presta sus servicios a cambio de una ocasional coautoría o invitación a uno de los lugares “consagrados” de la antropología mundial? Lo mismo desde el Sur. ¿Cuántas veces el colega norteamericano es menos huésped amistosamente recibido que codiciada fuente de recursos de todo tipo y posible puerta de acceso a publicaciones y eventos de relieve? ¿Cuántas veces es tratado con una mezcla incoherente de sospecha (por sus posibles ligas con intereses imperialistas) y admiración apriorística (que deriva más de su cercanía física con los más recientes debates de California, París y Manchester que con la calidad probada de su trabajo científico)?

Un ejemplo más de esta apreciación de las antropologías del Sur, en la que convergen los académicos del Norte y del Sur y que igualmente contribuye a ocultar la existencia misma de una antropología del Sur es la atracción, pocas veces discutida, que para estudios de posgrado y estancias sabáticas ejercen los centros universitarios del Norte. Con esta observación no se quiere disimular el muchas veces lamentable equipamiento de bibliotecas, hermerotecas, laboratorios y artefactos electrónicos de la mayoría de las universidades del Sur y menos aún ciertos discursos suramericanos que disculpán la falta de rigor científico y nivel académico y la ausencia de criterios de calidad, defendibles mediante la vaga referencia a una supuesta originalidad. Pero el hecho es que para la abrumadora mayoría de las antropólogos y los antropólogos del Norte (incluyendo a sus estudiantes) la estancia en una universidad del Sur es vista, en el mejor de los casos, como una especie de trabajo de campo y que un número extraordinario de antropólogos del Sur han sido estudiantes y profesores visitantes sólo en países del Norte y nunca del Sur; sin duda, esta situación inhibe, aparte de todo lo de-
más, en propios y extraños la conciencia de la mera existencia de una antropología del Sur y conduce, en caso de tomar nota de ella, a concebirla apenas como el “pariente pobre” de la antropología propiamente dicha.

Cuatro puntos “críticos” de las antropologías del Sur

Antes que nada hay que recordar que la producción de conocimientos científicos es un proceso de creación cultural semejante a otros procesos de creación cultural. Al igual que todos los demás, tampoco éste debe ser analizado únicamente como sistema simbólico separado de los demás aspectos de la realidad social más comprehensiva; tal procedimiento significaría reducir a la antropología a los resultados de este proceso de producción e incluso a restringir su historia al desarrollo del “pensamiento antropológico”. Una implicación inmediata de esto es que no debe estudiarse como un proceso sin sujeto: cualquier análisis de la ciencia antropológica tiene que incluir de manera fundamental la atención a las características de las comunidades científicas que generan y difunden los conocimientos antropológicos considerados por ellas mismas y por otros sectores sociales como científicos. Es crucial caer en la cuenta que los generadores (que siempre son colectivos) de tales conocimientos al igual que sus estructuras organizacionales y sus vínculos con la realidad social más comprehensiva no son algo “externo” al conocimiento antropológico, sino que se trata de elementos tan intrínsecamente constitutivos del mismo como, por ejemplo, la dinámica argumentativa del debate científico.

Naturalmente, a partir del reconocimiento del origen noratlántico de la ciencia antropológica hacia fines del siglo pasado, su presencia en los países del Sur puede ser vista como resultado de un proceso de difusión. Sin embargo, en la situación actual, las antropologías del Sur no son reductibles a meras “extensiones” o “réplicas” (acaso imperfectas) de un modelo antropológico original. Más bien, nos encontramos ante formas de generar conocimientos antropológicos que tienen características particulares. Independientemente de las peculiaridades nacionales y regionales presentes a lo largo y lo ancho de América Latina, una breve mirada a la antropología del llamado “subcontinente” puede servir para reconocer algo de la dimensión y la profundidad de esta diferencia.

a) Estudiosos y estudiados como ciudadanos del mismo país

Una de las características que a primera vista distinguen a la antropología “clásica” de la que se practica en el Sur es que en el ámbito de esta última los estudiosos y los estudiados son ciudadanos del mismo país. Esto no es, obviamente, una cuestión de geografía, aunque en muchas ocasiones la cercanía física entre el lugar donde se recoge la información empírica y los lugares donde se analizan estos materiales y se discuten y publican los resultados de la investigación, resulta ser importante. Más trascendental es que hoy en día, incluso desde el seno de comunidades rurales relativamente apartadas, se puede tener acceso a los resultados de los trabajos antropológicos generados sobre ellas y establecer diferentes tipos de interacción con sus autores, situación que es facilitada enormemente por la existencia de un solo idioma nacional oficial. Por otra parte, el hecho de que estudiados y estudiosos son afectados (aunque no necesariamente de la misma manera) por decisiones políticas y económicas emanadas de las instituciones públicas en cuya configuración y legi-
mación ambos toman parte, crea un vínculo entre intereses profesionales e intereses sociales y políticos mucho más diferente que el que puede darse en el caso de un investigador visitante con respecto al grupo social que estudia durante un tiempo. Finalmente puede suponerse que el origen sociocultural (estrato socioeconómico, religión, región, etnia, incluso género, etcétera) de los autores de trabajos antropológicos influye de modo diferente sobre inicio, desarrollo y resultado de una investigación cuando éstos están bajo los efectos del mismo sistema (socioeconómico, religioso, desequilibrio regional, discriminación étnica y de género, etcétera) que quienes estudian, que cuando estos últimos viven en condiciones totalmente distintas que los investigadores venidos de lejos.

b) Conceptualizaciones de ciencia y de ciencia social

Un aspecto crucial que distingue la mayoría de los países del Sur de los países originarios de la antropología es la valoración social del conocimiento científico en general y del conocimiento antropológico en particular. Mientras que la dominancia económica, política y militar de los últimos se basa de modo creciente en la creación de conocimientos (y el control sobre los mismos), en los países del Sur no sólo se importa la mayoría de los conocimientos científicos y tecnológicos considerados útiles, sino que incluso se sustituyen conocimientos localmente generados y se bloquea la producción de éstos. En efecto, ¿cuál funcionario, empresario e incluso profesor universitario de un país del Sur cree realmente que en las universidades y centros de investigación del Sur podrían o deberían generarse conocimientos importantes e incluso decisivos para el futuro de su país? Aunque esta minusvaloración de la ciencia producida en el mismo país se encuentra pocas veces de manera explícita, el estatus social de los investigadores científicos y el que pocos investigadores del Sur pueden vivir de la dedicación de tiempo completo a las labores académicas son indicadores suficientemente elocuentes. Otro es la ausencia de sistemas efectivos de circulación de los resultados de las pesquisas. Además, al ver las aulas de la mayoría de las universidades del interior de los países latinoamericanos, donde se siguen impartiendo carreras de arqueología y lingüística sin laboratorios y donde se siguen abriendo posgrados en etnología para alumnos que a falta de libros, revistas y viáticos se limitan a estudiar los apuntes tomados en clase, quien ha conocido universidades de Estados Unidos y Europa, muchas veces se pregunta si la palabra “universidad” tiene en el Norte y en el Sur realmente el mismo significado.

c) Alteridades diferentes

Como se señaló arriba, la ciencia antropológica no nació como una reflexión abstracta sobre el contacto cultural en general (y es importante repetirlo: no pudo nacer así), sino que se originó como parte de un esfuerzo intelectual y social de una determinada civilización para comprender con los medios cognitivos entonces disponibles una clase particular de relación entre culturas y civilizaciones. Positivismo y neopositivismo, cientísmo y empirismo, han contribuido de manera importante a evitar la pregunta por las condiciones de posibilidad de “usar” o “aplicar” la antropología en otras civilizaciones, para comprender otro tipo de contactos culturales y para comprenderlos desde otra perspectiva. El carácter aplastante del proceso de difusión de la antropología ha hecho lo suyo. Pero ¿en qué medida esta difusión ha provocado diferencias en el seno de la antropología que no provienen de factores como
los mencionados en los dos incisos anteriores sino directamente de la calidad distinta de la alteridad sociocultural a la que se enfrenta la antropología en los países del Sur hoy? ¿Es posible considerar a la ciencia antropológica como un instrumento cognitivo “neutro”, quiere decir, despojable por completo de las condiciones que le dieron origen? ¿No guarda como todo instrumento las huellas de su procedencia y no prefigura como todo instrumento de la realidad que produce?

Algunas veces, se responde a tales preguntas simplemente con que la antropología se ha convertido en el Sur, a lo largo de este proceso de difusión, en una especie de “sociología nativa”. Pero al menos dos hechos revelan rápidamente lo inadecuado de esta clase de respuestas. Uno es la permanencia de una diferenciación disciplinaria en las universidades del Sur, donde la antropología sigue conviviendo con sociología, ciencia política, etcétera. El otro es que necesariamente el tratamiento antropológico de la alteridad sociocultural se realiza a partir y desde una cultura determinada (y cada experiencia de trabajo de campo, el método central de la antropología, reproduce de modo condensado y altamente reflexivo este hecho).

Nuevamente hay que hacer referencia a las fuerzas homogeneizadoras omnipresentes. Es suficiente señalar aquí sólo las dos mencionadas en los dos incisos anteriores. Por una parte, es ampliamente sabido cómo los Estados nacionales latinoamericanos han tratado de suprimir la heterogeneidad cultural mediante muchos medios, desde el genocidio y el etnocidio abierto, hasta la aplicación de las más diversas políticas educativas y sociales. Por otra parte, precisamente la existencia de instituciones y prácticas de tipo universitario ha sido un poderoso factor en la creación de una conciencia colectiva de que el Sur, o, al menos, sus universitarios, son, sin más, parte integrante de la “civilización occidental”. Por ambas vías se refuerza así la idea de que al interior de los mismos países no existe, a no ser en forma de reliquias poco significativas, alteridad sociocultural. También por ello es altamente significativo que precisamente algunas de las llamadas “sobrevivencias” de determinadas culturas indias (por ejemplo, en la medicina y la agricultura, pero también en su cosmovisión y sus relaciones sociales) y los reclamos últimos de ciertos pueblos indígenas americanos, hayan contribuido a hacer recobrar la percepción de la alteridad cultural en el seno de los países latinoamericanos. Obviamente, esta alteridad no se restringe al ámbito de los pueblos indígenas, por lo que no puede extrañar que también en el estudio de procesos políticos y movimientos sociales, de la cultura urbana y de la religión popular se empiezan a reconocer por doquier problemas serios para la simple y llana “aplicación” de moldes conceptuales y herramientas metódicas provenientes de las tradiciones antropológicas corrientes.

d) La búsqueda de los antecedentes propios

Los tres aspectos hasta ahora mencionados se condensan, en cierta medida, en el problema de los “antecedentes” de las antropologías del Sur actuales. Cuando se narran las biografías de las primeras personas dedicadas desde fines del siglo XVIII de manera sistemática a la problemática cognitiva y práctica de la diversidad cultural, cuando se analizan sus obras y se describen sus esfuerzos por crear circuitos de comunicación con los demás especialistas en ciernes, se suele nombrar a los ciudadanos de las potencias de entonces y de hoy “precursores”, mientras que cuando se trata de habitantes de los países del Sur, éstos no pasan de ser simples “aficionados”.

La producción de la antropología en el sur


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Es suficiente la pertenencia o no pertenencia a uno de los pueblos en los que nació la antropología como disciplina científica para justificar tales calificativos? en parte sí, porque la antropología surgió inicialmente en determinada civilización y no en otra. El peligro reside en el ocultamiento provocado por el uso irreflexivo de estos calificativos.

Por una parte, se vuelve a silenciar la existencia misma de las antropologías del Sur. En la medida en que se disminuye el valor de sus antecedentes, para éstas aumenta la dificultad de reconocerse como tradición con perfil propio. Por otra parte, se encubre la transformación profunda ocurrida en la antropología desde su nacimiento. Hablando de manera muy esquemática, durante el siglo XIX y la primera mitad del siglo XX, ésta tenía un sólo centro. Cualquier práctica antropológica científica era, más que nada, aunque en grado variado, extensión y ramificación de impulsos provenientes de este centro. Pero en la segunda mitad del siglo que está por terminar, muchos de estos transplantes han empezado a revelarse como raíces, como formas de vida antropológica en la que se combinan de modo diverso, influencias provenientes de la larga discusión antropológica noratlántica con esfuerzos de comprensión de la diversidad cultural generados en el seno de culturas diferentes.

**Conclusión:**

*necesidad de una antropología de las antropologías del Sur*

Las conclusiones de todo lo dicho no son difíciles de formular. En primer lugar, resulta obvio que cada vez que se habla de “la antropología del Sur”, se habla, de hecho, en plural: las antropologías del Sur son tanto o más polifacéticas como las diferentes “escuelas” o “corrientes” que se conocen de la antropología del Norte. Empero, al igual que esta última, comparten determinadas características. Éstas distan de ser claras aun, pero naturalmente tienen que ver con la calidad de haber sido el “objeto” tradicional de la antropología original y con la división más profunda del mundo actual en dos esferas actualmente contrapuestas, el Norte y el Sur.

El estudio de las antropologías del Sur apenas ha sido iniciado. Este necesitará de especialistas (tanto antropólogos como expertos en otros campos relevantes para el tema) dedicados de modo específico a ello. Pero de modo igual necesita que se extienda la conciencia de la necesidad y urgencia de esta tarea, porque en muchos estudios antropológicos puede contribuirse con un grano de arena al descubrimiento de antecedentes propios, al desentrañamiento del perfil propio.

Los resultados de estos esfuerzos contribuirán, obviamente, a hacer más claras las características propias de las antropologías del Sur; por tanto, éstas pueden aprovecharse mejor o, en su caso, superarse. Pero también contribuirán a no seguir concibiendo a la antropología con una perspectiva desarrollista o, mejor dicho, evolucionista unilineal y centrada exclusivamente en la civilización noratlántica. Esto abriría el camino hacia una perspectiva —y un proyecto— verdaderamente planetario de la antropología. Así, el estudio de las antropologías del Sur será, por decirlo de otro modo, el reconocimiento de la diversidad en el seno mismo de la disciplina dedicada a estudiarla en todos los ámbitos de la realidad sociocultural.
La antropología moderna surge de este esfuerzo de comprensión y de interpretación del Nuevo Mundo ha señalado, por ejemplo, A. Palerm (1974: 90), concordando en cierta manera con C. Lévi-Strauss (1975: 16 y ss.).

2. Se entiende aquí por “antropología” el conjunto de sub-disciplinas formadas por la antropología social/etnología, la prehistoria/arqueología, la etnohistoria/historia antropológica, la bioantropología y la lingüística.


4. No se puede tratar aquí el hecho a menudo oscurecido en la conciencia de la misma antropología europea de que en los orígenes de ésta los pueblos “otros” de ultramar eran la fuente más importante, pero no la única de la experiencia de alteridad sociocultural.

5. No está por demás recordar aquí las a veces extrañas combinaciones de diferentes tipos de relación entre las colectividades antropológicas y las administraciones estatales en Latinoamérica: el frecuente uso de las primeras por parte de las últimas, la reducida importancia que suelen tener los resultados de la investigación antropológica para quienes toman las decisiones (incluso sobre aquellas poblaciones y con respecto a aquellos problemas acerca de los cuales existen informaciones y consideraciones antropológicas bien fundamentadas), la permanente atracción de posiciones de “influencia” sobre quienes ejercen el poder político para no pocos antropólogos.

6. Esta situación constituye una interesante diferencia con respecto a la situación de muchos países africanos y asiáticos, que debe ser considerada en la comparación de la antropología latinoamericana con las de África negra y ciertas partes de Asia.

7. Este aspecto ha sido enfatizado por uno de los antropólogos más dedicados a contrastar la presencia de modelos civilizatorios diferentes en el seno de las sociedades latinoamericanas (Bonfil, 1987).

8. Material para una primera aproximación a la polifacética situación de las antropologías latinoamericanas proporciona el volumen colectivo Balance de la antropología en América Latina y el Caribe (Arizpe y Serrano, 1993). Durante el pasado XIII Congreso Internacional de Ciencias Antropológicas y Etnológicas (México, 1993) se constituyó una red de antropólogos y antropólogos interesadas/os en las características de las antropologías del Sur; un primer esfuerzo de este naciente grupo de trabajo lo constituye el primer número del boletín Antropologías del Sur.
Referencias citadas


A CERTAIN FEELING OF HOMELESSNESS
REMARKS ON ESTEBAN KROTZ’S ‘ANTHROPOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH’

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I am caught within a circle from which there is no escape: the less human societies were able to communicate with each other and therefore to corrupt each other through contact, the less their respective emissaries were able to perceive the wealth and significance of their diversity. In short, I have only two possibilities: either I can be like some traveller of the olden days, who was faced with a stupendous spectacle, all, or almost all, of which eluded him, or worse still, filled him with scorn and disgust; or I can be a modern traveller, chasing the vestiges of a vanished reality. I lose on both counts … for, while I complain of being able to glimpse no more than the shadow of the past, I may be insensitive to reality as it is taking shape at this very moment… (Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, 1977: 33-4).

I shall commence my commentary on Krotz’s ‘Anthropologies of the South’ by recalling a personal anecdote. At the time, I was just beginning to write my doctoral dissertation to be submitted to a north-eastern university in the United States. I decided to entitle its first chapter ‘Encounters’, and proceeded to write a very personal and, I thought, literary account of fieldwork conditions and research problems. After one of my advisers read the piece, he fired back a two-page, single-spaced, typed reply. That was nearly ten years ago, but I still keep it - and I want to quote him now: What I don’t like is the tone of your writing, and your insistence on being literary, on flights of imagination, on misplaced metaphors, and on implicit ideological considerations… Your job is to describe clearly, concisely, to the point, and with the greatest depth that your data permit. Your job is to produce a good description and analysis of a concrete ethnographic and historical situation. Your job is to present the facts as unbiasedly as possible, leaving to others to elucidate what a novelist’s perspective can contribute to anthropological understanding. Forget about being fancy, just be a good ethnographer. This is not the place to be a philosopher, to express your ideological proclivities, and to obfuscate what good anthropology is… Please take my remarks as nothing more than my best effort … to make things as easy as possible for you and to help you to produce a good piece of research.

Often times in the past I have thought of what my professor wrote me then. He not only was a teacher I respected but we had become good friends. Thus, I did not resent his comments at all. To the contrary - for perhaps he was the one who in the end set me on the right track. Now, upon reading Krotz’s article, I began wondering yet again about what it was exactly that elicited my adviser’s worry; what was so wrong with my literary fancies and metaphors; why were my ideological considerations so utterly misplaced; what sort of collision was growing between my teacher and myself? In short, I mused, what was it that he meant precisely by his words, for I sensed there was an implicit text that his words did not quite adumbrate, something deeper than his obvious positivistic outlook on anthropology. Paraphrasing Krotz, I asked, was my case an instance of those ‘Southern discourses which defend a lack of scientific rigor and low standards by means of a vague reference to a hypo-
theoretical originality legitimated as such only by the geo-cultural situation of the place where it is produced’. And I hasten to add that I was writing ‘there’, in the United States, and not ‘here’, in Colombia - a land whose international ill-repute surely has something to do with a very mischievous and perverse brand of so-called ‘magical realism’ among its novelists.

The deliverance from my old quandary may lie, at least in part, in Krotz’s essay on the anthropologies of the South. For it appears to me that Krotz is generally right in his outline of the rise of a global anthropological community during the present century, a community in which the anthropology and anthropologists coming from the North hold the cards, as it were. Indeed, my tutor was not only my tutor. He was also the guardian of academic excellence, of scientific rigour. He was the holder of the keys to access that holiest of modern-age tabernacles, Science itself. And if I wanted to become one of the worshippers, perhaps even a minor priest, I had to render myself with submissiveness and fervour to the ordeals dispensed to those who dare to call at its gates, in the gruesome rite of passage that thesis-writing entails. (You realize, I still keep being metaphorical.)

To put the argument in a slightly different manner, if I wanted to graduate, I had to learn to mimic appropriately the ways of a scientist, his (her) culture, his idioms, even his demeanour. In a sense, I had to become him, I had to be ‘him’. After all, he was making things as easy as possible for me, a Latino who did not quite know all the rules of the game. And we may recall, with Krotz, that this game, this performance, science, was not born nor did it grow to become what it is in my land, in the South. Therefore, it was no surprise that I was supposed to be ‘modern’ before I could even start dreaming of becoming ‘postmodern’, with all those latently deceiving pursuits such as writing experimental ethnographies of the sort which were making such a razzle-dazzle in those days. But, one may ask in fairness, was my adviser being so different than all we teachers, in this power game which is an intrinsic part of academia. The answer is no, of course, for in the educational system, in all educational systems, there are ‘paternal figures’, teachers, masters and models, who are to be imitated and identified with, and in due course, hopefully rejected by students, disciples and followers.

At this point, I may start examining the persuasiveness of Krotz’s assessment of what he calls the anthropologies of the South vis-a-vis the anthropologies of the North. In order to accomplish that, I first want to recapitulate briefly what he writes. For him, anthropology, as we understand it nowadays, was one of the consequences of the global expansion of the ‘North Atlantic civilization’, and further, of the consolidation (he writes ‘hegemonization’) of a type of knowledge we have all come to term ‘scientific’ (notwithstanding the fact that his word, ‘scientific’, may not have altogether commensurable meanings depending upon philosophical paradigms). Moreover, the decline of the East-West conflict has had a most important effect in this regard: to highlight in stark characters the old divide between the capitalist, ‘modern’, ‘developed’ North, and the ‘underdeveloped’, ‘traditional’, ‘local’ and the like, South. What separates South from North, he argues, is not only a ‘passing technological, economical or informational inequality gap’ but likewise a cultural division. The latter proposition is a fundamental one in his analysis. For, he contends, if the rise and construction of anthropological discourse is related, in ways he chooses not to delve into, to its cultural context, we certainly cannot accept that the anthropology which is produced in the South be judged, as it now is, according to some rule of thumb or parameter.
which is only relevant to assess the anthropology which is created in the North Atlantic civilization. Therefore, in anthropological matters, Krotz seems to imply, we still have to be relativistic. Or else, we stumble into the pitfalls of considering ‘Other’ anthropologies ‘underdeveloped’, a ‘kind of echo or diluted version[s]\ ‘extensions’ or ‘replicas’, albeit imperfect ones, of the original North Atlantic anthropological model. Furthermore, these other anthropologies have histories in their own right, and it is not fair to consider these histories appendices to the proper history of anthropology, again, the history of anthropology as it is pursued in the North.

Thus, what we are confronted with in this article is an echo of a different sort. Indeed, what Krotz is trying to do is to bring to the fore of the history of anthropology some of the debates that the pot-pourri known as postmodernism has established in contemporary social thinking. In particular, it seems to me that he is concerned with postmodernism’s critique of the notion of a universal, unilinear conception of history, whose centre of gravity always has to do with what comes into existence in the advanced capitalist countries of the West, whereas what happens in the rest of the world is somehow peripheral, marginal, subsidiary (not to say irrelevant). For Krotz appears to be in favour of a notion of history fully aware of cultural determinations, a history capable of taking issue with diverse and multiple cultural logics, with a plurality of human experience. In short, our author would like to support any appraisal of the rise and coming to fruition of anthropological discourse which meets the challenge to relate and articulate micro-processes, regional and local, within larger academic and intellectual traditions - even including the grand anthropological tradition which originated, as he puts it, in 19th-century Europe and its western (North America) and eastern annexes. Therefore Krotz would like to give a louder and more far-reaching voice to the South in anthropological matters. For he does not want to be silent or a late-arriving guest in the global forum of anthropology.

This is doubtless a very commendable intention. It has my wholehearted applause too. However, I am also quite puzzled by Krotz’s choice of categories. For this opposition between the North and the South seems to me to be an already outdated, Manichean dichotomy, a very crude sort of alterity, for grasping the richness in nuances that his declared subject-matter entails - namely, that those lands of the world outside the areas where the North Atlantic civilization thrived allowed anthropology to become what it has, but now they are more than the habitat of the objects of study of anthropological science. Why, one is led to query, did our author not frame his analysis, say, in terms of a world-system or a global approach? Thus he might be in a better position to ascertain the relationships between the central, semi-peripheral and peripheral areas of the world in which anthropological knowledge and discourse are forged, in this ever increasingly interconnected and intercommunicated planet of the Internet age. Furthermore, he might assess in a more sophisticated way how anthropological information flows, and, what is perhaps even more important, evaluate better the relationships which are established in each case between different academic communities at the international and regional and local levels. What he calls the North, in effect, is far from being a homogeneous, solid entity without fissures, at least as far as the concept relates to anthropology. The anthropology which comes from, say, France, has its own peculiar flavours and accents, as compared with the anthropology which comes, say, from the United States in any given point in time. True, concrete scholastic communities rooted in the countries of our example, and made out of actual people, women and men who participate in different institutional arrangements or,
academic settings, may communicate dialogue with or contradict each other in books, journals, meetings, academic exchanges and so on - that is, their relationships may range from being very intense to being practically null, or what amounts to the same, may be of intense admiration or of intense repulsion. But these issues always have to be documented and elicited ethnographically, and not only theoretically - for surely, an ethnographic undertaking on the actual practice of anthropology is desperately needed before we go on assuming that ‘this’ North does exist, just as much as we need to do ethnographies of the relationships which are established between these ‘central’ places of anthropological pursuits and their semi-peripheries and peripheries. Incidentally, it is worth mentioning here that Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the helmsmen of world-system theory, was not only influenced by the work of the French historian Fernand Braudel. He was also anticipated by the work of a pleiad of Latin American dependency theorists which had a great impact upon social thought and politics in this part of the world during the 1960s. The latter, in turn, were working following an older tradition inaugurated earlier in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).

By the same token, and despite Krotz’s repeated efforts to talk of the South in the plural, underscoring its diversity, his simplified picture does not quite match reality either. As a Colombian anthropologist I can attest to this fact. For certain communities of Mexican anthropologists tend to think of themselves and behave as though theirs was already another metropolitan anthropology. Their proper audience, as it were, is not some less sophisticated anthropological community, for instance that of Colombia, but instead the leading communities of international scholars who are advancing the frontiers of anthropological knowledge. Nevertheless, it is also true that there is a very large, active and mature community of anthropologists in Mexico, full of interesting possibilities, relevant results of enquiry, and a very significant number of publications. For Mexico, along with Spain, are the leading countries in terms of publishing anthropological, and anthropologically related materials in the Spanish language, both materials written originally in Spanish, and translations into Spanish mainly, but not exclusively, from English and French. Furthermore, here in Colombia, and in the past, we have acknowledged the leadership of Mexican anthropology within Latin America. Mexico is one of those countries where our students go to pursue graduate work in anthropology. Oftentimes, we have invited Mexican anthropologists to deliver the central lectures in our meetings — an opportunity some of them have taken advantage of to tutor us in the latest developments, as for instance one congress some ten years ago when they lectured us on Marxism in anthropology (!).

Another very strong anthropological community in the region is that of Brazil. Lately, some Colombian anthropologists have turned their attention to the original and relevant work their Brazilian colleagues are propounding. This is particularly true with regards to Amazonian studies, an obvious area of encounter inasmuch as both countries share profound interests and conflicts within the Amazon Basin. However, this is not the sole topic of exchange and communication between both anthropological communities. For Brazilian anthropologists also address other, non-traditional issues, such as Carnival and various rituals in urban settings, the ‘hybridization’ of cultures in the cities as a consequence of change and so-called modernization, and Afro-American studies, and the results of their work are met with approval and enthusiasm by Colombian anthropologists.
Therefore, it is my contention that Krotz’s assertion that ‘in most parts of the South the present leading generation of anthropologists have a better knowledge of the Northern than of the Southern anthropological communities, journals, etc., even of those of their neighboring countries’ is slowly but surely becoming obsolete. There is nowadays much more of a flux of ideas and people between the anthropological communities of the Latin American region, and this claim also includes the Peruvian, Ecuadorian, Argentine and Chilean anthropologies - to name other countries where anthropology seems to be making headway in this part of the world, as far as the ongoing process of creating and consolidating regional and local anthropological communities is concerned. Nevertheless, I must acknowledge that at least we in Colombia know much less of what is happening in anthropology, say, in Africa, New Guinea and Australia, although I am not sure whether Krotz would consider Australian anthropology within the ‘Southern’ group.

However, what I do not really approve of in Krotz’s article is the tone of his writing, to use my adviser’s formula above. It seems to me that he falls all too easily into a certain vein of complacent dejection. This is quite apparent in his rendering of the ‘silencing’ of the anthropologies of the South, and in his singling out of the four critical issues for the characterization of these anthropologies. Far from being a hindrance, as Krotz would lead us to believe, the fact that in the ‘South’ ‘those studying and those being studied are citizens of the same country’ may turn out to be an important asset for the future advancement of these anthropologies. To put matters straightforwardly, in countries such as Colombia we anthropologists do not have ‘to go to the field’, we are in the field. Thus, the forests, the mountains, the roads, the streets of my city, even my own university office, are parts of the field, and if I so desire, I may be doing field-work all the time, as I please. This, it seems to me, opens up a wide range of possible avenues to pursue our intellectual and anthropological interests, only, of course, if we confront the challenge and dare to be original and innovative. Moreover, a few Indian young persons from the group I do research on are now my anthropology students. They are no longer my ‘informants’, for they read what I write about them, they contradict me, they teach me and their fellow non-Indian classmates about their people, and in return we help them to understand our national state, and the country’s conflicts, if that is possible at all. Our classroom, therefore, has become an exciting ethnographic setting very apt to carry on this ‘long conversation’ that anthropology is all about. What else could I have expected? And I am not, of course, the only, nor the most important, example I could offer as far as this potentially fruitful interaction goes. To give but one other, the very influential book written more than 30 years ago by Gerardo and Alicia Reichel-Dolmatoff, The People of Aritama: The Cultural Personality of a Colombian Mestizo Village (1961), has become in the past few years a sort of a charter for the people the authors conceptualized as mestizo to reclaim and strive for their right to be considered an Indian group once again. Surely, the aritameños are skilfully combining anthropology with ethnic politics to take advantage of the opportunities the new 1991 National Constitution has to offer to ethnic minorities. And that, again, is welcome, for it shapes enthralling roads for research and action.

Lest I may be judged as a naive optimist, Krotz is on safer ground when he declares that in Latin America the traditional relationships between intellectuals, the state and society are often intricate; and, furthermore, that in some countries of the region - e.g. in Colombia - sometimes it may be difficult to survive as a critical social scientist in the face of censorship, political persecution and even personal menace. Likewise, Krotz is closer to the truth when he affirms that our universities are far from being optimal in terms of laboratories, libraries, computers and the like (although the Internet era creates immense
possibilities for us, as yet only beginning to be explored); that there is not much research funding available, and that there is a general lack of appreciation for locally produced knowledge, for we tend to rely more upon foreign expertise, scientific and technological. In matters anthropological, the latter difficulty is further compounded, as Krotz has correctly asserted, by a plain and simple ‘application’, instead of a ‘recreation’, of the ‘conceptual molds and methodological tools inherited from the dominant anthropological traditions’.

But the issues involved in this respect are much more complicated, if one really intends to appreciate in full the dilemmas that social science confronts in a country such as Colombia. When our author points out that in Latin America there is a combination of a sort of suspicion or even outright rejection of the social science produced in these countries by local intellectuals with a penchant for imitating dominant anthropological traditions, he is setting his sights on something which deserves to be further developed. For a dominant position always calls forth a subordinate position, and conversely, to be subordinate implies in a sense to accept that there is someone who is ‘higher-up’ in the hierarchy, with enough power to make one comply, desire and do as he or she pleases or deems appropriate, even if that means to doubt or reject one’s own attainments or possibilities. This is the inveterate condition of the master (teacher) and the disciple, the most important source of the typical phenomenon of copying or imitating, a mimetic condition we have been so far unable to supersede in the construction of our anthropological discourse - or, for that matter, in other realms of our cultural lives in this global world of fashions, advertising, likeness in style, and interconnectedness that we presently live in. For imitative desire is always the desire to be another, to use here a formula coined by René Girard. Thus, it is not so much that some ‘Northern’ anthropology silences our ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘diluted replicas’ of anthropology, in a conspiratorial scenario, but rather that we are quite contented with attempting to become Other, to be like ‘them’, representatives of this metropolitan anthropology we are so intent on trying to duplicate, for it is our model and our rival. And the toll is heavy, for in the process we sacrifice whatever potential we have, and shall endlessly be torn between two opposite feelings towards our models - towards those we have chosen as models - namely, the most submissive reverence and the most intense malice (to use Girard’s words again). Here, I submit, may lie the basis of an alternate account of what Krotz refers to in his essay as the ‘paternalism’ that envelops all interaction between ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ anthropologists. (In passing, this was precisely the predicament I was in with my thesis adviser.)

I have thus come to the point of concluding this appraisal of Esteban Krotz’s article on the anthropologies of the South. For if we anthropologists who belong to the semi-periphery and periphery of the anthropological circuits of information want to evince the ‘proper profile’ of our anthropological traditions, we had better take seriously the demand of being ourselves, or being our own models. That involves both to be as fully conversant as possible with anthropological discourse as it is produced elsewhere, and to be true to our own ideas and other modes of representing the human condition. We have to be us, and that implies setting aside, or at least holding back, our intense proclivity to mimesis and imitation, just as much as we must steer clear of those easy nationalistic discourses which often lead only to xenophobia and parochialism. In short, we have to remain firmly attuned to our cultural and social condition, always in search of more persuasive forms of interpreting and representing it, without becoming too entangled with our political and cultural establishments. For in intellectual matters, as Susan Sontag reminds us in her essay ‘The
melessness’. Perhaps a new form of ‘heroism’ is therefore called forth for these other anthropologies which rebel at their subordinate position - not the heroism of those travellers of olden and modern times whose records so annoyed Lévi-Strauss in his wanderings across those *tristes tropiques*, but the heroism of being sensitive to reality as it is taking shape at this very moment in these other lands, our lands. Then our voices shall be heard in the global anthropological forum without having to indulge in our consuetudinary jeremiads. Or else, as in *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, we might not have a second chance.

Notes

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